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ABSTRACT 
Background: The World Health Assembly Resolution in 2005 urges Member States to 
introduce and/or strengthen universal coverage policy in order to offer financial risk 
protection (FRP) to households in order to avoid catastrophic health expenditures and 
impoverishment from seeking care. The other goal of universal coverage is to ensure 
equitable access to healthcare based on relative need, irrespective of ability to make health 
care payments, social status or geographical location. The two prepaid financing mechanisms 
that guarantee universal coverage are social health insurance and general tax revenue. 
 
Aim: To undertake a comparative analysis of selected OECD countries with universal 
coverage to derive lessons that could inform the development of universal coverage policy in 
low-to-middle income (LMICs) countries. 
 
Methods: Empirical evidence from the OECD was sourced through an extensive review of 
published literature from print and electronic sources. Selection sought to include a range of 
countries in different continents and health systems with a long history as universal systems. 
Most universal systems are in OECD countries. OECD countries were selected because of 
availability of quality and credible data. The data for the analysis is drawn from the OECD 
Health Data 2008 dataset. Kutzin‟s conceptual framework is the analytical tool for the critical 
analysis of evidence, including OECD data, to evaluate the functionality of each health 
system based on the concepts of equity, sustainability, efficiency and feasibility. 
 
Results: Findings from the analysis show that publicly funded (primarily tax-funded) 
systems have lower out-of-pocket expenditures and offer greater financial risk protection. 
Systems with a single risk pool and a single payer tend to be more administratively efficient 
than multiple pools and payers. Allocating health resources based on a needs-based allocation 
formula is more equitable than historical budgeting. Capitation provider payment promotes 
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Executive Summary 
The World Health Assembly Resolution in 2005 urges Member States to introduce and 
strengthen universal coverage policies in order to offer financial risk protection (FRP) and 
ensure equitable access to healthcare based on relative need, irrespective of ability to make 
health care payments, social status or geographical location. This is achievable through the 
establishment of financing mechanisms that guarantee universal coverage mainly social 
health insurance and general tax revenue. 
 
The present study thus seeks to undertake a comparative analysis of selected OECD countries 
that have attained (or are transiting to) universal coverage to derive lessons that can be 
applied in the development of universal coverage policy especially in LMICs. The 
comparative analysis will identify best practice in the four OECD countries, given their 
lengthy experience as universal systems, specifically as relates to the extent to which 
financial risk protection and equity in access to health care services have been upheld. 
 
Empirical evidence from the OECD countries will be gathered from an in-depth review of 
literature from both print and electronic sources. Key words for the literature search are: 
health care system, universal coverage, social health insurance, private health insurance, 
health financing, provider payment mechanism and country names (Canada, Mexico, 
Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom). Kutzin‟s conceptual framework will be applied 
as analytical tool for critical analysis of evidence based on OECD data. The functionality of 
each health systems will be analyzed based on these concepts; equity, sustainability, 
efficiency and feasibility. Data for the critical analysis will be sourced from the OECD 
Health Data 2008 dataset.  
 
Findings from the extensive literature review will inform the study objectives most 
importantly in contributing to informing health reforms in LMICs that are considering 
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1.0 Background 
Most countries in the world are restructuring their health financing mechanisms to meet the 
health care needs of the population with financial risk protection dominating the health 
reform agenda (WHO 2005a). Financial risk protection against health care costs is the main 
objective of universal coverage defined as guaranteed „access for all to appropriate 
promotive, preventative, curative and rehabilitative services at an affordable cost‟ (Carrin et 
al. 2008). Universal coverage means that everyone in the population has equal access to 
health care based on relative need irrespective of ability to pay, social status or place of 
residence.  
 
For countries that are yet achieve universal coverage, the challenge is to shift the current 
unfair financing burden, which is largely borne by households through large direct out-of-
pocket payments, to prepayment of health care through financing mechanisms such as social 
health insurance or general tax, which guarantee universal coverage (Savedoff 2004). 
Universality has been achieved in unique fashion in different countries. Some health systems 
are single payer systems financed entirely through mandatory contributions or general tax 
revenue; others combine the two prepaid financing mechanisms, sometimes with each 
financing mechanism covering different population groups.  Additionally, within primarily 
SHI- or tax-funded health systems and/or mixed systems, private health insurance (PHI), 
another prepayment financing mechanism plays specific financing roles (Carrin, James 
2004). These roles can be PHI offering principal, duplicate, substitutive, supplementary and 
complementary coverage (OECD 2004). PHI in most universal systems expands consumer 
choice by accelerating access to services that not covered by the public insurer or payer. 
 
The majority of households in LMICs lack adequate FRP from the financial consequences of 
seeking health care. Evidence shows that they are getting into poverty and ill health as they 
struggle to keep afloat with out-of pocket spending on public and private health services.  
This occurrence commonly referred to as the „the medical poverty trap‟, leads to long-term 
impoverishment; irrational drug use, reduced access to care and untreated morbidity 
(Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans 2001). For most households, out-of-pocket payments through 
user fees or co-payments on publicly insured services create financial barriers with most 
foregoing care or cutting down on spending on other basic needs such as food and clothing to 
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The next section explores health financing in two low income countries, Ghana and Kenya, 
and one middle income country, South Africa, in the African continent. Kenya and South 
Africa are considering implementing universal coverage policy while Ghana implemented the 
policy in 2005. The following sections will give a detailed overview of health financing in 
Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. 
 
1.1 Overview of health financing in three countries in the African continent 
1.1.1 Ghana 
According to National Health Accounts (NHA) estimates for 2007, Ghana spent 6% of its 
GDP on health.  Private spending accounted for the largest share of the total health 
expenditure amounting to 63.9%. Most private spending was from out-of-pocket expenditures 
which accounted for 78.9% of private expenditure while 6% of private expenditure was from 
private health insurance. General government expenditure accounted for 36.1% of the total 
health expenditure, this includes donor funding which was 22.6% of the total health 
expenditure (NHA Ghana 2009). 
 
In the colonial era, Ghana operated a tax-financed health system supplemented with user fees 
and external donor funds. On attaining independence in 1957, health care services at state-run 
health facilities were provided at no charge to the consumer (Nyonator, Kutzin 1999, 
Assensoh, Wahab 2008). However, in 1969 hospital fees were re-introduced when the 
Hospital Fees Decree later becoming the Hospital Fees Act in 1971, was endorsed. This was 
followed by the Hospital Fees Regulation of 1985, which established the “cash and carry 
system” whereby user fees had to be paid upfront for consultation, laboratory and diagnostic 
procedures, drugs, hospitalization, dental, surgical and medical services in government-run 
facilities. However, some populations groups were granted full or partial fee exemptions 
(Nyonator, Kutzin 1999).  
 
The cash and carry system came into full effect at the time the international banking 
institutions introduced Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Ghana. One conditionality of 
the SAP was for government to cut back on public spending. Accordingly, the budgetary 
allocation to the health sector declined gradually from 10% of government resources in 1982 
to a low 1.3% by 1997 (Konadu-Agyemang 2000). To supplement revenue shortfalls as result 
of reduced budget transfers, government-run facilities intensified the use of user fees, which 
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due to the financial barrier. In addition, most health care facilities engaged in unfair revenue 
generating practices and under the table payments to providers (Nyonator, Kutzin 1999). 
Nevertheless, user fees for maternal care were abolished in 2005 (Witter et al. 2007).  
 
It is against the background of excessive out-of-pocket payments and inadequate FRP that the 
national health insurance (NHI) was introduced. Parliament passed the universal coverage 
law in 2003 but implementation was only initiated in March 2005 (Assensoh, Wahab 2008)  
The NHI comprises multiple schemes catering for both the formal and informal sector. The 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (MHIS) in each district collect contributions directly from 
the informal and receive contributions for formal sector workers living in their district via the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) (McIntyre 2007). A recent publication 
by McIntyre et al. (2008) indicated that 55% of the population in Ghana was covered under 
the NHI by December 2007. 
 
1.1.2 Kenya 
According to the NHA estimates in 2007, the expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 
was 4.7%. General government expenditure was 48.4% of the total health expenditure, while 
private spending was 51.6%. Social security systems accounted for 8% of the public health 
expenditure. Nearly 7% of the private expenditure was from private insurance and 80% from 
direct payments. Donor funding (which in the NHA is incorporated under government 
expenditure) accounted for 14.9% of the total health expenditure (NHA Kenya 2009). Most 
donor funds are programme-oriented directed to malaria control and HIV/AIDS preventative 
services. Despite declaring HIV/AIDS a national disaster in 1999 (Ministry of Health 2006) 
government spending on HIV/AIDS treatment has not matched funding from donor and 
household sources. Government‟s contribution is only 20.3% of HIV/AIDS expenditure, 
compared to donor‟s 51% and household‟s 26.3% from direct out-of-pocket payments 
(USAID 2007). 
 
After independence in 1963, access to health services was free at the point of use in public 
sector facilities in the tax-funded health system. Reduced economic growth coupled with 
market-oriented policies introduced in the early eighties resulted in health financing policy 
changes through the introduction of user fees at all government-run facilities (Mwabu, 
Mwangi 1986). However, pressure from various interest groups led to the abolishment of user 
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(Collins et al. 1996). In 2000, user fees for maternity care at public sector facilities were 
abolished. In other developments, with effect from July 2004, government-run dispensaries 
and health centres are required to provide health services at no charge to the patient except 
for a minimum registration fee. Fee exemptions are granted for the poor and children aged 
below five years and those ailing from malaria and tuberculosis (Chuma et al. 2009).  
 
In spite of these safety nets at public sector facilities, households lack adequate FRP as direct 
payments constitute a significant share of private spending. Most of this spending is driven 
by utilization of services from the parallel delivery system, i.e in private hospitals, clinics and 
pharmacies. With respect to prepayment of health care, PHI covers the rich as the high cost 
and risk rating of premiums locks out the majority of the population.  The National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF), a mandatory scheme for formal sector employees offers inpatient 
cover for these employees and their dependants (Carrin et al. 2007). The informal sector can 
enrol in the scheme on a voluntary basis where a monthly contribution flat rate charge of 
KES 160 (USD 2.13) is required to cover an entire nuclear family. The latest inclusion to 
prepayment of care is through community based health insurance schemes that were 
introduced in 1999. So far an estimated 32 schemes countrywide insure 170 000 beneficiaries 
(Mathauer, Schmidt & Wenyaa 2008). 
 
There are gaps in coverage and inequities as formal sector employees have some level of 
financial protection from hospitalization costs through the NHIF while the rest of the 
population (without PHI or not enrolled to CBHIs) does not have adequate FRP from health 
care costs. To ensure equity in financing and reduce the out-of-pocket financing burden, 
government proposed the transformation of NHIF, into a National Social Health Insurance 
Fund (NSHIF) in order to achieve universal coverage. The NSHIF Bill passed preliminary 
readings in parliament in 2004, but amendments are yet to be made to pass the bill into law. 
The NSHIF would be financed through income-rated contributions for employees and 
employers in the formal sector, flat-rated monthly contributions for the self-employed and 
subsidized contributions for the poor and other vulnerable groups. Coverage of 60-80% is 
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1.1.3 South Africa 
South Africa‟s health system is two tiered consisting of a tax-funded public sector delivering 
health services to the majority of the population and a private sector providing health services 
to approximately 20% of the population financed through private health insurance and out-of-
pocket payments (McIntyre et al. 2006). The total expenditure on health as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) was 8% in 2007 (NHA 2009). Private health spending 
accounted for 61.6% of the total health expenditure while public expenditure was 39.4%. 
About 78.1% of the total private spending was from private health insurance and 17.5% from 
out-of-pocket expenditure. Social security contributions accounted for 3.7% of the total 
expenditure on health (NHA 2009). The provincial health departments are the main financing 
intermediaries in the public sector while medical schemes (private health insurance 
companies) take the single largest share of private sector expenditure, accounting for 38% 
and 46% of the total expenditure on health, respectively (McIntyre et al. 2007).  
 
The South African health system has a substantial public-private mix and a severely 
fragmented medical schemes‟ industry. Inequities in financing are partly attributable to the 
heavy subsidization of medical scheme contributions for civil servant who account for a 
quarter of medical scheme beneficiaries. Government spends 12 times more on a civil servant 
to enrol to a medical scheme than it spends on an individual to use a public sector facility. 
The other inequity is from the tax rebates offered for private health insurance (McIntyre et al. 
2006). Given that most medical scheme beneficiaries are high income earners, the subsidy 
not only reduces potential income tax revenue but exacerbates the existing health inequities 
by giving tax relief to those that least need it. In examining the degree of the public-private 
mix in utilization of health services, 15% of the total population are medical scheme 
beneficiaries accessing care almost entirely at private sector facilities. Additionally, 21% of 
the population not covered by medical schemes use private sector facilities on an out-of-
pocket basis for primary health care but are dependent on the public sector for inpatient care. 
The largest proportion of the population, 64.2%, is dependent on the public sector for both 
primary health care and secondary care (McIntyre et al. 2007). Evidently, a substantial 
percentage of the population is not protected from the financial consequences of ill health. 
 
The debate on implementing a universal coverage policy has been ongoing since the first 
democratic election in 1994.  The newly elected African National Congress (ANC) 
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Health Plan. Subsequent proposals followed in 1995 and 1997. Additionally, the Taylor 
Committee of 2002 explicitly proposed a NHI system that would be funded through multiple 
financing intermediaries through general revenue funds and private health insurance but 
eventually phase out these multiple pools to form an integrated NHI funding system 
(McIntyre et al. 2007). In 2002, the National Department of Health (NDH) established a 
Ministerial Task Team to review the Taylor proposal. The MTT recommended the 
implementation of a SHI with major changes to the benefit package. One was the 
introduction of a standardized basic benefit package (BBP) similar for all medical schemes 
and the public insurer. The benefit package would cover all primary health care services in 
addition to the existing PMBs prescribed for medical schemes. The MTT proposal is 
illustrated by McIntyre et al. (2007:82-84). So far six committees have deliberated on how 
the universal system should be financed to ensure adequate FRP and equity in access. 
Consensus is yet to be reached.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
There is a global imbalance in health spending between high-income and LMICs. The global 
health expenditure is concentrated in high-income countries, yet they bear the least global 
disease burden and are less populous. On the contrary the health expenditure in the highly 
populated LMICs, where 84% of the world population resides, is 12% of the global health 
expenditure. Additionally, LMICs bear 90% of the global disease burden.  The greater 
percentage of the health spending in LMICs is from out-of-pocket expenditure, which 
accounts for between 40-60% of the health spending in LMICs compared to about 20% in 
high-income countries (Gottret, Schieber 2006). Without doubt, households in LMICs bear 
the greatest health financing burden given the excessive payment of health care on an out-of-
pocket basis. It is against this background of inequities in the financing burden and 
widespread impoverishment and catastrophic health expenditures from excessive out-of-
pocket spending that led to the World Health Assembly Resolution in 2005 calling for 
Member States to introduce and intensify the prepayment of health care by introducing social 
health insurance (WHO 2005b). Most LMICs are therefore considering introducing universal 
coverage policies so as to FRP, but there is a lot to learn from countries that have long 
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1.3 Research question 
What „best practice‟ characteristics of health financing policy in four selected Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are applicable in 
contributing to the development of universal coverage policy  in LMICs? 
 
1.4 Justification 
Implementation of a universal coverage policy ought to be an informed process, drawing on 
evidence from health systems that have experience in running universal systems. The present 
study intends to provide insights from four selected OECD countries by considering best 
practice and shortcomings of these universal health systems. 
 
Review of international experience is particularly helpful in identifying approaches that have 
ensured financial risk protection and equity in access to care when needed for citizens of the 
four selected countries.  
1.5 Aim 
To undertake a comparative analysis of selected OECD countries which have achieved or are 
in transition to universal health coverage with the intention of deriving lessons that can 
inform the development of universal coverage policy in LMICs. The findings will provide 
insights into best practice in these countries and key factors that have made financial risk 
protection and equity in access achievable. 
1.6 Objectives 
 To undertake an extensive literature review of health systems in selected OECD 
countries. 
 To critically analyze the health systems of four OECD countries with respect to the 
functions of revenue collection, fund pooling, purchasing and provision.  
 To analyze data for these four countries from a comprehensive dataset, the OECD 
Health Data 2008, which consists of a variety of health indicators in the OECD 
countries 
 To critically assess, through analyzing trends of key health system indicators (health 
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equity, efficiency and sustainability of purchasing and provision of health care 
services in each country. 
 
2.0 Methodology  
2.1 Study Design. 
The research takes a desk-based approach. The key findings of the literature will be presented 
using a case-study approach, a research strategy that gives better insights into divergent 
issues present within single settings making discoverability of issues within a given area of 
interest  achievable (Guy 1994). The main strength of a case study design is that it gives a 
contextual analysis of data gathered from multiple sources through various collection 
techniques (qualitative or quantitative methods) using tools such as surveys and document 
review.  
 
Fundamental to this study, is the review of documented evidence from literature and analysis 
of data provided in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
health dataset, using an analytic matrix to facilitate in understanding the dynamics of the 
health financing functions of each of the selected health systems. Drawing out themes from 
these diverse health care systems is only achievable through this approach which explores 
and assesses a range of issues including the organizational structure in a given system. The 
use of an analytic template (discussed in following sections) to guide the analysis instead of 
going through the critical assessment arbitrarily, allows key lessons to be derived in a 
systematic way. 
 
Often, conclusions drawn from a case-study analysis are only specific to that area of study 
and not generalizable to other settings (Guy 1994). In this study, all the selected health care 
systems have unique organizational and management structures; therefore, lessons derived 
from one country are specific to that health care system and not transferable. Nevertheless, 
useful lessons can be drawn from the cross-country analysis and their appropriateness 
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2.2 Population and sampling.  
2.2.1 Population 
The population of interest is all countries that have achieved UC or are in transition to UC. 
Most universal health care systems are in OECD countries.  
 
2.2.2 Criteria for sampling 
The first selection decision restricted the sample to OECD countries based on the availability 
of quality data in these countries particularly the comprehensive OECD health information. 
This was seen as important in order to complement information on the nature of the health 
systems under evaluation from the literature review. The OECD dataset shows consistent data 
collected over different time periods based on health care indicators such as health care 
financing, expenditure on health, health care utilization, health outcomes, pharmaceutical 
industry, non-medical determinants of health, health care resources and a range of other 
health-related indicators. However for this study only the economic indicators (health care 
financing and expenditure on health) will be used. See Appendix 3 for a detailed explanation 
of the variables. 
 
Secondly, review countries are drawn from different continents: Asia (Republic of Korea), 
Europe (United Kingdom), South America (Mexico) and North America (Canada). The 
exclusion of countries from Africa was due to the absence of a universal system in the 
continent and lack of reliable data attributable to undeveloped information systems in these 
countries. Although Ghana passed legislation to introduce a national health insurance system 
in 2003, universal coverage has not yet been achieved.  
The inclusion criterion was thus: 
 Countries that have achieved or are in transition to universal coverage. 
 OECD countries because of availability of data. 
 Selection drawn from different continents. 
 Preference was given to countries that have long experience of universal coverage. 
Of the selected health care systems, three (Canada, Republic of Korea and the United 
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From preliminary investigation, the four health systems have achieved UC differently.  
Canada and the United Kingdom achieved universal coverage through a single-payer system 
financed primarily from general tax revenue with an element of mandatory contributions 
(Marchildon 2005, The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). The Republic 
of Korea achieved universal coverage through a multiple payer system prior to the integration 
reform in 2000. By 1998 there were 227 insurance societies catering for the self-employed, 
142 for industrial workers and a single scheme, the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation 
(KMIC) for civil servants and teachers in private schools (Kwon 2003).  The Republic of 
Korea was particularly chosen for this study because of attainment of UC under a severely 
fragmented multiple payer system. It would be interesting to identify factors that made UC 
feasible. 
 
Mexico is the outlier of the four countries but it was chosen for this comparative analysis 
because besides being one of only three OECD countries that do not run universal systems, 
the other two are Turkey and the United States (OECD 2009), Mexico implemented universal 
coverage policy in 2004. Additionally, Mexico is an OECD country characterized by the 
realities of most low to middle income countries (OECD countries fall under the high-income 
and upper-middle income bracket) in particular, the wide income and social inequalities and 
the complex epidemiological transition which presents a challenge to the health system in 
responding to diseases of poverty on hand and those of lifestyle on the other. Lastly, the 
Mexican health system is a multiple-payer system with separate social health insurance 
schemes for formal and informal sector employees. Pooling or risks through various 
employer-based mandatory schemes has ensured full coverage for formal sector workers 
while the voluntary contribution arrangement for the informal sector to join „mandatory‟ 
schemes has impeded full population coverage for this group. The recently introduced 
scheme for the informal sector, Seguro Popular, however intends to insure most of the 
informal sector by 2010 through an incentive-driven contribution model (Frenk et al. 2006). 
Therefore, Mexico provides an interesting case study especially in identifying the factors that 
led to the passing of the universal coverage law and possible factors that could have hindered 
its achievement of UC. 
 
The selection of Canada and the United Kingdom was based on their long experience as tax-
funded health care systems albeit with different organizational structure. The United 
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systems are publicly financed through general taxation with dominance of public providers in 
health care provision. There is often minimal private contracting with publicly raised revenue 
and strict regulation of private health insurance, since financial flows from PHI hardly ever 
goes to public providers. Canada does not fall under the NHS-type criteria though it is for the 
most part tax-financed. Provision in this health system is dominated by not-for-profit private 
providers. Therefore, the similarity in the two in terms of financing and the differences with 
respect to service delivery and PHI regulation makes the two health systems interesting case 
studies. 
 
Therefore, exploring these divergent health financing themes from the selected health care 
systems, especially the differences in the financing approaches that have made universal 
















2.3.1.1 Review of literature  
The review will explore empirical evidence from four OECD countries that have achieved 
universal coverage or are transiting to universality. Evidence from online sources will be 
sourced from peer-reviewed journals and from grey literature such as manuscripts, policy 
documents, policy briefs and reports. Other material will be sourced from books and print 
journals. The evidence gathered from all these sources is largely descriptive. The main search 
engine to search for the online publications is Google Scholar. The key databases are 
Academic Search Premier, Medline, Science Direct and Pub Med. Useful websites are the 
World Health Organization, Pan-American Health Organization and the European 
Observatory of Health Care Systems websites. The key words for the search were: health care 
system, universal coverage, social health insurance, private health insurance, health 
financing, provider payment mechanism and country names (Canada, Mexico, Republic of 
Korea and the United Kingdom). 
 
2.3.1.2 The Kutzin framework 
An analytical tool that can be used to evaluate the financing of health care systems, a 
framework developed by Kutzin will be applied in analyzing each of the selected health care 
systems. The conceptual framework will be applied in reviewing the empirical evidence from 
literature and analyzing data from the OECD database. The framework is unique in that it 
evaluates the health system by combining, and not considering separately, health policy 
objectives and the health financing functions (revenue collection, pooling and purchasing). 
The framework considers the policy objective alongside the health financing functions to 
determine how the overall function of health insurance described as „access to care with 
financial risk protection‟ by Kutzin (2001) has been attained in a given health care system. 
Additionally, the framework distinctly maps out three allocation mechanisms and two points 
of payments (contribution prepayment and direct payments or cost-sharing at the point use) 
and two- or multi-sided subsidies to fund pools, purchasing organizations and providers of 
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(Source Kutzin 2001:174). 
Figure 1: Kutzin’s framework illustrating health system financing and population links.  
Furthermore, the framework defines conceptual features of health financing namely; funding 
sources, contributing mechanisms, collecting organizations, pooling organizations, allocation 
mechanisms and purchasing organizations, into categories with distinct characteristics as 
illustrated in the matrix Table 1. In addition to factors discussed above, Kutzin‟s framework 
is preferred for the present comparative analysis because of its ease in applicability in 
analyzing both public and private financing and the respective organizations under each 
sector. The components of the conceptual framework developed by Kutzin are condensed 
into a matrix (Table 1) that will aid in the critical analysis of literature and data based the 
concepts of equity, sustainability, efficiency and feasibility. 
The Kutzin matrix is the tool, which will guide in the analysis of OECD data and 
synthesizing evidence from the literature. The matrix depicted in Table 1 incorporates the key 
features of the Kutzin framework alongside the concepts of equity, sustainability, efficiency 
and feasibility which are often used to assess functionalities of health systems. The analysis 
using the matrix will not be descriptive but rather will involve a concise and critical 
assessment of the health system to determine if the equity, sustainability, efficiency and 
feasibility goals have been met while exploring possible factors that have made attainment of 
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Table 1: The Matrix for analysis 
    
2.3.1.3 Validity and reliability of instruments  
The reliability of Kutzin‟s conceptual framework in evaluating healthcare systems is credited 
by the fact that the framework yields similar conclusions when the template is applied in 
evaluating published literature in a consistent manner. The accuracy or validity of the 
framework is based on its mainstream applicability in assessing functionality of health 
systems. For instance, in the comprehensive review of health financing in LMCIs, McIntyre 
(2007) applied this conceptual framework alongside the condensed matrix. Additionally, the 
conceptual framework was used by McIntyre et al. (2008) in the assessment of health 
financing in three African countries namely; Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of 
Tanzania.  
2.4 Data analysis 
Data is sourced from Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Health Data 2008. This is a database containing data on key indicators of health care systems 
in 30 OECD reflecting on the performance of each health system.  The main variables in the 
dataset are: health status, health care resources and utilization, long-term care resources and 
utilization, health expenditure, pharmaceutical consumption and sales by the pharmaceutical 
 Equity Efficiency Sustainability Feasibility 
Revenue Collection  
Source of funds     
Contributions mechanisms     
Collecting organizations     
Pooling of funds  
Coverage & composition of pools     
Allocation mechanisms     
Purchasing of services 
Benefit package     
Provider payment mechanisms     
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industry and data on non-medical determinants of health and general data on demographic 
and economic references. These health system indicators show how the health system is 
functioning at present and its performance in past periods of time. The assessment of for 
instance expenditure levels, utilization rates, health employment and remuneration, 
investment in health services among other indicators, over given timelines will give an 
indication of which countries are performing better than others as far as those indicators are 
concerned. Emphasis will be placed on these variables: health financing and health 
expenditure and their indicators outlined Appendix 3. This coupled with the extensive 
literature review will highlight the contributory factors to good or bad performance in aspects 
of the health care systems in the review countries. 
2.5 Ethics 
Ethics approval will be sought from University of Cape Town Ethics Research Committee. 
As this is a desk-based review, drawing only on public domain secondary sources, there are 
no major ethical implications. 
2.6 Stakeholders 
Parties that may be interested in findings from this study are: 
 School of Public Health, University of Cape Town 
 National Research Foundation (NRF) 
 Health sector policy makers  
2.7 Reporting and implementation 
The study will provide evidence-based findings that can inform the development of universal 
coverage policies in developing countries. Dissemination seminars will be organized and the 
stakeholders mentioned above will be invited to discuss the findings of the study. The report 
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1.0 Introduction 
This review explores empirical evidence from health care systems in four OECD countries 
that have attained (or are transiting to) universal coverage. This was done through an 
extensive review of published literature from print and electronic sources. This review 
focuses primarily on health financing in the selected health care systems, with two broad 
objectives: to undertake a comparative analysis of selected OECD countries that have 
achieved or are in transition to universality; to derive lessons or best practice in selected 
universal health systems and key factors that have made financial risk protection (FRP) and 
equity in access achievable. 
 
1.1 Focus 
Health financing mechanisms in various countries are being re-structured to offer FRP for all 
citizens (WHO 2005b) with the intention of avoiding catastrophic expenditures and 
impoverishment from seeking care. FRP and equity in access are the fundamental goals of 
universal coverage. Within universal systems, every individual has equal access to health care 
based on relative need irrespective of ability to make health payments, social status or 
geographical location. Most countries are strengthening or introducing policies to move to 
universal systems which offer FRP, following the World Health Assembly Resolution in 
2005 by Member States.  
 
1.2 Search Methodology 
Evidence from online sources was gathered from peer-reviewed journals, and from grey 
literature such as manuscripts, policy documents, policy briefs and reports. Other sources 
were books and print journals. The evidence gathered from all these sources was largely 
descriptive. The main search engine for the online publications was Google Scholar while 
key databases from which evidence was gathered were EBSCOhost via Academic Search 
Premier and Medline, Science Direct and Pub Med. Useful websites from which additional 
information was sourced were the World Health Organization, Pan-American Health 
Organization and the European Observatory of Health Care Systems websites. The key words 
for the search were: health care system, universal coverage, social health insurance, private 
health insurance, health financing, provider payment mechanism and country names (Canada, 
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1.3 Structure of the paper 
There are three main sections of this review: the first section defines the concepts used to 
describe and assess health financing in the selected countries; the second section focuses on 
the key health financing sub-functions; and, the third section reviews the selected health 
systems. For each country, a brief historical background on the health system‟s progression to 
universal coverage is provided; key health reforms instituted after universal coverage are 
described, and key health financing elements in the health system are discussed. 
 
1.4. Concepts 
1.4.1 Universal coverage  
Universal coverage is defined as “access for all to appropriate promotive, preventative, 
curative and rehabilitative services at an affordable cost” (Carrin et al. 2008). The definition 
encompasses two broad components: financial risk protection defined as “access to adequate 
healthcare for all at an affordable price” (Carrin, James 2005) and; equity in access to needed 
health services (Carrin, James & Evans 2005, Mills 2007). To attain adequate levels FRP 
while upholding equity in access involves three key goals have to be met: maximization of 
prepayment financing mechanisms to redistribute the financing burden from high- to low-
income groups; attaining the largest possible risk pool for maximum cross-subsidies; and, 
establishing purchasing plans that ensure health services are equitably and efficiently 
delivered  (Gottret, Schieber 2006). When universal coverage has been attained with adequate 
levels of financial protection (some health systems have achieved attained universal coverage 
without adequate FRP), households are protected from impoverishment and catastrophic 
expenditures. Financial catastrophe associated with making health payments occur when a 
great proportion of health services are only accessible on an out-of-pocket basis; where there 
is a low ability to pay for health care within the population; and, where there is a lack of risk 
pooling through prepayment (Xu et al. 2005). 
 
In addition to FRP and equity in access, universal coverage also incorporates the concept of 
equity in financing (Carrin, James & Evans 2005). This means that under UC there are cross-
subsidies from high-income to low-income groups (income cross-subsidies) and the healthy 
to the sick (risk cross-subsidies). With respect to revenue-generating mechanisms, equity in 
financing is upheld when a larger proportion of households are covered through prepaid 
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the larger the population covered by an integrated financing mechanism, the larger the degree 
of risk-pooling
1
 and the greater the cross-subsidies. Ultimately, the financing burden is 
equitably spread across different individual households since risk are pooled across a large 
societal risk pool (Carrin, James 2005). Moreover, non-financial barriers to care (Mills 2007) 
such as the broadness of health services covered (Carrin et al. 2008) and the organizational 
structure of health care systems in terms of resource allocation fit into the broader definition 
of FRP. The latter aspect touches on the impact of geographical barriers, cultural barriers, 
issues dealing with quality of care, provider behaviour and attitudes that could hinder 
utilization of health services by certain vulnerable population groups such as the indigent and 
women (Mills 2007).  
 
Universal coverage is achieved through two key revenue generating mechanisms: general 
taxation and social health insurance.  As illustrated in Figure 2, universal coverage occurs 
incrementally. In the early stages, direct payment of health care dominates health financing 
but this is gradually decreased as prepayment for health care dominates financing through 
different prepaid financing mechanisms catering for various population groups such as 
community based health insurance for rural populations, mandatory contributions for formal 
sector employees and private health insurance performing a defined financing role in the 
health system. On attainment of universal general tax revenue and social health insurance and 
a mix of the tax- financing and other types of health insurance are the main prepayment 
financing mechanisms (Carrin, James & Evans 2005). 
  
                                                 
1
 Defined as the “collection and management of financial resources so that predictable individual financial risks 















   
         
           
           
        
 
 
           
           
        
      
                    
 
           
Source (Carrin, James & Evans 2005:2) 
Figure 2: Financing options in the transition to universal coverage  
 
1.4.2 Equity 
Two approaches commonly used in determining if a health system is meeting its equity goals 
are the evaluation of equity in financing and in utilization of services. Equity in financing 
implies that financial contributions to funding health services should be based on ability to 
pay. The progressivity of each financing source determines the degree of FRP (Kutzin 1995) 
while the choice of the revenue collecting mechanism (whether prepaid or direct payment 
mechanism) determines the degree of progressivity or regressivity of the respective funding 
source (Hussey, Anderson 2003). With progressive funding sources, high-income groups 
contribute a greater share of income towards health than low-income groups, while for 
regressive funding sources; lower income groups contribute a larger proportion of their 
income. For proportional financing mechanism, everyone in the population makes equal 
percentage payments towards health, but in absolute terms wealthier households tend to pay 
more (McIntyre 2007; Hussey, Anderson 2003). Therefore, an inequitable financing 
mechanism is one that shifts the health financing burden to those with lesser ability to pay 
rendering the financing mechanism regressive. Furthermore, inequities in financing arise by 
offering tax rebates to private activities such as the subsidies to subscribers of private health 
insurance, most being high-income groups (McPake, Kutzin 1997). The potential revenue lost 
from the subsidy can instead be used to augment the general revenue fund pool to finance a 
broader range of health services accessible to wider proportion of the population.  
Absence of financial                      
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The principle of equity in utilization is modelled on the idea that “health services and 
resources should be distributed according to need not according to other factors such as 
people‟s ability to pay for services” (Kutzin 2008:5). Therefore, the utilization of health 
services should be reflective of populations‟ health need rather than income, insurance status, 
age, gender or place of residence (McPake, Kutzin 1997; Kutzin 1995). This includes the 
equitable distribution of health personnel, facilities, budget and utilization per capita in 
different geographical areas (Kutzin 1995). An inequitable health system is one where certain 
geographical areas are constrained with respect to health care resources and/or where 
someone can only access a service if they are able to pay for it. 
 
1.4.3 Efficiency  
This is evaluated as the extent to which technical and allocative efficiency goals are met. The 
concept of technical efficiency refers to the link between resources and health outcomes 
implying the “maximum number of health services that can be provided within a specific 
budget or a measure of the lowest cost needed for each health service to function without 
compromising quality of care” (McIntyre 2007).
2
 Technical inefficiencies arise when the unit 
costs of providing a service are exceedingly high (Kutzin 1995).  
 
Allocative efficiency on the other hand deals with combining the right health care 
programmes or interventions to maximise the health
 
of society (Palmer, Torgerson 1999). 
This entails the allocation of resources to activities that produce highly valuable health 
outcomes in a cost-effective manner (McPake, Kutzin 1997). Allocative inefficiencies in 
health systems are likely to arise when referral systems are weakly structured leading to 
overcrowding in hospitals for services that could have been provided quicker and in less 
costly environments (Kutzin 1995).  
 
The other important concept as relates to efficiency is administrative efficiency. This type of 
efficiency ought to focus on “minimizing duplication of functional responsibility for 
administering the health financing system” argues  Kutzin (2008:7) The author further argues 
that administrative efficiency should not simply over emphasis on decreasing administrative 
                                                 
2
 A technically efficient
 
allocation is achieved when there is improvement in health outcomes from a given set of 
resource inputs (Palmer, Torgerson 1999) or use of minimum costs by limiting misuse of inputs or resources 
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Two aspects, financial and institutional, are used to determine the sustainability of the diverse 
functions in health financing. Funding mechanisms should have the potential to generate 
more funds over time to meet the growing health care needs and demands in the population. 
Therefore, financial sources that are vulnerable to fluctuations in revenue generation over 
given periods of time should be avoided and preference given to revenue sources that show 
consistency in revenue generation in the long-term (McIntyre 2007). Therefore, a financially 
sustainable financing mechanism is one that maintains a sufficient level of finance over time 
without necessitating supplementary funds from external sources.
3
 The other sustainability 
aspect relates to institutional sustainability which implies that the organizational structure in a 
given health system, mainly the managerial capacity, should be adequate in sustaining health 
reforms and ensuring changes in the health system are managed effectively (Kutzin 1995). 
 
1.4.5 Feasibility 
In evaluating feasibility, the stand taken by various stakeholders in the health sector should 
be examined to verify their support or opposition to a given policy issue, which could 
influence implementation of the policy. With respect to financing, the support or opposition 
for a given financing strategy by various interest groups, and the availability of technical and 
administrative capacity to implement the strategy (McIntyre 2007) is an issue that also 
impacts on feasibility.  
 
1.5 Health financing  
Health financing comprises three main sub-functions: revenue collection, pooling of funds 
and purchasing of services. The main objectives of health financing are: to raise “sufficient 
and sustainable revenue in an efficient and equitable manner” (Schieber et al. 2006:226); to 
provide an essential package of health services in order to offer adequate financial protection 
from unforeseen catastrophic expenditures; and, to manage pooled revenue to allow for 
                                                 
3
 Schieber et al. (2006) describes fiscal sustainability is attainable when “over a specific period, the managing 
entity will generate sufficient resources to fund full costs of a particular program, sector, or economy, including 
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health risks to be equitably and efficiently spread; and, to purchase  health services to achieve 
the broad objective of technical and allocative efficiency (Schieber et al. 2006). 
 
1.5.1 Revenue collection  
Revenue collection deals with the financial contributions that fund health care services, the 
structure of these financing contributions, and the organizations or agencies that collect the 
contributions (Kutzin 2008, McIntyre 2007). Health financing revenue is drawn from two 
main sources: domestic sources; and, external sources in form of  donor grants or loans 
(McIntyre 2007). Financial contributions towards health financing are classified according to 
the contribution mechanism as prepayment mechanisms which collectively consist of general 
tax revenue, payroll tax revenue or compulsory social health insurance contributions and 
voluntary health insurance, and direct payments which take the form of out-of-pocket 
payments (Kutzin 2008). 
 
1.5.1.1  Direct payment 
Direct payments are made on an out-of-pocket basis directly by the patient to public or 
private providers; co-payments by the insured; and direct payment for self-medication at 
pharmacies (Carrin et al. 2008). Out-of-pocket payments have major implications for 
households, with most foregoing care or cutting down on basic needs such as food and 
clothing to finance health care payments (Carrin et al. 2008, Xu et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
households suffer financial catastrophes because of these payments
4
. In health systems where 
the total out-of-pocket expenditure is less than 15%, households seldom incur catastrophic 
health expenditures (Kutzin 2008). Most of these health systems are in high-income countries 
where universal coverage has been attained.  
Therefore, given these negative implications, pre-payment mechanisms offer greater FRP 
than direct payments do not allow for equity or risk cross-subsidies.  
 
1.5.1.2  Pre-payment 
This refers to financing mechanisms that allow for the collection and management of 
financial contributions prior to the illness and subsequent utilization of health services by an 
individual (OECD 2004). Prepayment offers a means of distributing financing risks equitably 
and efficiently between high- and low-income groups within a population (Gottret, Schieber 
                                                 
4
 Each year an estimated 150 million individuals globally face catastrophic expenditures and 100 million 
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2006). Given the unpredictability of health care expenditures which vary in timing and 
magnitude, prior pooling of health risks ensures that individual health needs are spread 
equitably in a risk pool (Smith, Witter 2004). There are at least four structural arrangements 
in health financing that ensure risk pooling and prepayment: state funded systems through 
ministries of health (MOHs) or NHSs that raise funds from general tax revenue; social 
security organizations (SSOs) from social health insurance; voluntary private health 
insurance; and community based  health insurance (CBHI) (Gottret, Schieber 2006).   
Prepayment payment mechanisms are classified as mandatory or voluntary.  
 
1.5.1.2.1 Mandatory prepayment mechanisms 
These can take the form of general tax revenue or mandatory health insurance contributions 
(Carrin et al. 2008).  
 
1.5.1.2.1.1 General tax revenue 
This comprises direct and indirect taxes. Inequities in revenue collection arise when the tax 
mix constitutes a larger proportion of regressive than progressive taxes. In such instances, 
equity is achieved through appropriate redistributive policies (Schieber et al. 2006, Savedoff 
2004) where revenue raised through regressive taxation is spent progressively such as is the 
case in some Western European countries (Savedoff 2004).  
 
1.5.1.2.1.2 Mandatory health insurance (MHI) 
Mandatory insurance systems finance health services through payroll deductions made by 
employees and employers, towards a health fund. The financial contributions for the formal 
sector are based on wages or salary while for the self-employed the contributions are often 
flat rated and based on estimated income (Carrin, James 2005). Mandatory health insurance 
(MHI) can take the form of national health insurance (NHI) or social health insurance (SHI). 
With the former government subsidizes the mandatory contributions for those with less 
ability to pay mainly low-income workers, the unemployed and other vulnerable groups in 
society (McIntyre 2007; Carrin, James 2005). Within SHI funded systems only contributors 
receive health benefits while in NHI systems both contributing and non-contributing 
members are entitled to health benefits (McIntyre 2007, OECD 2004). The contribution 
arrangement under NHI is based on the principle of social solidarity, a concept that infers 
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Anderson 2003). Therefore, NHI systems promote equity when universal coverage has been 
achieved.  
 
1.5.1.2.2 Voluntary prepayment financing mechanisms  
1.5.1.2.2.1 Voluntary health insurance (VHI) 
Health insurance involves two key elements: pre-payment defined as the distribution of an 
individual‟s financial risk by pooling costs over time; and, risk pooling (OECD 2004). The 
size of the insurance pool can vary from single insurance schemes, which involve a greater 
degree of risk pooling, to multiple payer schemes where each individual has a prepaid 
medical savings account with the insurer (Hussey, Anderson 2003). The latter schemes are 
characterized by risk fragmentation and inadequate financial risk protection owing to market 
failures characteristic to insurance markets: adverse selection and cream skimming. 
 
With adverse selection, high-risk individuals with a greater need for health care, are more 
likely to purchase insurance coverage insurance than low risk healthier individuals (McIntyre 
2007).
5
 To prevent adverse selection insurance companies preferentially select and enrol low 
risk healthier individuals and often young individuals as members. This practice is referred to 
as cream skimming (Hussey, Anderson 2003).  
 
VHI is classified based on its financing role in the health system, which can be primary, 
duplicate, substitutive, supplementary or complementary.  
 
VHI performs a primary role if public or mandatory health insurance is non-existent in the 
health system, or individuals that are entitled to public insurance opt out of the public insurer. 
Primary VHI is of two types, substitute and principal (OECD 2004). In settings where 
primary VHI is the main prepayment method for some proportion of the population, VHI is 
described as providing principal coverage. Principal insurance covers a wide range of health 
care services similar to those in tax-funded systems. VHI purchased for principal coverage is 
                                                 
5
 If the practice of adverse selection continues unabated, it can lead to premium spiral death, where insurers 
raise premiums to mitigate the losses suffered as a result of a greater enrolment of high than low risk 
individuals. Accordingly, low-risk individuals may choose to opt out of the insurance plan in search of a cheaper 
alternative while high risk individuals remain in the plan, increasing the cost of treatment to which the insurer 
responds by increasing premiums. Ultimately the premium gets to the „death‟ part in the premium spiral when 
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highly regulated in OECD countries, especially if it is the only risk pooling mechanism 
(Mossialos, Thomson 2004). Substitutive insurance “substitutes for cover that would 
otherwise be available from the state” (Mossialos, Thomson 2004).  
 
Supplementary private health insurance “provides cover for additional health services not 




Complementary insurance “complements coverage of publicly insured service within 
principal or substitutive health insurance, which is intended to pay only a proportion of 
qualifying costs” (OECD 2004). The coverage covers for excluded services or partially 
insured services not reimbursable under the public plans such as co-payments (Mossialos, 
Thomson 2004).  
 
Duplicate insurance offers coverage for services already insured under the public plan 
(OECD 2004, Dhalla 2007).
7
 Duplicate insurance beneficiaries are not exempt from 
contributing to public insurance (OECD 2004). 
 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes are a form of VHI (McIntyre 2007) 
often managed and operated on a not-for-profit basis by non-governmental organizations 
(Bennett 2004). Contributions to the scheme are often made once a year mostly during 
harvest time (McIntyre 2007). The degree of risk pooling in CBHI pools is restricted within a 
given community without addressing the variations in income and health status that prevail 
across communities (Hsiao 2007). 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Depending on the health system, the range of insurable services with supplementary cover includes services 
not insured by the public plan such as cosmetic surgery, elective care, pharmaceuticals, rehabilitation, 
alternative care and amenity hospital services, or some health services covered by the public plan but are 
accessible faster from the private sector (OECD 2004). This type of cover expands a consumer‟s choice of 
providers (mostly private providers) and guarantees faster access to different health services such as amenity 




 This insurance covers health services already insured by the public plan, with this type of coverage, often, 
marketed as an option to public plans as it ensures access to similar services privately delivered care whose 
costs are not reimbursed by the public insurer; faster access in the public system as this covers facilitates queue 
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Figure 3: Taxonomy illustrating the role of VHI in health financing. 
(Source: Author’s diagram based on VHI definitions discussed by Mossialos, Thomson 
2004 and OECD 2004). 
 
1.5.2 Pooling 
This is the “accumulation of prepaid revenues on behalf of a population” (Kutzin 2001). 
Revenue collected to finance health care is  pooled by various public and private agencies 
that include national ministries of health, decentralized branches of health ministries, 
mandatory insurance schemes and for-profit and not-for-profit private insurers (Kutzin 2008) 
that transfer the pooled revenue to purchasing organizations (Smith, Witter 2004). 
Additionally, organizations involved in risk-equalization between competing insurers also 
perform a pooling function. Inadequate accumulation of funds undermines the degree of 
financial risk protection and equitable distribution of health care resources as a result of 
failure in aligning incentives that uphold efficiency in provision of health services (Kutzin 
2008). 
1.5.3 Purchasing 
This is “the transfer of pooled funds to providers on behalf of the population” (Kutzin 2008). 
Often, the purchasing and pooling functions are performed by the same agencies (Kutzin 
2001) with the exception of pooling agencies that redistribute funds to other fund pools 
(Kutzin 2008). Purchasing involves two main arms: provider payment, which is the transfer 
of financial resources to providers (Kutzin 2001) and benefit package, which are the services 
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2007). Services not covered are paid by the patient fully or partially as a cost-sharing measure 
(Kutzin 2008).  
 
1.5.3.1 Provider payment mechanisms 
The provider reimbursement method in a given health system impacts on the quality of 
services offered to patients, overall health expenditure patterns, utilization rates and costs of 
health services (Jegers et al. 2002) since some methods create incentives to over-service or 
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Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of different provider payment mechanisms 
(Source McIntyre 2007:44) 
 
Payment Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 





Low administrative costs 
Possible under-provision 
and/or poor quality of car 
 
Little incentive for efficient 
behaviour and productivity 
unless linked to performance 




Link part of payments to 
performance 
Capitation 






Incentive for under-service 
 
Possible cream skimming 
 
Possible cost shifting 
(referral to another provider) 
Adjust payments to risk 
 
Monitoring and peer 
review of provider 
practices (including referral 
patterns) 
 
Patient choice of provider 
Fee-for-service 
Incentive for technical 
efficiency (where fee 
schedules are fixed) 
Incentive for overprovision 
and cost escalation 
 
High administrative costs 
Global caps and/or 
adjusting fee to keep 
within resource limits 
Budget allocation 
Predictable expenditure 
and tight control 
 
Low administrative costs 
Limited direct incentives for 
efficiency unless linked to 
performance 
 
Can lead to over servicing 
and cost shifting 
Link part of payment to 
performance 
 
Monitoring and peer 
review 
Per diem 
Some incentive for 
technical efficiency 
Incentive to extend length of 
stay and/or increase number 
of admissions 
Global caps/budget limits 
 










Incentive for cream 
skimming 
Adjust for case mix 
(grouping people according 
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1.5.3.2 Benefit package 
There are four key issues in relation to a benefit package: type of service covered, type of 
provider, affordability and sustainability of the package.  
Type of services covered: In designing a benefit package to offer FRP, consideration should 
be given to health services termed as catastrophic events, that is low-frequency, high-cost 
services that involve inpatient care and long term treatment for chronic illnesses. However, 
high-frequency and low-cost often provided at primary care level should also be considered 
as they can also result in financial catastrophes in low-to-middle income countries (McIntyre 
2007). 
Type of provider: The purchaser also determines which type of provider (for example public 
sector facility or a non-governmental organization facility) it will reimburse to provide the 
services. Furthermore, contracts made between purchasers and providers of health services 
specify the range of services to be provided to beneficiaries (McIntyre 2007). 
Affordability and sustainability McIntyre (2007) argues that the trade-off between the breadth 
of services (how many people are covered) and the depth (which services are covered) should 
be considered to ensure the benefit package is sustainable amid epidemiological transitions. 
 
1.6 Progression to universal coverage 
The impediment to using health care and the occurrence of catastrophic spending on health 
care from out-of-pocket spending is the reason prepayment mechanisms are preferred over 
direct payments because of the greater financial risk protection they offer, especially general 
taxation and mandatory social insurance contributions (Savedoff 2004). General taxation 
specifically pools revenue from a larger risk pool and tax funding sources include income, 
purchases, property and capital (Savedoff 2004). Additionally, the characteristic market 
failures common to voluntary health insurance markets (McIntyre 2007) are not a feature of 
tax funded and SHI funded systems.  
 
Therefore, adequate financial risk protection requires maximization of prepayment financing 
mechanisms to guarantee sufficient cross-subsidies; equity in financing through redistribution 
of costs from low to high income earners; and through purchasing contracts that ensure 
efficient delivery of health care (Schieber et al. 2006). Health systems use various approaches 
to arrive at the goal of financial risk protection, through different combinations of 
prepayment financing mechanisms as will be highlighted in subsequent sections of this 
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The integration of risk pools such as tax with mandatory insurance contributions facilitates 
universal coverage. The other combination is that of a prepayment mechanism with direct 
payments as a cost-sharing measure such as in tax-funded system where some fees are 
charged at the point of use, or to deter moral hazard in a national health insurance (NHI) 
system 
 
In Canada, the main prepayment mechanisms are general taxation, employer-based health 
insurance and to a lesser extent duplicate health insurance. In the Republic of Korea, the main 
prepayment financing mechanisms are mandatory insurance contributions and the partial and 
full subsidy for the self-employed and the poor, respectively, from general tax revenue. VHI 
in Korea accounts for a small share of the total health expenditure covering mainly 
catastrophic illnesses: the degree of risk pooling in VHI is therefore limited. Mexico‟s main 
prepayment mechanisms are the mandatory insurance contributions for the formal sector and 
general tax revenue, which partly subsidises formal sector employees, the self-employed and 
low-income earners‟ contributions while fully subsidizing the poor. VHI in Mexico is a 
preserve for high-income groups and facilitates access to private care. Lastly, the United 
Kingdom‟s NHS is financed with two main prepayment mechanisms, general taxation and 
the national insurance (NI) contributions. The other prepayment financing mechanism, 
duplicate VHI has a limited role in financing and facilitates access to privately delivered care.  
 
In the following sections, health financing in the four health systems will be outlined in a 
descriptive fashion while key lessons on how equity, efficiency, sustainability and feasibility 
have been achieved will be discussed in the article manuscript. Policy implications of 
universal coverage based on evidence from the four OECD countries reviewed will be 
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2.0 Canada 
2.1 Historical background  
The foundations of the Canadian health care are constitutionally bound in the British North 
America (BNA) Act of 1867 when Canada became a confederation (Hirdes 2001). Provincial 
governments provided public health services and granted financial subsidies to non-profit 
organizations for the provision of hospitals services and outpatient care (Li 2006). Prior to the 
economic depression in the 1930s health care was provided according to socio-economic 
status or ability to pay in the for-profit private sector (Hirdes 2001). In 1947, Saskatchewan 
province established a hospital insurance plan termed „hospitalization‟ (Marchildon 2005). 
The transition to „hospitalization‟ in other provinces occurred gradually due to financial 
constraints but was aided by the fund-sharing bill of 1959, the Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act (HID). According to this Act, federal and provincial governments 
financed hospital-based care costs on an equal 50-50 basis (Marchildon 2005, Deber 2003). 
This was a great inducement for other provinces to enact hospitalization bills. By 1961 all 
provinces had complied with the HID Act. In the same year Saskatchewan extended universal 
insurance coverage for ambulatory physician services modelled on the sharing funding 
formula with the federal government (Schell 1989). The federal governments‟ Medical Care 
Act (MCA) of 1966 was then enacted requiring all provinces to provide coverage for 
ambulatory physician services (Hutchison, Abelson & Lavis 2001). By 1972, all provinces 
had complied with the Act (Deber 2003). In 1984 the HID and MCA Acts were consolidated 
into one, the Canada Health Act of 1984, a policy milestone that explicitly set the guidelines 
for provision of all insured services in accordance with the five principles of public 
administration, comprehensiveness, portability, universality and accessibility (Marchildon 
2005).  
 
The Canadian health system or Medicare is predominantly tax-financed with private (not-for-
profit and for-profit) provision of health care services (Marchildon 2005). The thirteen 
provincial single payer universal systems provide “medically necessary services” or publicly 
insured as stipulated in the Canada Health Act. Insured services are provided free at the point 
of use (Health Canada 2009). The provincial and territorial governments fund health services 
with assistance from the federal government in the form of the federal fiscal transfer called 
the Canada Health Transfer (CHT), which is allocated on a per capita basis (Department of 
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limited. The government sets national standards for Medicare, public health, drug and food 
safety regulation and directly provides health care services for persons excluded from 
Medicare, mainly serving members of the Canadian Forces or Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, veterans, inmates of federal penitentiaries and First Nations people living in reserves 
and the Inut (Marchildon 2005). 
 
2.2 Major reforms 
2.2.1 Regionalization 
The high public debt accumulated by both federal and provincial governments was one of the 
factors that led to changes in the fiscal policy after the economic recession of the early 1990s. 
The federal government froze federal cash transfers to provinces and finally cut them off in 
1995 (Marchildon 2005). In turn, provinces reduced budget allocations to hospitals among 
other cost cutting measures such as hospital closures and rationing of services through the 
undersupply of technology and human resources (Angell 2008). Structural changes in service 
delivery were effected through the devolution of authority from provincial governments to 
regional health authorities (RHAs), in a process termed regionalization (Marchildon 2005). 
The aim of the reform was to cut costs by creating a seamless delivery system through the 
dissolution of the many autonomous boards and creation of one administrative body, the 
RHAs (Denis, Contandriopoulos & Beaulieu 2004). All provinces have merged hospitals into 
quasi-independent RHAs with the exception of Ontario which has devolved authority through 
a recommendatory authority, the District Health Council (Forest, Palley 2008). However in 
2005, Prince Edward Island province halted regionalization (Marchildon 2005). 
 
Regionalization has decreased gaps in provision of care, reduced service duplication and 
increased responsiveness of the health system to population health needs. RHAs are able to 
respond faster to pertinent issues as there are fewer autonomous bodies to consult in the 
decision making process (Denis, Contandriopoulos & Beaulieu 2004, Lewis, Kouri 2004). 
Some argue that the challenge arising from regionalization is from low morale among front-
line providers and managers. Changing the organizational culture that has taken decades to 
evolve has been challenging in tackling financial issues, integration of services, and 
community participation in decision making. Additionally, RHAs do not have authority over 
physicians‟ service contracts and budgets and pharmaceutical budgets, the main cost drivers 











- 51 - 
 
2.2.2 Primary care reforms 
Primary care innovations were launched in three waves starting in the 1970s with an aim to 
change the organizational structure of family practice and funding patterns. The reform began 
in Quebec in 1972 through the introduction of Centres locaux de services communautaires 
(CLSCs) (Marchildon 2005, Hutchison, Abelson & Lavis 2001). CLSCs reimbursed 
physicians on a salary basis. By the end of the 1990s slightly over 20% of family physicians 
and GPs worked in CLSCs (Hutchison, Abelson & Lavis 2001). Later Health Service 
Organizations (HSOs) were founded in Ontario, where general practitioners practising in the 
HSOs were reimbursed on a capitation basis. HSOs were unceremoniously suspended and 
Community Health Centres (CHCs) were introduced in their place. CHCs were funded 
through global budgets and employed physicians, nurse practitioners and midwives 
(Hutchison, Abelson & Lavis 2001). Salary and capitation payment methods were often used 
to reimburse physicians and to a lesser extent fee-for-service and global budgets.  
 
The goal of changing the fee-for-service provider payment mechanism for primary care 
practitioners has not been successful owing to: physicians‟ powerful opposition and 
insistence on autonomy; and, lack of stewardship by federal government in steering the 
process. The latter‟s influence is only felt at the funding level of mainly pilot and 
demonstrative projects most meeting their demise before any real changes can be achieved 













- 52 - 
 
2.3 Health financing 
2.3.1 Revenue collection 
There are three main financing sources: general tax revenue, private health insurance and out-
of-pocket payments.  
 
2.3.1.1 General tax revenue  
General revenue funds (GRF) are the main funding source for the Canadian health care 
system accounting for over 70% of the total health expenditure. The taxes comprise direct 
and indirect taxes collected by provincial and federal governments with a large share of the 
revenue coming from individual and corporate income taxes. Moreover, some provinces raise 
auxiliary health revenue through earmarked taxes or „premiums‟ (Marchildon 2005).  
 
2.3.1.2 Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket payments are the main source of private finance for health goods and services 
such as vision care, over-the-counter medications, and complementary and alternative 
medicines and therapies (Marchildon 2005). They account for 15% of total expenditure on 
health. 
 
2.3.1.3 Private health insurance (PHI) 
Private insurance accounts for 12% of the total health expenditure. This insurance performs 
two main roles: complementary and duplicate. The former is employer-based sponsored by 
trade unions and professional organizations and is compulsory for all employees and covers 
65% of the population (Dhalla 2007, Marchildon 2005). This insurance facilitates 
reimbursement of health goods and services that are not financed with public funds such as 
out-of-hospital pharmaceuticals, dental care, home care and outpatient rehabilitation mainly 
in physiotherapy clinics (Marchildon 2005). In addition, tax rebates are offered to subscribers 
of complementary PHI (Dhalla 2007) in all provinces with the exception of Quebec which 
taxes this health benefit under the province‟s income tax system (Marchildon 2005).  
 
On the other hand, duplicate PHI is allowed in four provinces (New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan) and illegal in six provinces-Alberta, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward and Quebec. Duplicate insurance covers all or 
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bill the public plan to practice in the private sector). Only in Nova Scotia are physicians 
(opted in or out) not allowed to bill more than rates charged by the public insurer. In 
Newfoundland, there are no limits to the range of services private plans can cover (Flood, 
Archibald 2001). This arrangement offers a perfect incentive for private insurance to thrive 
but the private sector is not flourishing because of the lack of public subsidies for duplicate 
insurance and the fact that physicians must opt in or out of the public plan deters dual 
employment (Dhalla 2007, Flood, Archibald 2001). Following the 2005 ruling in the Chaolli 
v Quebec case
8
 the, ban on duplicate PHI was lifted in Quebec province (Steinbrook 2006, 





2.3.1.4 Auxiliary sources of finance 
Contributions to social insurance funds raised by employers from provincial workers‟ 
compensation schemes and donations from charitable organizations directed towards health 
research, upgrading of facility infrastructure and equipment acquisition are other sources of 
funds for Medicare (Marchildon 2005). 
2.3.2 Coverage and composition of risk pools 
There are three main pools: the general tax revenue pool covers 100% of the population 
(Marchildon 2005) and the employer based private health insurance pool covers 65% of the 
population (Dhalla 2007). Population coverage for duplicate health insurance is still 
undetermined. 
 
                                                 
8
 The court ruled that the one-year wait for a hip replacement, a publicly insured service, (Steinbrook 2006) was 
a violation of the province‟s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms since the lengthy wait compromised the 
individual‟s health. The public insurer could either have shortened the waiting time or allowed the procedure to 
be provided in the private sector (Angell 2008). 
9
 In 2006 Quebec province revised its Medicare law to correspond with its human rights charter and the 
remaining five provinces that had previously banned PHI coverage for medically insured services are re-
examining their laws in anticipation of future litigation if the current CHA stipulations are perceived to conflict 
with a patient‟s human rights (Angell 2008, Marchildon 2005). The Quebec government has proposed that 
duplicate insurance should be limited to services obtained from opted out practitioners (Madore 2006). Alberta 
has allowed duplicate PHI to meet the costs of privately delivered care by allowing direct purchasing of publicly 
insured services from private providers and permitting dual employment of physicians in both sectors. The 
provincial government of British Columbia, is considering private delivery and possibly financing of publicly 
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2.3.2.1 Pooling organizations 
The Canada Revenue Agency collects federal taxes but taxes are also collected at provincial 
and municipal levels (PWC 2009b).  
 
2.3.2.2 Allocation mechanisms 
The federal government transfers pooled general tax revenue on a per capita basis to 
provincial governments, which then transfer funds to RHAs through global budgets 
(Marchildon 2005). Global budgets result in some regions receiving disproportionately more 
funds than others creating across-region inequalities. To harmonize this disparity, a needs-
based-funding or population-based funding has long been proposed (Li 2006) for allocating 
budgetary funds from the provincial government to the RHAs. So far, only three provinces 
(British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan) have adopted the needs based approach while 
Ontario applies this funding method in allocating financial resources for home care and 
community-based services (Hurley 2004). 
 
Insurers reimburse providers based on claims made by the insured to the health insurance 
company for medical expenses paid (Li 2006). 
 
2.3.3 Purchasing 
2.3.3.1 Benefit package 
Medically necessary services at secondary, tertiary, emergency care and elective care levels 
are offered free of charge, not-for-profit hospitals. Provincial drug plans or complementary 
health insurance, subsidizes the costs of out-of-hospital prescriptions Primary care services 
are provided by private physician practicing in solo and rarely in group practices. Patients 
have a choice of a primary care provider since there is no rostering. Most patients have an 
established relationship with physicians (Marchildon 2005). Outpatient prescriptions are not 
publicly funded but all provinces have drug plans (Pharmacare) to insure against these 
charges for those on social assistance and citizens aged over 65. The exceptions are New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland where the drug plans cover only senior citizens with very low 
incomes. All the provincial drug plans are tax-financed except in Quebec where those on 
Pharmacare are required to pay an annual premium based on net income. The premium is 
collected through the provincial income tax system. In addition, Alberta offers an extended 
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recipients. This plan also provides coverage for outpatient prescriptions (Blomqvist, Xu 
2001). 
 
Rehabilitation within hospitals is publicly insured, while out-patient rehabilitation mainly 
home-based physiotherapy services or workplace occupational therapy may be financed 
through employer based health insurance, duplicate insurance or purchased directly from 
service providers (Marchildon 2005).    
 
2.3.3.2 Provider payment 
Salaries are the preferred provider payment method for all cadres of nursing personnel and 
pharmacists working in the for-profit retail sector (Marchildon 2005). Physicians are 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis (Li 2006, Marchildon 2005, Leatt, Pink & Guerriere 
2000). Hospitals and clinics receive global budget transfers from RHAs (Li 2006). The RHAs 
have the authority to determine the method of allocation and payment to the various health 
organizations in a specified region (Marchildon 2005). 
 
2.3.3.3 Purchasers  
General practitioners have the gatekeeper role in the health system (Marchildon 2005). RHAs 
do not provide primary care but contract out to private practitioners (Hutchison, Abelson & 
Lavis 2001) but they manage acute care facilities and directly reimburse the salaried health 
personnel (Marchildon 2005). 
 
2.3.4 Provision 
The services covered at primary care level include maternal and child health care and other 
non-acute medical care services. Patients have a choice in selecting a family practitioner with 
most patients having established relationships with respective family physicians (Marchildon 
2005). Physicians are independent contractors with one third practicing in solo practices 
while the rest practice in small group practices, averaging five physicians per group, owned 
and managed by the physicians (Hutchison, Abelson & Lavis 2001). 
 
Dental services are provided by independent practitioners in private practices. An estimated 
94% of all dental care services are not publicly financed. Dental services are privately 
financed either through direct out-of-pocket payments or through employer-based private 
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subsidized for social assistance receipts for some or all services provided.  However, dental 
surgery performed within a hospital setting is publicly financed (Marchildon 2005). 
 
Hospitals are structured as non-profit organizations that are publicly funded through global 
budgets. The hospitals are managed by RHAs. For-profit private hospitals do not qualify for 
block funding and are prohibited from providing health care services that are covered by the 
public payer (Detsky, Naylor 2003). Inpatient rehabilitation is publicly financed while 
outpatient rehabilitation mainly in physiotherapy clinics is not covered by public insurance. 
This service is accessible from private providers through employer based health insurance or 
out-of-pocket payments. Long term care for the elderly is provided in nursing homes either 
run by RHAs or by both not-for-profit or for-profit independent organizations (Marchildon 
2005). 
 
For pharmaceutical care, physicians are permitted to prescribe a wide range of prescription 
items and to a lesser extent dentists and nurse practitioners. Out-of-hospital prescription items 
and over the counter drugs are obtained at the various retail pharmacies in the country which 
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3.0 Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
3.1 Historical background 
The first Korean medical insurance law was enacted in 1963 (Kwon 2009) allowing firms 
with 300 employees or more to create health insurance societies for enrolment on a voluntary 
basis. This was highly ineffective due to adverse selection (Peabody, Lee & Bickel 1995) 
limited funding and high administrative costs leading to a revision of the law in 1970 (Son 
1998). Health insurance remained voluntary until 1977 when mandatory insurance was 
introduced (Yang, Bae & Kim 2008, Kwon 2003a, Jong-Chan Lee 2003). Contributions were 
progressively structured in terms of income, and benefit entitlement was independent of the 
level of contributions (Anderson 1989). 
 
The first group to be insured were firms with 500 or more employees (Kwon, Chen 2008, 
WHO 2005a, Son 1998). Extension of health insurance to other occupational groups and their 
dependants occurring incrementally; in 1978 to government workers (Peabody, Lee & Bickel 
1995), 1979 to school employees and pensioners (Anderson 1989), 1980 to military personnel 
and to establishments with 100 workers in 1981, 16 in 1983 and 5 in 1988 (Son 1998). With 
the formal sector insured, coverage was extended to the informal sector. This was intended to 
decrease the unequal payments for health care between the two sectors. Providers charged 
higher unregulated fees to the non-insured group as a counteractive measure to the 
government-regulated fees reimbursed by formal sector insurance societies (Kwon 2009). 
Accordingly, the self-employed in rural areas and foreign residents were covered in 1988 and 
in 1989, the last un-insured group, the urban self-employed were covered (Kwon 2003a, Son 
1998). 
 
Universal coverage was achieved through the numerous social insurance societies and a 
means-tested program, Medical Aid, which subsidized contributions for low income earners, 
the unemployed and poor (Kwon 2003a) to create the national health insurance (NHI) system 
in Korea. Medical Aid was established in 1977 (Anderson 1989) and is financed primarily 
with general revenue funds (WHO 2005a) with supplementary funds from local government 
which manages the programme (Peabody, Lee & Bickel 1995). The fund covers 4.6% of the 
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Health care services are provided by for-profit providers reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
(FFS) basis. Thus, the vulnerability of the health system to financial shocks and increases in 
health spending is inevitable given this FFS dominance with limited incentives to contain 
costs (Kwon 2007). Cost containment and fiscal stability in the NHI can be only achieved by 
reforming the financial incentives embedded in the current provider payment system to 
ensure provision of cost-effective care while reducing the escalating health cost inflation 
(Kwon 2009). 
3.2 Major reforms 
3.2.1 Pharmaceutical reform 
Prior to the pharmaceutical reform in 2000, both pharmacists and physicians could prescribe 
and dispense medicines (Kwon, Reich 2005), a practice influenced by the lack of role 
differentiation between prescriber and dispenser in the tradition of Oriental medicine 
prevalent in East Asia (Jeong 2005). The sale of drugs was highly lucrative as local 
pharmaceutical companies supplied physicians with drugs with high profit margins (Kim, 
Chung & Lee 2004). Revenue from drugs sales accounted for 40% of total income in most 
physician clinics (Jeong 2005).  On the other hand, pharmacists played the role of primary 
care providers (Jong-Chan Lee 2003, Kwon 2003c), a practice boosted by the culture of self-
medication among Koreans (Kwon, Reich 2005, Kim, Chung & Lee 2004).   
 
The pharmaceutical reform was enacted to decrease misuse and overuse of drugs, improve 
the efficiency of the pharmaceutical sector and streamline drug distribution. The policy 
mandated separation of not only the dispensing and prescribing roles but of medical 
institutions, outlawing location of pharmacies within hospitals (Jeong 2005). Faced with 
revenue losses generated from sale of drugs, both office-based and private-hospital based 
physicians engineered a series of nationwide strikes in defiance of the reform, grinding the 
health system to a halt (Kwon 2007, Kwon, Reich 2005, Kwon 2003c). As restitution for 
revenue losses, government increased medical fees by 45% in 2000 (Kwon 2007). The 
dominant bargaining power gained by physicians led to alteration of the original reform 
agenda, with negative consequences for the health system. For example, regulation granting 
the right to prescribe by brand name was passed allowing for generic substitution only for 
drugs that had undergone mandated bioequivalence tests (Jeong 2005). Accordingly, a greater 
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NHI‟s reimbursable list. Additionally, the right to administer injection was restored to 
physicians (Kwon, Reich 2005, Jeong 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Payment reform 
The unprecedented national economic crisis in 1997 (Kim, Chung & Lee 2004) widened the 
NHI‟s financial deficits worsening the escalating health care cost inflation that was fuelled by 
the profit-driven delivery system, an ageing population, expensive medical supplies and 
increased spending on pharmaceuticals (Kwon 2003b). To contain the rising health costs on 
the delivery side, government adopted two provider reimbursement methods; Diagnostic 
Related Groups (DRG) and resource-based relative value (RBRV) payments in the late 1990s 
(Kwon 2007, Kwon, Reich 2005, Kwon 2003b).  
 
The DRG-based prospective payment system for inpatient care was launched in 1997 as a 
pilot programme (Kwon 2007) among voluntarily participating hospitals (Kwon, Reich 
2005). By January 2000, there were 798 hospitals participating in the pilot project (Kwon 
2003b). Evaluation of the program after the three-year pilot proved providers were 
responding to the saving incentives of the DRG-based method (Kwon, Reich 2005). The 
economic burden on patients had lessened due to expansion of the benefit package and 
overall there was a decrease in medical care costs, inpatient days, average number of tests per 
inpatient and the use of antibiotics without compromise to quality of care (Kwon 2003b). 
However, the DRG payment method was not implemented nationwide in spite of its proven 
efficiency because of the pharmaceutical reform (Kwon 2007, Kwon, Reich 2005, Kwon 
2003b).  
 
The RBRV-based payment for office-based physicians aimed at introducing new fee 
schedules that would change the relative prices of health services and redistribute income 
across specialties by cutting fees on over-valued services and increasing prices on the under-
priced services. However, physicians affected by the fee cuts opposed the reform and instead 
the RBRV payment system was implemented in 2001 with some modifications. While the 
fees for under priced services were increased, fees for overpriced services were not reduced 
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3.2.3 Single payer system 
Prior to the integration reform in 2000, the NHI was characterized by multiple insurance 
schemes operating as non-profit quasi-official bodies regulated by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare. The schemes had statutory benefit packages and the same FFS reimbursement 
mechanism for paying providers (Peabody, Lee & Bickel 1995)
10
. By 1998 there were 227 
insurance societies catering for the self-employed, 142 for industrial workers and a single 
scheme, the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation (KMIC) for civil servants and teachers in 
private schools (Kwon 2003a). 
 
Faced with rising health expenditures, the medical schemes catering for the self-employed 
experienced financial instabilities as the partial subsidy from government, though increased 
incrementally over time, was insufficient in meeting the health expenditures. As a counter 
active measure, contributions were increased to augment revenue but with less ability to pay 
among the rural population, most rural medical societies faced chronic financial instabilities 
requiring risk equalization
11
 (Kwon 2009, Kwon 2003a). This revenue-sharing arrangement 
involved all schemes in the NHI and involved creation of a fiscal stabilization fund that took 
account of catastrophic expenditures and proportion of aging members in each scheme in 
determining the per capita amount payable to providers. As expected, the beneficiaries of 
risk-equalization were schemes catering for the rural self-employed (Kwon 2003a). In spite 
of the stabilization measures, financial insolvency lingered in rural schemes and the NHI as a 
whole (Kwon 2009). This eroded social solidarity and widened the health inequities among 
NHI beneficiaries due to varying fiscal capacity and composition of enrolees. Rural schemes 
had decreasing numbers of enrolees (Kwon 2009) and a higher percentage of high risk 
individuals (the elderly, low income earners and chronically ill) than other schemes (Kwon 
2003c), attributes that limited cross-subsidies in the schemes. It is against this background 
that the NHI was transformed from a multiple-insurer system characterized by fragmented 
pools incapable of equitable risk pooling and deficient in harnessing the economies of scale 
                                                 
10
 The insurance schemes did not engage in competitive behaviour to attract enrolees nor improve risk pooling 
(Kwon 2003a) but operated as co-operatives (Peabody, Lee & Bickel 1995). They managed finances resources 
by collecting own revenue and managing this financial resource through accumulation of surpluses which 
ensured their financial stability (Anderson 1989) 
 
11
 “A mechanism whereby revenue accruing from contributions to several health insurance schemes or health 
funds acting as financing intermediaries (i.e organizations that receive contributions and pay health care 
providers) for a social health insurance system is pooled and the individual schemes allocated an amount which 
reflects the expected costs of each scheme according to the overall ill-health risk profile of its membership 
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in management, to a single payer system (Kwon 2003a). Other reasons were the apparent 
horizontal inequity, a consequence of differences in level of contributions with individuals of 
comparable earnings contributing more or less depending on which society they were 
enrolled in (Kwon 2009, Kwon, Reich 2005), and lack of self-governance within the medical 
societies due to centralized decision making passed down by bureaucratic elites (Kwon 
2003a).  
 
Merging of insurance societies was achieved in two phases: the partial merger in 1998 that 
consolidated the insurance societies for the self-employed, civil servants and private teachers 
and the full merger in 2000 when industrial workers‟ insurance societies were incorporated 
into the National Health Insurance Co-operation (NHIC) (Jeong 2005). The NHIC determines 
the level of contributions, level of services, provider payment and fund management. These 
roles are implemented by NHIC branches countrywide (NHIC 2009). 
3.3 Health financing 
3.3.1 Revenue collection 
There are four sources of finance in this health system: mandatory insurance contributions, 
out-of-pocket payments, general tax revenue and voluntary health insurance. 
3.3.1.1 Mandatory insurance contributions 
This is the main source of finance for the NHI. The contribution levels for the self-employed 
takes into account income and property (Kwon 2009, Kwon 2007) while for industrial 
workers, civil servants and school employees the contributions are proportional to income 
shared equally between employer and employee (Kwon 2009). The contribution rate is fixed 
at 5.08% (NHIC 2009).  
 
3.3.1.2 Out-of-pocket payments 
This is the second major source of funds for the health care system and relates to quite 
substantial co-payments on insured services and direct payment of uninsured services. 
Though the NHI benefit package has been expanded gradually, the proportion of OOPs has 
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3.3.1.3 General revenue funds 
These funds fully subsidize the contributions to the NHI for the poor through Medical Aid 




3.3.1.4 Supplementary private health insurance 
Private insurance plays a supplementary role in Korea. This type of benefit is supplementary 
to public insurance and comprises a fixed amount of benefits in the event of catastrophic 
illnesses to cover the cost of co-payments (Kang et al. 2009, Shin et al. 2009). This insurance 
is provided by life insurance and damage insurance companies (WHO 2005a). The benefit 
covers few cancer screening services and/or preventative services after diagnosis has been 
made. The patient then purchases the needed treatment from providers with the lump sum 
payout (Kang et al. 2009). Given the large benefit payouts made to beneficiaries, PHI often 
over- or under-insures Koreans. The average benefit payable to newly diagnosed cancer 
patients was 20 000 USD between 2001 and 2005 while actual co-payments for cancer 
services under the NHI are usually lower than 10 000 USD. This “over insurance” could 




3.3.2.1 Coverage and composition of risk pools 
There are three main fund pools: the social insurance pool, the general taxation pool and the 
private insurance pool. The social insurance pool covers 96% of the population, general tax 
revenue covers 4% (NHIC 2009) and private insurance covers between 2-4% of the 
population. 
 
3.3.2.2 Pooling organizations 
The NHIC through its nationwide branches collects revenue (NHIC 2009). There is pool 
integration between the general revenue fund pool and the mandatory insurance pool, through 
the partial and full subsidization of the NHI contributions with GRF. 
  
                                                 
12
 80% of the subsidy is from general government budget while 20% is from the earmarked cigarette tax (Kwon, 
Chen 2008). The partial government subsidy pays 22%-50% of contributions for the insured in island and 
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3.3.2.3 Allocation mechanisms 
There is no definite formula for allocating of health resources in the Korean health system. 
The central claim review agency, the Health Insurance Review Agency (HIRA), reviews all 
medical claims and determines whether services delivered to NHI beneficiaries are medically 
necessary and cost-effective (Kwon 2009, NHIC 2009). The NHIC then reimburses providers 
based on HIRA‟s assessment. 
 
3.3.3 Purchasing 
3.3.3.1 Benefit package 
Health care benefits are either in the form of cash or benefits in-kind, the latter constitutes 
99% of all inpatient benefits. The benefit package has been expanded over time to include a 
variety of health interventions such as unlimited inpatient stay days, medicines dispensed in 
pharmacies, CT scanning technology (Jeong 2005) traditional medicine (Kwon 2007), meals 
during hospitalization, nursing, ambulance services (NHIC 2009), bi-annual checkups and 
vaccinations (Kwon 2009). Cancer screening for stomach, colon, breast and liver is shared 
between insurer (80%) and beneficiary (20%). Uninsured services are those that are not life-
threatening or impair physical activity such as plastic surgery (NHIC 2009).  
 
 3.3.3.2 Provider payment 
Office-based physicians are primarily public-funded through the NHI (Wagstaff 2007). The 
reimbursement is based on the RBRV- method but they also receive substantial revenue from 
patients through direct payment of fees for utilization of uninsured services. Hospital-based 
physicians are on salaried contracts (Kwon 2003). Private and public hospitals have a similar 
fee schedule (Kwon 2009). Providers are paid on a regulated FFS basis by the single insurer 
(Kwon 2007, Kwon 2003b). The common fee schedule for both primary and tertiary care is a 
strong incentive for providers to oversupply uninsured services (Wagstaff 2007) for which 
patients pay directly such as sonograms, private rooms, special treatment charges (STCs), 
most nuclear scanning and some chemotherapy (Yang 1996). 
 
3.3.3.3 Purchasers 
The lack of role differentiation at all levels of care and absence of gate keepers at the primary 
care level (Kwon 2003) results in a weak referral system. Ambulatory clinics offer an 
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in hospitals resulting in competition for patients between hospitals and physician clinics 
(Kwon 2009). Active purchasing by the single insurer, the NHIC, is non-existent. 
 
3.3.4 Provision 
Providers are a mix of for-profit, not-for-profit and public institutions (Yang 1996). Most for-
profit hospitals are owned and managed by physicians (Kwon 2003). Approximately 90% 
(Jong-Chan Lee 2003) of acute general and acute hospitals (Yang 1996) and all ambulatory 
clinics are privately owned (Yang, Bae & Kim 2008). The not-for profit hospitals are owned 
by for-profit owners. Many private hospitals evolved from physician clinics with few beds 
that were expanded by enterprising physicians to meet the growing demand and utilization 
health care as result of the NHI programme (Kwon 2003b). The public sector controls fewer 
than 10% of acute hospitals (Kwon 2009, Kwon, Reich 2005, Jeong 2005)
13
. 
                                                 
13
This comprises tuberculosis, leprosy and psychiatric hospitals (Yang 1996), the Bogeunso or public health 












- 66 - 
 
 
Figure 5: Health Financing Korea  
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4.0 The United Kingdom  
4.1 Historical background 
Social care and provision of state-funded health care was common in England since the 16
th
 
century with the poor receiving care from religious missions particularly monasteries. 
Advancements in medical education paved the way for the establishment of hospitals by local 
and municipal authorities. Local authorities were responsible for providing community health 
services and public health while general practitioners provided primary care as a family 
doctor service (Greengross, Grant & Collini 1999). In 1911, parliament endorsed a national 
health insurance act that allowed insurance coverage for low-income workers. The insurance 
covered primary health care, drugs and provided cash benefits at the time of illness (Savedoff 
2004, Light 2003). However, dependants were not covered by the scheme. The affluent were 
covered through various provident societies, fraternities and clubs that offered voluntary 
health insurance. Inequities in access to health care prevailed as majority of the population, 
mainly the poor and the unemployed did not have any form of prepaid health care. They 
financed their health care costs on an out-of-pocket basis or depended on the mercy of private 
GPs, who offered primary health care services to the poor as a form of charity (Light 2003). 
The hospital system was two-tiered with public hospitals on one hand offering a 
comprehensive range of care and smaller, under-funded private hospitals offering limited 
health care services on the other. Service co-ordination between the two-hospital types and 
access to specialized care was lacking. Specialists owned and located private practices in 
affluent areas where a greater number of private patients resided (Light 2003).  
 
Plans to extend and improve the national insurance scheme to a universal scheme to cover 
more people were expressed in the 1942 report “Social Insurance and Allied Services” 
authored by Sir William Beveridge (Musgrove 2000). The report explicitly described the 
need for universal health care, greater spending on education, housing, social security and 
employment (Light 2003). The recommendation in the Beveridge report came into effect 
after the devastation of the Second World War. There was a high degree of social 
cohesiveness with collective responsibility towards nation building. The key political actor at 
the time, the Labour Party, riding on the emerging cross-class social solidarity pushed for a 
centralized universal health system financed with general revenue funds (Savedoff 2004). 
Accordingly, the National Health Service (NHS) Act was enacted in 1946 paving the way for 
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The three fundamental principles of the NHS at its launch were: that it met the needs of the 
population; service delivery was free at the point of delivery and care based on clinical need 
and not ability to pay (Greengross, Grant & Collini 1999). Nonetheless, professional 
organizations representing medical specialists and general practitioners were opposed to the 
idea of „socialized medicine‟. Incentives were offered through lucrative service contracts and 
professional autonomy to make them receptive of the new system. GPs were allowed to 
practice independently, but would be contracted by the NHS to treat their patients. On the 
other hand, specialists were granted flexible contracts that allowed dual employment in the 
public and private sector. This entailed employment on a full or part-time basis in NHS 
hospitals under salaried contracts while allowing for private practice under fee-for-service 
contracts (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). This has remained 
unchanged until today. 
 
In terms of organizational structure, local agencies and organizations are separately 
responsible for planning, decision making and regulating the NHS (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). The Department of Health formulates policies 
and sets standards on key issues in the NHS. The delivery system comprises strategic health 
authorities and primary care trusts (PCTs) the former responsible for strategic planning while 
PCTs commission services on behalf of NHS patients. Health care is accessed through 
primary and community health facilities and hospitals which deliver a comprehensive range 
of services, mainly health promotion, curative care, preventative care, self-care, rehabilitation 
and aftercare. Secondary care is provided at NHS hospitals or Trusts and specialist care 
centres upon referral from primary care trusts (PCTs). Emergency services are handled by 
ambulances provided under the NHS Ambulance Trust (The European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems 1999). 
4.2 Key reforms 
4.2.1 Purchaser-provider split 
The introduction of the purchaser-provider split in 1991 was intended to improve efficiency, 
widen patients‟ choices, improve quality in service delivery and encourage competition 
among providers for service contracts from purchasers (The European Observatory on Health 
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provision of hospital services to hospitals, which came to be known as NHS Trusts, after 
health authorities took on the new role of purchasers to compete with GP fund-holding 
schemes (Chalkley, McVicar 2008). By 1998 all acute hospitals, community care providers 
and ambulance services had become trusts (The European Observatory on Health Care 
Systems 1999).  
 
GP fund holding was abolished in 1998, and in its place, primary care groups (PCGs) were 
introduced, later becoming primary care trusts (PCTs) (Abbott, Procter & Iacovou 2009). 
PCTs have a dual role as providers of primary care and purchasers of secondary care, within 
an integrated budget, an approach that improves technical efficiency. Unlike in the fund 
holding era where joining such a scheme was voluntary, all GP are mandated to join a PCT. 
Typical PCTs comprise 4-5 GPs. Health authorities are now responsible for strategic 
planning in collaboration with PCTs, other NHS trusts and local authorities (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999).  
 
4.2.2 Performance-based contracts for providers 
Performance-linked contracts introduced in the 1990s failed to induce GPs to meet health 
promotion and immunization targets in spite of financial incentives (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). New contracts were introduced in 2004 in which 
GPs earn points for meeting set targets on three main indicators of delivery of quality care 
namely clinical, organizational structure of the practice and patient experience. Additional 




Following the purchaser-provider split, purchasers and providers had autonomy to determine 
the nature of the contract to enter into with respective partners, the contracts included block, 
cost and volume and cost per case contracts (Greengross, Grant & Collini 1999). These 
payment methods generated perverse incentives for providers to retain financial surpluses 
without any cost saving measures (Chalkley, McVicar 2008). Additionally, providers did not 





 Health outcomes are deemed to improve especially in reducing the mortality and morbidity from non-
communicable diseases that constitute the highest burden of disease in the UK, illnesses excluded from the 
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have incentives to increase elective activity, as extra work was not remunerated. Payment by 
result (PbR) introduced in 2005 links funds allocated to hospitals to elective activities 
undertaken. This payment arrangement creates incentives to reward good performance while 
reducing waiting times and decreasing average length of stay (Department of Health 2002).  
 
4.3 Health financing 
4.3.1 Revenue collection  
There are four main financing sources for the NHS; general tax revenue, national insurance 
(NI) contributions, voluntary health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
 
4.3.1.1 General revenue funds 
The NHS is primarily tax-financed with central government revenue (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999) that comprises an assortment of taxes collected 
by the central collecting authority (Adam, Browne 2006).  
 
4.3.1.2 National Insurance (NI) contributions 
These are mandated contributions for employers, employees and the self-employed. The 
financial contributions are paid to the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) (Busse et al. 2002). 
The contribution entitles contributors to social security benefits. The NI contributions are 
capped consisting of upper and lower limits for employee and employer contributions. The 
NI funds are further supplemented by an earmarked 1% levy on income introduced in 2003 
(WHO 2006). Local government taxes seldom finance health care (Busse et al. 2002) but 
instead provide additional funding for social services mainly home care and residential care 
for the elderly (WHO 2006). 
 
4.3.1.3 Private health insurance (PHI) 
PHI is primarily of two types: employer- based (59%) as a work related health benefit; and, 
individual plans (31%) that are voluntarily purchased. The remaining 10% consists of 
voluntarily purchased PHI by certain employees, without the employer-sharing arrangement 
with professional bodies or trade unions acting as umbrella organizations (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). PHI expands consumer choice by offering access 
to a wider choice of providers, treatment facilities and timing of treatment by private 
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depend on the price of the premium; the higher the premium the more comprehensive the 
cover and vice versa. PHI flows to providers of alternative care such as home nursing 
services, superior accommodation in private hospitals and cosmetic surgery. PHI does not 
extend benefits for resource-intensive services such as accident and emergency services 
(Foubister et al. 2006). 
 
4.3.1.3.1 Health cash plans 
They provide prepayment for health care payments made on an out-of-pocket basis. The 
benefit is a fixed proportion of the out-of-pocket charge (Foubister et al. 2006). 
 
4.3.1.4 Out-of-pocket payments 
These payments are made for services not covered with public funds such as use of amenity 
beds in NHS hospitals, prescription charges, dental care, and ophthalmic services (The 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999).  
 
4.3.2 Pooling  
4.3.2.1 Coverage and composition of risk pools 
There are two main pools: the general taxation pool and the PHI pool. The general tax pool 
covers 100% of the population, while the PHI covers 11% of the population (Foubister et al. 
2006). 
4.3.2.2 Pooling organizations  
General revenue funds and NI contributions are collected by the central revenue collecting 
agency, Her Majesty‟s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). NI contributions are then channelled 
to the National Insurance Fund managed by Treasury, from which a fixed proportion is made 
to the NHS (Adam, Browne 2006). PHI contributions are collected by private insurers or 
professional intermediaries or paid directly by patients to insurers (Foubister et al. 2006). 
 
4.3.2.3 Allocation mechanisms 
Pooled funds from general revenue and NIS are allocated to the NHS through the primary 
care trusts (PCTs) (Department of Health 2008). This budgetary allocation from central 
authorities to PCTs is based on a weighted capitation formula determined by population size 
and weighted for age composition and other indicators of relative need for health care such as 
mortality, morbidity, social economic status and ethnicity. The allocation formula ensures 
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relative need for care (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). This 
ensures that all legal residents of the United Kingdom have access to health care services 
irrespective of geographical location, age, social economic status and so on.  
 
4.3.3 Purchasing 
4.3.3.1 Benefit package 
The benefit package is not explicit. Instead health authorities have discretionary authority in 
influencing service delivery by making sure that providers avail needed health care to their 
resident population in line with the Patient‟s Charter introduced in 1991 (The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999).  
 
Benefit package decisions are based on the recommendations of the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) (Gress et al. 2005, Rawlins 1999). NICE was established in 1999 
to provide explicit guidelines on the cost-effectiveness of new and existing treatment regimes 
and technology (Appleby et al. 2009). NICE is an autonomous organization responsible for 
technology appraisal; development of clinical guidelines based on economic data; and for 
upholding clinical audits and confidential inquiries (Gress et al. 2005, Schreyögg et al. 2005). 
The decision criterion is based on both the incremental costs and incremental effectiveness of 
treatment and diagnostic procedures through which costs per Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALY) are comparable across QALY league tables. The accepted cost effectiveness 
threshold applied by NICE is a range between £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY gained 
(Appleby et al. 2009). The appraisal provided by NICE is based on directions from the 
Department of Health. The process is rigours and transparent involving key stakeholders 
including professionals and patient-focused organizations. Implementation of NICE 
guidelines is monitored by the Commission of Health Improvement (CHI) (Gress et al. 2005). 
Recently, NICE endorsed complementary therapies such as acupuncture and chiropractic 
therapy as additional therapies to conventional pain treatment regimens (Praities 2009). 
 
Primary health care is subsidized by public monies and is free, provided by independent 
medical practitioners. In-patient care at NHS hospitals is free except for amenity care (private 
wards in NHS hospitals). Direct payments are levied for services not covered in the NHS but 
those with a lesser ability to pay are excluded from making the payments (Li 2006; The 
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Dental care is provided by independent private dental practitioners commissioned by PCTs. 
Co-payments for dental services account for 80% of the cost of treatment but there is a co-
payment ceiling for dental services (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 
1999). In the absence of adequate public financing for dental care, private financing of these 
services with dental insurance has grown (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 
1999). It is estimated that one in every four patients has dental insurance. This is inequitable 
for those that cannot afford supplementary cover. The fact that patients meet all the costs of 
dental care with the exception of children, pregnant women and nursing mothers and social 
assistance recipients, erodes the NHI principle of equity in access for all.  
 
4.3.3.2 Provider payment methods 
General practitioners are reimbursed on a capitation basis with a mix of fixed allowances, 
health promotion payments and service payments or quality points. Hospital GPs and other 
health professionals are on salaried contracts. Specialists working for the NHS on a full time 
basis have flexible contracts that allow them to earn up to 10% of their gross income from 
private practice while those on maximum part-time contracts do not have restrictions on their 
earnings from private practice and can work unlimited hours in the private sector by giving 
up an eleventh of their NHS salary. In the private sector, fee-for-service is the preferred 
payment method (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999).  
 
Hospitals are reimbursed based on payment by result (PbR) which induces increases in 
elective output as hospital budgets are proportional to the increase in elective activity 
(Marini, Street 2007). PCTs now commission for acute care based on a cost-and volume basis 
using Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs). HRGs are „a tool for classifying patients into a 
manageable number of groups of cases that are clinically similar and that require similar 
levels of healthcare resources for diagnosis, treatment and care‟ (Department of Health 2002). 
This case-mix payment arrangement is advantageous due to the uniformity in prices 
nationally for interventions and conditions (Klein 2006), an approach that promotes risk 
sharing between relatively mild illnesses and chronic ailments.  
 
4.3.3.3 Purchasers 
PCTs arrange for health care on behalf of the population covering 50 000 to 250 000 people 
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from NHS trusts and primary care from independent practitioners (GPs, dentists, pharmacists 
and optometrists) and directly providing community care (Abbott, Procter & Iacovou 2009). 
Referrals to specialist care are done after consultation with respective GPs, assigning them 
the gatekeeper role (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999). 
 
4.3.4 Provision 
Patients self-select to register with a GP in their respective geographical area. Registered 
patients have access to a wide range of preventative, diagnostic and curative primary care 
services (The European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999) provided by general 
practitioners in PCTs within stipulated office hours. Private provision of primary health is 
limited in the NHS since GPs are not allowed to see their listed NHS patients privately or 
issue prescriptions. Additionally, only limited insurance companies give coverage for primary 
health coverage hindering growth in this area expect for walk-in clinics in cosmopolitan cities 
such as London. By 2002, there were 36 walk-in private clinics (Busse et al. 2002).  
 
The hospital system is three tiered with community hospitals at the lowest level followed by 
district general hospitals at the middle level, which serve as the foundation of the hospital 
system. Tertiary hospitals are at the apex where specialized care such as neurosurgery, heart 
and liver transplants among other services are offered (The European Observatory on Health 
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5.0 Mexico 
5.1 Historical background  
The health system dates back to 1943 when the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Children‟s 
Hospital and the Mexican Institute for Social Security or IMSS were established (Frenk et al. 
2003b). Years later in 1959, another social security system the Institute
 
of Social Services and 
Security for Civil Servants (ISSSTE) was established (Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, Knaul, Frenk 
2005).  
 
The Mexican health system is characterized by inequities in access, health status and 
financing (Barraza-Lloréns et al. 2002) and inefficiencies through the segregation of social 
health insurance systems serving different population groups based on employment status 
(Birn 1999). There are three main subsystems in the health system: (1) the social security 
systems that caters for salaried formal sector workers; (2) the government-funded health 
services through the SSA or Ministry of Health and limited nongovernmental organizations 
catering for the uninsured population; (3) the private sector (Barraza-Lloréns et al. 2002).  
 
The institutions in the social security system are the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 
(IMSS, Mexican institute for social security); the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales 
de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE); the Instituto de Seguridad para las Fuerzas 
Armadas Mexicanas (ISFAM, for the armed forces), and medical services provided by and 
for the national oil company (PEMEX), the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SDN, 
department of national defense), the Secretaría de Marina (SECMAR, navy department), and 
the Sistema de Transporte Colectivo del Metro (underground transport system).  
 
IMSS is the largest social security system catering for private sector workers followed by the 
ISSSTE that insures government workers and their dependants (Maurer 2008, Knaul, Frenk 
2005). Progress towards universal coverage through the social security schemes had been 
envisaged to occur incrementally (Laurell 2001) but interest groups fought the integration of 
different population groups into a single social security scheme and instead established 
parallel social security institutions insuring formal sector workers in the public and private 
sectors (Barraza-Lloréns et al. 2002). By 2001, IMSS and ISSSTE covered 95% of Mexico‟s 
formal labor force with the remaining 5% insured through other social security systems 
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The population outside the formal economy was treated as a „residual‟ group accessing care 
in the government-funded health care facilities, the SSA or ministry of health or State 
Secretariats of Health (SESA) (Knaul, Frenk 2005). The benefit package was not only 
imprecise but also underfunded, with health care for this group financed primarily from a 
combination of federal general revenue funds and user fees and to a lesser extent states‟ 
general revenue funds (Frenk et al. 2006). However, in 1979, the IMSS took the 
responsibility of managing the non-contributory rural health program (IMSS-Solidaridad) 
which was financed by the federal government to provide health care for the uninsured in 
remote geographical areas (Laurell 2001). However, they had access to health insurance 
through two voluntary schemes: Voluntaria al Regimen Obligatorio for the self-employed 
and Seguro de Salud para la Familia for workers in the informal sector (Moise, Docteur 
2007). Nonetheless, these two schemes were unsuccessful in scaling up full coverage to the 
population outside the formal sector. The recently introduced voluntary scheme Seguro 
Popular or Popular Health Insurance is viewed as a springboard to universal coverage and 
intends to insure previously uninsured Mexicans by 2010 (Laurell 2007, Frenk et al. 2006, 
Knaul et al. 2006, Knaul et al. 2005). 
 
The private sector in Mexico is diverse in quality, level of care offered (Barraza-Lloréns et al. 
2002), price and availability of care (Sosa-Rubí, Galárraga & Harris 2009). The sector is 
heterogeneous
15
 comprising: private physician clinics; under resourced hospitals the majority 
with a bed capacity of fewer than 15 beds; and, a for-profit hospital sector consisting of 
several hospital groups but there has been a move towards monopolisation by one group 
(Laurell 2007) through mergers and acquisition. 
 
5.2 Major reforms 
5.2.1 Decentralization 
Decentralization was targeted only at the delivery system for the uninsured population 
leaving the inequities in quality, spending and duplication of services within the social 
security systems to continue (Birn 1999). The main goal was to create a public health system 
in each of the 32 states by devolution of responsibility to states and integration of the physical 
                                                 
15
 Highly-trained specialists operate from state of the art medical facilities located in large cities catering for the 
upper and middle class segments of the population, that finance care through private health insurance or out-of-
pocket payments (Sosa-Rubí, Galárraga & Harris 2009). The private clinics on the other hand are run 
physicians, often without residency training, and offer low quality care to the uninsured masses dissatisfied with 
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and human resources of the SSA and IMSS-Solidaridad subsystems. Decentralization began 
in the early 1980s but stalled in 1987 only to resume a decade later in 1996 and finally 
conclude in 1997 (Laurell 2001).  
 
5.2.2 The 1995-1997 reforms 
The 1995 reforms were presented as part of the National Development Plan (Lloyd-Sherlock 
2006). The reform‟s objectives were to separate the IMSS‟s pension and social health 
insurance functions (Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, Laurell 2007) and restructure the organizational 
structure of the IMSS through a purchaser-provider split by introducing competitive 
purchasing (Laurell 2007). Medical Areas (MAs)
16
 were created which totalled 139 IMSS 
medical units by 1998. There were four MAs per state managed by seven Regional 
Directorates (Laurell 2001). Each IMSS MA is responsible for 260 000 enrolees, and 
comprises of several primary care units and a secondary level hospital. Specialized care is 
contracted to the 41-IMSS run tertiary hospitals (Telyukov 2001). Given that the aim of the 
reform was to introduce competitive purchasing in the IMSS, private managed care 
organizations (MCOs) were legislated in 2000 to compete with MAs and have been in 
operation since then. MCOs provide a range of health services or contract out services from 
other providers for IMSS beneficiaries based on the prestación indirect
17
 arrangement. 
Providers contracted by MCOs are reimbursed on a prospective capitation basis (Telyukov 
2001).  
5.2.3 2001-2006 Mexican Health reform 
The 2000 World Health Organization (WHO) Report singled out catastrophic health spending 
as a major challenge in the Mexican health system, ranking it 144 out of 191 countries with 
inequitable financing (Knaul et al. 2005). These findings coincided with an in-depth national 
analysis in 2001 that highlighted the high levels of catastrophic expenditures among the poor 
and uninsured households (Knaul, Frenk 2005). Catastrophic expenditures affected 2 to 4 
million households yearly (Knaul et al. 2005). Evidence from the detailed country-analysis 
brought to the public domain a reality that had been outside the health policy debate, that 
health costs could be a direct cause of impoverishment (Frenk 2006).
18
 International and 
                                                 
16
 MAs are similar to primary care trusts (PCTs)  in the United Kingdom. 
17
 IMSS beneficiaries through their employers receive a per capita fee, which they can use to access care outside 
the IMSS subsystem either in other public institutions or in the private sector, a strategy that is aimed at 
improving private managed care (Telyukov 2001) 
18
 The analysis revealed that in every trimester in 2000, 3.4% of the population suffered catastrophic health 
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national analysis served as advocacy tools for the establishment of a system of social 
protection in health, which was actualized in 2003 when the new insurance law was passed 
(Knaul, Frenk 2005, Frenk et al. 2003a). On the 1
st
 of January 2004, the General Health Law 
established the System for Social Protection in Health (SSPH) (Knaul, Frenk 2005). The 
voluntary Seguro Popular or Popular Health Insurance intends to cover the 50 million 
uninsured Mexicans by 2010 (Frenk et al. 2006).  
 
5.3 Health financing 
5.3.1 Revenue collection 
There are four main funding sources: mandatory insurance continuations, private insurance 
health insurance, general tax revenue and out-of-pocket payments. 
 
5.3.1.1 Social insurance contributions  
These are mandatory payroll deductions made by formal sector workers towards the various 
employer-based social security systems. The contributions are shared among the employer 
and employee with auxiliary funds from the federal‟s general revenue funds (Frenk et al. 
2006). The payroll deduction is 8.5% of base salary defined as „contractual salary plus some 
fringe benefits‟ to which the employee and federal government share equally at 5% each 
while the employer pays the remaining 90% (Martinez-Vazquez 2001).  
 
There are three main schemes catering for those outside the formal sector: Voluntaria al 
Regimen Obligatorio; Seguro de Salud para la Familia and Seguro Popular. The former two 
schemes are financed through subscriber contributions and a federal contribution (PAHO 
2002)
19
. Seguro Popular was introduced in 2004 and is aimed at insuring the previously 
                                                                                                                                                        
households in the lowest income quintiles (Gakidou et al. 2006). Catastrophic expenditures were spread out 
across the income distribution with wealthier households experiencing catastrophic expenditures from 
hospitalization while less wealthy households incurred catastrophic expenditures from low cost items such as 
ambulatory care and drugs. The latter accounted for 75% of total health spending on an out-of-pocket basis in 
poor households compared to 34% in wealthier households (Knaul et al. 2006). Additionally, the rates of 
catastrophic spending were higher in the uninsured than the insured groups, at 9.9% and 2.2%, respectively 
(Knaul et al. 2005). 
19
 The annual contribution ranges from US$100-250, while the federal subsidy is close to US$110(Lloyd-
Sherlock 2006). The high premiums are an impediment to enroll in these voluntary schemes (Moise, Docteur 
2007). With the exemption of the Seguro Popular which covers a comprehensive range of health services, the 
other two schemes offer benefits similar  to those offered to formal sector workers but with key exclusions: 
individuals with pre-existing conditions are not eligible to enrol, while some surgical procedures and expensive 
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uninsured Mexicans (Frenk 2006). The goal is to enroll 14.3% of the uninsured population 
per annum which translates to 11 million households (Knaul, Frenk 2005). 
 
The financing structure for mandatory insurance is tripartite in nature with differing roles and 
responsibilities among the various funding entities (federal, state and households), an 
arrangement that enhances solidarity and co-responsibility between governments and families 
(Frenk et al. 2006). 
 
The first component is a fixed allocation per family or „social quota‟ funded by the federal 
government adjusted periodically to factor in inflation. This allocation guarantees equal 
redistribution of finance resources (general revenue funds) among all population groups and 
upholds solidarity (Frenk et al. 2006). The federal social quota for Seguro Popular was 15% 
of the mandatory minimum wage in 2004 (Knaul et al. 2005). 
 
The second component is the co-responsible contributor which guarantees solidarity in each 
population group and redistribution among states. For IMSS the private sector employer is 
the co-responsible contributor and government for ISSSTE. Since there isn‟t an employer for 
Seguro Popular the co-responsibility is between state and federal governments that takes into 
account the variations in development across states. The federal contribution is on average 
1.5 times higher than the social quota with poorer states receiving higher increments than 
wealthier ones (Knaul, Frenk 2005). 
 
The third component is the pre-paid family contribution, which is progressive and 
redistributes family income. For IMSS and ISSSTE beneficiaries, the contribution is a 
monthly payroll deduction set at a progressive proportional rate to the wage ( Frenk et al. 
2006). 
 
5.3.1.2 General revenue funds 
These are derived from federal and state taxation. Federal general tax revenue fully 
subsidizes the contributions for families in the lowest income quintiles affiliated to Seguro 
Popular, and partially for those in other income quintiles in the informal sector and formal 
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5.3.1.3 Out-of-pocket payments 
This financing source accounts for the largest source of financing for the health system. Out-
of- pocket payments made are for user fees charged at the point of use in SSA facilities for 
inpatient care, dental care, and primary care services with the exception of maternal and child 
care (Birn 1999). Patients also pay directly for services in the private sector and for medicines 
at community pharmacies. An estimated 27% of the out-of-pocket spending goes towards 
consultations while 47.2% goes to medicines (Pagán et al. 2006). The fee-for service payment 
method in the private sector (Perez-Nunez et al. 2006) can be singled out as the main cost 
driver for the high out-of-pocket spending in Mexico. 
 
5.3.1.4 Private health insurance 
Private insurance performs a supplementary role in Mexico. PHI is often employer-based or 
voluntarily purchased by individuals. The annual premium charges range from $3000-$4000 
with extensive copayments and deductibles (Kirby 2006). Most subscribers of PHI are high-
income groups, or the few employees covered by employer-based health insurance. PHI is 
thus beyond the reach of most Mexicans. 
5.3.3 Pooling 
There are three fund pools in this health system: the mandatory social health insurance pool; 
the general tax revenue pool; and the PHI pool.  
 
5.3.3.1 Pooling organizations 
Federal general tax revenue is collected by the Tax Administration Service while social 
insurance contributions are collected and administered by two separate organizations: the 
Mexican Institutes of Social Security; and, the Housing Fund (PWC 2009a).  
 
5.3.3.2 Allocation mechanism  
The allocation formula takes into account health needs and level of socio economic 
development across states by tackling previous historical imbalances and inequities and 
differential health needs in the population. The new funding arrangement changes the 
incentive structure for state governments and providers since current state health budgets are 
attached to Seguro Popular affiliation. The allocation is a demand-driven funding approach 
that incentivizes states to enroll more families in return for increased federal transfers (Frenk 
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The allocation of general tax revenue is divided between federal and state revenue. Federal 
allocation under the System for Social Protection in Health (SSPH) is divided into four 
components: health related public goods that include stewardship roles of the Ministry of 
Health or SSA; community health services; non-catastrophic personal health services and 
high cost personal health services (Knaul, Frenk 2005).  
 
The stewardship functions (planning, information, evaluation, research and human resource 
development are financed through the regular Ministry of Health (MoH) budget (Frenk et al. 
2006).  
 
Personal health services financed through Seguro Popular are divided between an essential 
benefit package comprising both primary and secondary level interventions and high cost 
tertiary care. The latter is financed through a catastrophic fund, Fund for Protection against 
Catastrophic Expenditures (Fondo de Protection contra Gastos Catastróficos, FPGC). The 
essential package is financed with state level funds while the catastrophic services are 
aggregated at a national level because the small risk pool at the state level is inadequate for 
equitable risk pooling (Frenk et al. 2006). Furthermore, the provision of these services at 
tertiary facilities, which are managed by the federal government necessitates the aggregation 
at federal level. The FPGC receives 8% of the federal social quota plus the federal and state 
solidarity contributions (Knaul, Frenk 2005). An additional 2% is set aside for infrastructure 
development in marginalized areas and a reserve fund of 1% of the total is designated for 
unexpected increases in service utilization and provisional payments across all states (Frenk 
et al. 2006). The remaining social quota and solidarity contributions are allocated to states to 
finance the essential benefit package under Seguro Popular while the entire family 




5.3.4.1 Benefit package  
The benefit package under Seguro Popular  is expanded annually based on the emerging 
diseases (epidemiological profile), technological advancements and resource availability 
based on cost-effectiveness analyses and ethical deliberations on the socially acceptable 
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accounting for 95% of all hospital admissions and 17 highly complex interventions under the 
catastrophic fund (Frenk et al. 2006). 
 
For those insured under social security schemes such as the IMSS, services that are covered 
by the mandatory premium are listed under the Comprehensive Health Package. Health care 
services excluded from this benefit package can be accessed through supplementary 
voluntary health insurance (Laurell, 2001). 
 
5.3.4.2 Provider payment mechanisms 
Hospitals are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis in the private sector while public hospitals 
are allocated global budgets (Knaul, Frenk 2005). Voluntary participating hospitals (15 in 
total) and clinics under the IMSS social security system are reimbursed based on the 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) payment  method introduced in 1999 (Telyukov 2001). 
Prospective capitation is used to reimburse private MCOs and IMSS affiliated MAs (Laurell 
2007, Telyukov 2001). 
 
5.3.4.3 Purchasers 
The IMSS Medical Areas (MAs) have a dual role as providers and purchasers. Private 
managed care organizations (MCOs) also actively purchase health services on behalf of 




For the insured formal sector, health care access is free at the point of use (Frenk et al. 2006) 
at medical facilities owned and funded by each social security scheme, which also employs 
its health personnel (Anderson 2006). Health services for the uninsured are decentralized to 
state governments through a primary health care model with emphasis on public health 
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6.0 Conclusion 
Universal coverage has been attained differently in the four health systems. Canada and the 
United Kingdom have achieved 100% coverage through general tax revenue with an element 
of mandatory contributions for formal sector workers and the self-employed in the United 
Kingdom. These two health systems operate a single payer that purchases health care services 
from public providers in the United Kingdom and not-for profit providers in Canada. There is 
minimal contracting from for-profit private providers in the two health systems. Korea and 
Mexico on the other hand achieved universal coverage or are transiting to universal coverage, 
respectively, through a multiple-payer system (although Korea now has a single payer). 
Mandatory risk pooling through social insurance has ensured full population coverage in 
Korea but full population coverage is yet to be attained in Mexico‟s informal sector because 
of weakly enforced contribution arrangements and widespread evasion.  
 
All four countries are diverse in the organizational structure, which accounts for efficiency in 
provision in some health systems and inequities and inefficiencies in others. With respect to 
purchasing of health care services, purchasers in the four health systems possess monopsony 
purchasing power. However, in spite of this leverage over providers, purchasers do not 
engage in active purchasing to improve efficiency in delivery of services. The PCTs in the 
United Kingdom are the only purchaser seen as exercising the monopsonistic purchasing 
power in purchasing decisions albeit not actively as would be expected of a monopsonistic 
purchaser. The PCTs rather engage in collaborative relationships with public providers for 
the most part since contracting from private providers is limited. Elsewhere in Canada and 
Korea, physicians and specialists wield stronger bargaining power than the monopsonistic 
purchasers the RHAs and the NHIC in Canada and Korea, respectively. This has resulted in 
inefficiencies in provision through unwarranted remuneration to providers through over-
servicing under the fee-for-service provider payment method which gives providers strong 
economic incentives to over-service. This inefficiency is attributed to lack of stringent 
supply-side regulation particularly in Korea. On the other hand, Mexico‟s public delivery 
system (social security system and state-run health facilities) is inefficient due to widespread 
service duplication. Table 3 gives a broad sweep of the health financing sub-functions 
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The article manuscript, in the next section, gives more explicit detail of the experiences of 
these countries by critically analysing health financing functions (revenue collection, pooling 
and purchasing of health services) to determine the functionality of these components in each 
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Table 3: Summary of revenue collection, pooling, purchasing and provision of health services in four OECD countries. 
 Canada Republic of Korea Mexico United Kingdom 
Revenue Collection  
Source of 
funds 
Domestic sources from 




 PHI (Complementary and 
duplicate) 
 OOP payments 
Domestic sources from households and 




 OOP payments 
 Supplementary PHI  
Domestic sources from households 
and firms. Four main sources:- 
 
 GTR 
 SHI  
 PHI 
 OOP payments 
Domestic sources from households and 
firms. Four main sources:- 
 
 GTR 
 NI contributions 
 PHI 




 Progressive income taxes 
 Monthly deductions of  
contributions by insurance 
companies for employer-based 
complementary cover 
 Duplicate PHI often purchased 
by individuals of a higher SES 
 Direct payment of services not 




 Mandatory contributions shared 
equally between employer and 
employee. Contributions proportional 
to salary and thus regressive. Monthly 
payroll deductions for the self 
employed after income assessment. 
 
 GTR fully subsidizes contributions for 
the poor, unemployed and elderly. 
Partial for the self-employed and low 
income earners, the disabled and those 
aged above 65. 
 OOP payments made for co-payment 
on insured services and provider 
charges for uninsured services. 
 Progressive income taxes.  
 
 Low-income earners exempt from 
income taxes. 
 
 SHI  tripartite in nature shared 
among federal, state and households 
or companies. 
 
 OOP payments made for user fees 
in public sector facilities, for 
prescription charges and user 
charges for privately delivered care. 
 Progressive income taxes 
 NI contributions made by 




The Canada Revenue Agency 
collects federal taxes.  
 
 The National Tax Service (NTS) 
collects taxes 
 
 Mandatory contributions collected and 
managed by the National Health 
Insurance Corporation (NHIC). 
The Secretary of Finance and  
Public Credit or the Hacienda is the 
tax collection authority  
 
The Seguro Popular scheme is 
managed by the National Commission 
of Social Health Protection.  
The Mexican Institute for Social 
Security and the Housing Fund collect 
contributions social security schemes. 
 Taxes and NI contributions are 
collected by the central collecting 
agency, Her Majesty‟s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC).   
 PHI contributions are collected 
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3 main fund pools 
 GTR  pool covers 100% of the 
population  
 Employer based PHI covers 
65% of the population 
 Duplicate PHI pool :- coverage 
undetermined  
3 main fund pools 
 GTR covers 4% of the population  
 SHI pool covers 96% of the 
population  
 PHI covers 2-4% of the population. 
 
 
3 main pools 
 GTR pool covers 50% of the 
population 
 SHI pools cover 50% of the 
population 
 PHI covers about 3% of the 
population 
 2 main pools 
 GTR covers 100% of the population 
 PHI covers 12.8% of the population 
Allocation 
mechanisms 
 Federal cash transfer on a per 
capita basis 
 Provincial governments to 
RHAs based on global budgets. 
 Three provinces use population- 
based funding in allocating 
funds to RHAs  and Ontario 
province in allocating financial 
resources for home care and 
community-based services. 
 Insurers reimburse providers 
based on claims made by the 
insured to the health insurance 
company for medical expenses 
paid 
 Lack of an explicit allocation 
mechanism 
 A central review agency HIRA 
reviews all claims while the NHIC 
reimburses providers based on the 
recommendations by HIRA. 
 
 
 Population based funding in 
allocating federal GTR to states 
based on number of Seguro Popular 
enrolees in a state. 
 Needs-based allocation formula 
applied in allocating resources to 
PCTs. 
 Insurers reimburse providers 
directly while specialists bill the 
patients who then claim 
reimbursement from the insurer 
Purchasing of services 
Benefit 
package 
Implicit benefit package with 
explicit exclusions.   
 
Medically necessary services at 
primary, secondary, tertiary level 
offered free of charge in by not-
for-profit providers. 
Out-of-hospital prescriptions not 
publicly insured. 
Social assistance recipients and the 
The benefit package is explicit and 
covers a wide range of health care 
services. Curative services are the 
main insured services. 
 
High co-payments on insured 
services.   
Outpatient services:-30% to 55%, 
The essential benefit package under Seguro 
Popular comprises 249 interventions 
accounting for 95% of all hospital 
admissions and 17 highly complex 
interventions under the catastrophic fund.  
BP is without co-payments for SP 
beneficiaries 
Comprehensive benefit without co-
Implicit benefit package with 
explicit exclusions mainly dental 
care, eye care, alternative therapy 
and cosmetic surgery. 
99% of the population registered 
with a PCTs. 
Primary, secondary and tertiary 
care is free except for amenity care. 
Prescription drugs are subsidized 
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elderly meet the cost of outpatient 
prescriptions through tax-financed 
provincial drug plans or 
Pharmacare.  
 
Inpatient services:- 10% to 20% 
Prescription drugs:-30% 
Deductible of $4 for each unit of 
service.  
 
payments for SSS beneficiaries. prescriptions.  
 
An estimated 85% of prescription 
items dispensed do not qualify for 




 Salary main provider 
payment method for  all 




 Physicians reimbursed on 
a fee-for-service basis 
contracts are applicable. 
 Hospitals and clinics 
receive global budget 
transfers from RHAs 
 
 Hospital doctors and other health 
personnel are on salary contracts. 
 Public and private providers 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
basis. 
 Resource-based relative value 
(RBRV)-based payment method 
for outpatient office-based 
physicians. 
 Few hospitals reimburse inpatient 
services based on the prospective 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) 
-payment system. 
 Private providers (hospitals and 
physicians) reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
basis. 
 Prospective capitation is used to reimburse 
private MCOs and IMSS affiliated MAs 
 Some hospitals (15 in total) and clinics 
under the IMSS social security system are 
reimbursed based on the Diagnostic 
Related Groups (DRG). 
GPs are paid on a capitation basis. 
Hospital doctors and other health 
professionals are on salaried 
contracts. 
 
Specialists have flexible service 
contracts. Full time salary contracts 
for the NHS.  FFS in the private 
sector. 
 
Hospitals reimbursed based on 





 Private provision by not-
for-profit providers. Non-
profit hospitals funded 
through global budgets. 
For-profit private 
hospitals not eligible for 
block funding  
 
 Approximately 90% of acute 
general and acute hospitals and 
100% of ambulatory clinics 
privately owned. 
 Public sector controls fewer than 
10% of acute hospitals. Mainly  
tuberculosis, leprosy and 
psychiatric hospital, public health 
centers, the National Medical 
Centre and provincial medical 
centers. 
 Over 4 000 hospitals 
 Private sector largest provider. Controls 
close to 70% of acute care dominated by 
various hospital groups. 
  26.2% hospitals in the public sector. 85% 
general and 13.2% general and tertiary 
hospitals, respectively. 
 Non-profit providers such as the Red 
Cross provide HIV/AIDS-related services 
and reproductive health services. 
 Hospital system three tiered with 
community hospitals at the 
lowest level, district general 
hospitals at the middle level, and 
tertiary facilities at the apex 
 Private sector controls <5% of 
total hospital beds 
 Secondary care  provided in the  
general acute care NHS Trusts 
(>200) 
 Over 230 private hospitals 
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Abstract 
Background: The World Health Assembly Resolution in 2005 urges Member States 
to introduce and/or strengthen universal coverage policies to facilitate financial risk 
protection (FRP) to households in order to avoid catastrophic health expenditures 
and impoverishment from seeking care. The other goal of universal coverage is to 
ensure equitable access to healthcare based on relative need, irrespective of ability to 
make health payments, social status or geographical location. The two prepaid 
financing mechanisms that promote universal coverage are mandatory health 
insurance and general tax revenue. 
 
Aim: To undertake a comparative analysis of selected OECD countries with 
universal coverage to derive lessons that could inform the development of universal 
coverage policy in low-to-middle income (LMICs) countries. 
 
Methods: Empirical evidence on the selected OECD countries was sourced through 
an extensive review of published literature from print and electronic sources. 
Countries were selected from different continents to include health systems with a 
long history as universal systems. Most universal systems are in OECD countries. 
OECD countries were selected because of availability of high quality credible data. 
The data for the analysis is sourced from OECD Health Data 2008 dataset. Kutzin‟s 
conceptual framework is the analytical tool for the critical analysis of empirical 
evidence in terms of the equity, sustainability, efficiency and feasibility of each 
health system.  
 
Results: Findings from the analysis show that publicly funded (primarily tax-
funded) systems have lower out-of-pocket expenditures and offer greater financial 
risk protection. Systems with a single risk pool and a single payer tend to be 
administratively efficient. Allocating health resources based on a needs-based 
allocation formula is more equitable than historical budgeting. Capitation provider 
payment promotes greater efficiency than fee-for-service. A purchaser-provider split 
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Background 
Health is not only a human right; but good population health is central to economic 
and human development [1]. Ultimately, development in society is partly assessed 
by the quality of its population health, especially as it relates to the extent to which 
poor households are financially protected from the consequences of ill health, and 
how equitably health resources are distributed [2]. While money is crucial to 
financing health systems, increased spending on health does not automatically 
translate into equitable, efficient and effective health care. This is only feasible when 
suitable prepaid financing mechanisms are extensively used in financing the health 
system alongside a delivery system that allows for the provision of health care 
services in an equitable and efficient manner [3].  
 
Health financing mechanisms are being re-structured to offer greater financial risk 
protection (FRP) by increasing the use of prepaid financing mechanisms, primarily 
general tax revenue and mandatory health insurance. FRP and equity in access are 
the fundamental goals of universal coverage [4]. Within universal systems, every 
individual has access to health care based on relative need irrespective of ability to 
make health payments, social status or geographical location. Most countries are 
introducing or strengthening universal coverage policies in order to allow households 
access to care when needed while averting catastrophic expenditures and 
impoverishment from seeking health care. This follows the World Health Assembly 
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However, there are new challenges facing health systems in meeting the goals of 
universal coverage, given rapid health care cost inflation, the epidemiological 
transition, aging populations, growing expectations of consumers, the growth of new 
medicines and medical technologies and escalating pharmaceutical spending [6-8]. 
This is against a background of unfavourable fiscal constraints in many countries, 
limiting resource mobilization at a domestic level and failures in the health care 
market, especially attributable to information asymmetry between providers and 
consumers in health systems where supply-side regulation is not stringent. It is for 
these reasons that public intervention in health financing is essential in terms of 
equitably and efficiently collecting revenue to finance a comprehensive benefit 
package that offers adequate financial protection; efficiently managing public funds; 
and maintaining technical and allocative efficiency in purchasing health services [9]. 
In most OECD countries, government is actively involved in supply-side regulation 
and financing of health care. Using different prepaid financing mechanisms either 
through mandatory or voluntary risk pooling, most OECD countries with the 
exception of Mexico, Turkey and the United States have achieved universality [7]. 
Nonetheless, Mexico is in transition to a universal system following the 
implementation of a universal coverage policy in 2004. 
 
While no health system is identical with respect to organizational and management 
structures, there are similarities in aspects of revenue collection, pooling and 
purchasing of health care services. This paper draws evidence through a comparative 
analysis of four OECD countries that have achieved universal coverage (Canada, 
Korea and the United Kingdom), or are seeking to achieve universal coverage 
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evidence from literature. The aim of the paper is to derive lessons from the selected 
OECD countries that may inform the development and implementation of universal 
coverage policy in LMICs.  
 
Methods 
The paper‟s main focus is on the health financing policy in the four selected 
countries to determine the extent to which equity, efficiency, sustainability and 
feasibility goals have been met with respect to the functions of revenue collection, 
pooling of funds and purchasing of health services. Revenue collection deals with 
the financial contributions that finance health care services, the structure of these 
financing contributions, and the organizations or agencies that collect the 
contributions [10]; pooling, entails the “accumulation of prepaid revenues on behalf 
of a population” [11]; and lastly, purchasing, is essentially the “transfer of pooled 
funds to providers on behalf of the population” [12].  
A detailed overview of these health financing functions in the four health systems is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Population and sampling 
Countries 
The population of interest is countries that have achieved UC or are in transition to 
UC. The selection criteria singled OECD countries because most universal health 
care systems are in these countries. Additionally, universal systems in OECD 
countries have a long history, which was a significant motivating factor for their 
selection.  In addition, the availability of high quality credible data for analysis from 
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Review countries are drawn from different continents: Asia (The Republic of 
Korea/South Korea), Europe (United Kingdom), South America (Mexico) and North 
America (Canada). The exclusion of countries from Africa was due to the absence of 
a universal system in the continent and lack of reliable data attributable to 
undeveloped information systems in these countries. Although Ghana passed 
legislation to introduce a national health insurance system in 2003, universal 
coverage has not yet been achieved.  
 
Mexico was particularly chosen for this comparative analysis because it is was one 
of only three OECD countries that do not operate a universal system prior to the 
endorsement of the universal coverage policy in 2004. The other two countries are 
Turkey and the United States (OECD 2009). Although there was an attempt to use 
appropriate selection criteria, there are limitations especially with the selection of 
these four countries, which may be open to criticism. In light of this, it is important 
to point out that the study did not focus on drawing definitive conclusions on the 
various aspects of health financing but rather sought to identify some key lessons 
that could provide insights for other countries considering implementing universal 
coverage policy. 
Analyses 
This involved a combination of data on performance of health systems and extensive 
review of literature for empirical evidence. 
Data sources  
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Indicators 
The main focus was on economic indicators of specifically health expenditure 
indicators such total health expenditure, public and private expenditure on health and 
health financing indicators such as general government expenditure, social security 
expenditure health, private insurance expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure.  
Literature review 
Empirical evidence from online sources was gathered from peer-reviewed journals, 
and from grey literature such as manuscripts, policy documents, policy briefs and 
reports. Other sources were books and print journals. Google Scholar was the main 
search engine for online searches while Academic Search Premier, Medline, Science 
Direct and Pub Med were the main databases used. Useful websites from which 
additional information was sourced were the World Health Organization, Pan-
American Health Organization and the European Observatory of Health Care 
Systems websites. The key words for the search were: health care system, universal 
coverage, social health insurance, health insurance, health financing, provider 
payment mechanism and country names (Canada, Mexico, Republic of Korea and 
the United Kingdom).  
Analytical tool 
Kutzin‟s conceptual framework [11] was the analytical tool for the critical analysis 
of empirical evidence based on the concept of equity, efficiency, sustainability and 
feasibility.  
Ethics 
Ethics approval was sought from the University of Cape Town Ethics Research 
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Results and discussion 
Revenue collection 
Revenue is raised from four main sources in the four countries: general taxation; 
mandatory health insurance contributions; private health insurance; and, out-of-
pocket payments. However, there are significant differences in the mix between 
these financing sources and in the regulation of private health insurance. 
 
Public finance 
Figure 1 summarizes the main financing sources in the four health systems. Public 
finance dominates financing in the health systems of Canada and the United 
Kingdom while private finance, primarily out-of-pocket payments dominates 
financing in the Mexican health system. For the Korean health system, the share of 
public and private finance via the mandatory insurance contributions and out-of-
pocket payments, respectively, are almost of equal proportions. Private health 
insurance plays a minor financing role in all the health systems with the exception of 
Canada where spending on private insurance is almost four times the spending in the 
other three countries.  
General tax revenue 
On average, public expenditure on health in the OECD was 73% in 2006. Only the 
United Kingdom (87.3%) surpassed this average. Mexico (44%) was the least 
publicly funded health system followed by Korea (55.1%) and Canada (70.4%) 
(Table 1). 
 
General tax revenue dominated public finance in Canada (69%) and the United 











- 108 - 
 
Korea (42.6%) and Mexico (26.6%) in 2006  (Figure 1). General tax revenue was 
less than 20% of the total health expenditure in the latter two countries. 
 
Since government‟s role in health financing is constrained by the size of the 
economy, fiscal policy and other government policies that determine priority areas 
for government spending [13], the relatively limited capacity for allocations of 
general tax revenue to the health sector in Korea and Mexico may be attributable to 
narrow tax bases and possibly because of  lower marginal rates for income taxes 
compared to other OECD countries of similar income levels [14]. In Canada and the 
United Kingdom, nearly half of the general tax revenue is derived from the income 
tax system while Korea and Mexico obtain a larger percentage of general tax 
revenue from indirect taxes [See Appendix 1]. Income taxes offer sustainable 
revenue bases if structured progressively to capture revenue across a wide range of 
incomes. Additionally, the favourable economic climate in Canada and the United 
Kingdom provides opportunities for employment which makes general tax revenue a 
sustainable financing mechanism.  
 
Revenue bases can be broadened through tax reform by modifying tax rates, scaling 
back on excessive credits and exemptions on income tax returns and improving tax 
administration [15]. These measures improve tax efficiency by boosting revenue 
levels which offers prospects for expanding government‟s budget through creation of 
„fiscal space‟, which is defined as the “availability of budgetary room that allows a 
government to provide resources for a desired purpose without prejudice to the 
sustainability of that  government‟s financial position” [16]. Strengthening the tax 
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to fiscal policy, which essentially determines the proportion of the economy subject 
to taxation and the share of GDP allocated to fund government expenditure [13], 
GDP growth is the other vital macroeconomic component in creating sustainable 
fiscal space since economic growth facilitates resource mobilization at the domestic 
level [9].  
 
The evidence shows that countries with higher economic activity levels allocate 
more general tax revenue towards health financing. Based on the World Bank 
classification of economies, Canada, Korea and the United Kingdom are classified as 
high-income economies while Mexico is an upper middle-income economy [17]. As 
shown in Table 1 Canada and the United Kingdom have higher GDP per capita 
levels than Korea and Mexico and therefore allocate a greater share of their GDP 
towards health. On average, OECD countries spent 8.9% of their GDP on health in 
2006 [18]. Canada is the only country that surpassed this average, allocating 10% of 
its GDP to the health sector, closely followed by the United Kingdom (8.4%). Korea 
(6.4%) and Mexico (6.6%) allocated the least shares of their GDP to finance health 
sectors (Figure 2).  
 
Although the macroeconomic climate and government‟s fiscal policy are outside the 
control of the health sector, expanding the share of the economy subject to taxation 
offers prospects for boosting general tax revenue and using some of this revenue to 
finance government health budget. In aligning government‟s fiscal policy to meet 
health policy objectives, the Mexican government has restructured government‟s 
priority expenditure areas. Public spending has been increased by 1% of the 2003 
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With respect to efficiency in tax collection, the United Kingdom‟s tax system is the 
most efficient of the four studied given its simple tax structure comprising only 
twenty-two taxes [20]. In contrast, the Canadian tax system levies over seventy-three 
federal, provincial and territorial taxes [21]. This makes the tax system very complex 
and likely administratively inefficient. The multiple levels of tax administration at 
federal and provincial level, which is also a feature in the Mexican tax system [20, 
21] reduces administrative efficiency in revenue collection given the added costs of 
collection at the multiple collection points.  
 
Besides tax efficiency, it is also essential to ensure that the financing (tax) burden is 
distributed equitably among tax payers. Income taxes are structured progressively in 
all the countries considered.  In the United Kingdom, the Kakwani index for income 
taxes has a high positive value (+0.2843) implying that income taxes are highly 
progressive. Since a large share of the general tax revenue is drawn from direct taxes 
low-income groups contribute less towards taxation than high-income groups [22]. 
Similarly, in Korea taxation is progressive with rich households bearing a greater tax 
burden. This is in spite of Korea deriving a greater share of general tax revenue from 
indirect taxes [See Appendix 1. The Kakwani indices are positive for direct 
(+0.2683) and indirect taxes (+0.0379) (23), so indirect taxes are mildly progressive 
in Korea, which may be attributable to the extensive VAT exemptions.  
 
Although there are no similar data for the other two countries, there are horizontal 
inequities (the unequal treatment of equals) in the Mexican tax system through 
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large and expanding informal sector, businesses with similar taxable income as those 
in the formal sector, pay different taxes or evade the taxes entirely [14,24].  
 
Broadly, three issues are fundamental to the generation of general tax revenue: 
equitable distribution of the tax burden, efficiency in tax collection and economic 
growth. The latter two are beyond the jurisdiction of health policy but could be a key 
reason there is low government spending in some health systems. 
 
Mandatory health insurance  
There is a strong link between the source of public finance and the level of out-of-
pocket expenditure. In health systems where general tax revenue accounts for the 
largest share of public finance (Canada and the United Kingdom), out-of-pocket 
spending is low. Conversely, where social health insurance dominates public 
finance, out-of-pocket spending as a share of the total expenditure on health is high 
such as in Korea and Mexico.  
 
In Figure 3, a comparison is drawn between general tax revenue and social insurance 
contributions as a percentage of the total expenditure on health. The farther a country 
is from the diagonal line, the less the health system is publicly financed.  
Figure 4 shows the comparison between out-of-pocket expenditure and public 
expenditure on health. The closer a country is to the diagonal line, the less private 
insurance dominates financing and the father it is from the diagonal line, such as 
Canada, the higher the proportion of private insurance as a percentage of the total 
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Korea and Mexico are the least publicly financed and equally FRP is low given the 
high out-of-pocket expenditure. Thus, where SHI dominates public finance, 
households tend to lack adequate FRP. There are two main factors that are likely to 
contribute to the lack of adequate FRP through SHI: limited revenue generating 
ability because of low contribution rates; and a limited revenue base. 
 
In the United Kingdom and Canada mandatory contributions are collected centrally 
alongside income taxes. This is administratively efficient as there are minimal costs 
involved in collection. In Korea, countrywide National Health Insurance Corporation 
(NHIC) branches [25] collect the SHI contributions. This may also be efficient as the 
single payer is likely to maintain low collection costs unlike Mexico where two 
separate collecting authorities, the Mexican Institute for Social Security and the 
Housing Fund [PWC 2009] collect contributions for each scheme that makes up the 
SSS network.  
 
Compared to other  OECD countries that run SHI systems, for example Germany 
where the contribution rate is about 14% of earnings [15], Korea‟s SHI contribution 
rate of 5.08% of salary (NHIC 2009) and Mexico‟s (1.65%) are very low [See 
Appendix 1]. In Korea, low contribution rates were favoured at the onset of the NHI 
system since they offered minimal economic distortions and elicited greater 
willingness to pay especially among the informal sector ensuring rapid expansion of 
coverage. If individuals are making substantial health care payments on an out-of-
pocket basis, this can be converted to a „premium‟ and paid in the form of a prepaid 
mechanism such as payroll, income or indirect tax [15].  Koreans are already paying 
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prospect of boosting revenue while expanding the benefit package to cover more 
services while reducing co-payments. However, the feasibility of contribution 
increases is unlikely given the horizontal inequity in the NHI due to inaccuracies in 
assessing the incomes for the self-employed [26] to determine their mandatory 
contribution. This group contributes less in absolute terms, placing an unfair 
financing burden on formal sector workers, which may hinder willingness to 
contribute more. Additionally, the contribution rate is proportional rather than 
progressive to salary for formal sector workers adding to the regressivity of this 
financing mechanism. The Kakwani index is has a negative (-0.1634) value [23]. 
Low-income earners, therefore, bear a higher financing burden than high-income 
earners. Nonetheless, the full and partial subsidization of SHI contributions for the 
poor and low-income earners, respectively, upholds equity in financing by removing 
the financial barrier for vulnerable groups.  
 
Another reason why contribution increases may not be feasible is the lack of 
confidence and mistrust in the insurer. There is a general dissatisfaction with the 
insurer among beneficiaries with concerns that potential revenue boosts are unlikely 
to be used to expand the benefit package but instead reward provider inefficiency 
through unwarranted remuneration as a consequence of over- provision of, often, 
unnecessary health care [26]. Lastly, because of path dependency, the custom of low 
contribution rates is firmly entrenched among contributors [27]. 
 
Mexico faces similar challenges as Korea but unlike Korea the mandatory 
contributions are structured progressively such that the financing burden is equitably 











- 114 - 
 
financing burden than high income earners. Therefore, there may be greater 
willingness to pay given that there are greater social benefits the contribution 
provides besides health insurance such as retirement benefits, life insurance among 
other benefits. Nevertheless, low income levels, high poverty levels, wide income 
and social inequalities [29] could hamper efforts to increase contribution rates. Given 
that the primary revenue base for the mandatory contributions is formal sector 
employees, high contribution rates against a background of low income levels could 
be a deterrent for formal employment. As more individuals pull out of formal sector 
employment the revenue base is considerably reduced and the ability to generate 
more funds lessened. While the large informal sector also offers potential revenue 
base that could boost revenue levels, the enrolment of this group to „mandatory‟ 
schemes is often voluntary and weakly enforced. Wagstaff [15] argues that a 
voluntary and/or weakly enforced „mandatory‟ contribution arrangement for the 
informal sector is a deterrent for formal employment. Workers opt out of formal 
employment in favour of working in the informal sector with the option of insurance 
coverage at a lower cost though with a less comprehensive benefit package. 
 
Enrolling the informal sector had proven been challenging in Mexico through two 
other schemes (See Appendix 1) prior to the launch of Seguro Popular in 2004. 
Voluntary enrolment is at the core of Seguro Popular’s incentive structure by way of 
financial incentives that trigger financial flows from the supply- to the demand-side 
such that money follows the patient. Under the new scheme, state health facilities 
have a strong inducement to improve service delivery in order to encourage 
enrolment and re-enrolment as state health budgets are tied to the number of Seguro 
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in the two lowest income quintiles by fully subsidizing their contributions. This 
promotes equity in financing as the poor are encouraged to enrol by removing the 
financial barriers. Lastly, households that decide not to enrol by 2010 will continue 
to incur out-of-pocket payments at state health facilities since Seguro Popular offers 
beneficiaries access to a comprehensive benefit package covering essential personal 
care services and catastrophic interventions without co-payments [19,28]. This is a 
great inducement for households to enrol in the scheme, especially the non-poor 
informal sector workers. To show that the population is responding to the incentive 
structure, by the first quarter of 2006, 11·5 million individuals had enrolled in 
Seguro Popular representing 16–18% of the total population that did not have social 
protection or private health insurance. Of these enrolees, 19% were households in the 
poorest income quintile while 21% were households in the second lowest income 




In countries where the tax system is administratively efficient, the revenue 
generating capacity of general tax revenue is high with equally high spending on 
health. Given the low government spending in Korea and Mexico, the two health 
systems derive about half of health financing revenue from private sources with 
private expenditure accounting for 55.8% of the total expenditure on health in 
Mexico and 44.9% in Korea. Private expenditure accounted for just 29.6% in Canada 
and 12.7% in the United Kingdom of the total expenditure on health in 2006 (Table 
1). Most private spending is from out-of-pocket payments and to a lesser extent 
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United Kingdom had almost equal shares of the private insurance spending as a 
share of total expenditure on at 3.3% (Korea and United Kingdom) and 3.4% 
Mexico.  
 
The low out-of-pocket spending in Canada as a share of the total private expenditure 
on health can be attributed to prepayment of health care through schemes such as 
employer-based private health insurance, voluntary PHI and tax financed provincial 
drug plans for social assistance recipients and the elderly [31]. These prepaid 
financing mechanisms extend the scope of prepaid care beyond health care goods 
and services that are publicly financed. The OOP spending in the United Kingdom is 
also relatively low. Most of this spending is from payments for the limited number of 
services that are not publicly financed such as the prescription fee, dental and vision 
care. Vulnerable population groups [See Appendix 1] are exempt from out-of-
pocket payments. This promotes equity in financing by removing the financial 
barrier for those with a lesser ability to pay.  
 
While Canada and the United Kingdom have developed safety nets to offer FRP 
through prepaid financing mechanism and exemptions respectively, Korea and 
Mexico are yet to achieve meaningful gains in offering adequate financial protection 
Mexico received a low ranking in the WHO Report 2000 as a country with 
inequitable financing due to the dominance of out-of-pocket payments in financing 
the health system. Seguro Popular was launched in response to the findings that 
catastrophic health expenditures and impoverishment from seeking care were 
widespread, affecting poor households the most [32].  However, in spite of 
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Mexicans through Seguro Popular, the role of the large, unregulated and expanding 
private sector, which functions alongside the public delivery system, cannot be 
underestimated. Access to privately delivered care is often on an out-of-pocket basis 
since providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Few households possess private 
insurance to enable financial protection for privately delivered care. The growth of 
the private sector is strengthened by the inability of the public delivery system (both 
the social security system and state‟s health facilities) to deliver adequate and needed 
care in a timely fashion [33]. Lengthy waiting times at all levels is a major allocative 
inefficiency facing public providers. If service delivery is not streamlined under 
Seguro Popular, beneficiaries may opt to receive care in the alternative private 
sector where they continue incurring greater out-of-pocket expenditures.  
 
In Korea most of the out-of-pocket spending is from co-payments on insured 
services and direct payments on uninsured services.  Universal coverage was 
achieved at a low cost in Korea by means of low contribution rates, a limited benefit 
package and high co-payments on insured services. In spite of gradual expansion of 
the benefit package, the proportion of OOPs has only declined marginally possibly 
because of increased utilization of uninsured services.  Regardless of the high levels 
of co-payments in Korea, OOP payments are mildly progressive given the positive 
(+0.0124) Kakwani index [23].  This is not surprising as those with a greater ability 
to pay may demand more uninsured services for which they pay directly [34]. 
Wagstaff [35] in fact argues that if there are limited public resources, a 
comprehensive benefit package which levies similar and quite high co-payments for 
all beneficiaries‟ increases the degree of regressivity, while a limited benefit package 
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progressivity. Though Medical Aid offers FRP for vulnerable groups, there are 
possible errors of exclusion. Medical Aid covers on average 3-4% of the population 
but an estimated 12% of the Korean population have household incomes falling 
below or on the poverty line [34]. It is likely that this group of low-income earners 
whose contributions are not fully subsidized may be spending a greater share of their 
income in financing health care on an out-of-pocket basis. The scope of eligibility to 
the „non-contributory‟ Medical Aid should be expanded in Korea to include more 
vulnerable groups that are erroneously locked out through inaccurate household 
income assessments. 
 
Private Health Insurance (PHI) 
Private insurance plays a limited role in financing health care in all countries 
considered accounting for less than 5% of the total health expenditure except in 
Canada where the spending accounts for 12% of the total health expenditure (Figure 
1). There are some similarities but also important differences in the role of voluntary 
health insurance in the four health systems. 
 
In terms of similarities, PHI is progressive in all four countries since only the 
wealthy can afford to be PHI subscribers; they pay twice for health care services as 
opting out of public insurance is outlawed. Secondly, tax rebates are not offered for 
PHI in all the countries except for the employer-based health insurance in Canada. 
Subsidizing this cover makes it more affordable. However, Quebec province taxes 
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In the United Kingdom PHI expands consumer choice by offering access to a wider 
choice of providers, treatment facilities and timing of treatment provided by private 
hospitals and consultants. The demand for PHI in the United Kingdom is highly 
price-inelastic. The small effect of price on demand is attributable to purchase of 
insurance by individuals of a higher SES and the fact that private insurance coverage 
is offered by some employers as a benefit that comes with formal employment. The 
services covered by PHI in the United Kingdom vary in scope and depth; the higher 
the premiums the more comprehensive the cover and vice versa. PHI funds flow to 
providers of alternative care such as home nursing services, for superior 
accommodation in private hospitals, cosmetic surgery etc. However, PHI does not 
extend benefits for resource-intensive services such as accident and emergency 
services [37].   
 
PHI is of two types in Canada: employer-based and voluntarily purchased. The 
former performs a complementary role in that it “complements coverage of publicly 
insured service within principal or substitutive health insurance” [38] by facilitating 
the reimbursement of payments for health goods and services that are not publicly 
financed such as outpatient prescriptions and home based care among others [36]. 
Voluntarily purchased PHI performs a duplicate role by offering insurance coverage 
for services already insured under the public plan. Duplicate PHI is outlawed in most 
Canadian provinces [39].  
 
Recent developments however have expanded the scope of duplicate insurance. Prior 
to the Supreme Court ruling in the Chaolli v Quebec case in 2005 that lifted the ban 
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[39]. Quebecers now have the option of purchasing duplicate cover for some surgical 
procedures such as hip replacement [41] where waiting lists are long and it is 
possible to access similar services as those covered by the public insurer from 
private providers [40]. Other provinces that had outlawed duplicate insurance are 
revising their laws following the unprecedented ruling in anticipation of future 
lawsuits [41]. The creation of a two-tiered health system following the ruling is 
undeniable, with affluent Canadians possessing duplicate insurance and the rest of 
the population solely insured under Medicare. For the relentless advocates of 
privatization, a parallel private sector financed with duplicate PHI is argued to ease 
pressure on the public delivery system by reducing waiting times for elective care 
while expanding consumer choice. However, most Canadians are opposed to a two-
tiered system, as it will erode the principle social solidarity by giving preferential 
access to health care to the affluent [42].  
 
In Korea, PHI covers mainly co-payments for catastrophic ailments such as cancer. 
The insurer makes a payout to the patient to purchase needed health care from 
providers [43]. Private insurance may over-insure but it may also under-insure 
beneficiaries if the fixed benefit payout is less than the charges payable to the 
provider [44] necessitating payments on an OOP basis.  
 
Mandatory risk pools and resource allocation mechanisms  
Pooling of risks through mandatory prepayment mechanisms has facilitated universal 
coverage in all health systems considered with the exception of Mexico. There are 
two main mandatory risk pools common in all the four countries: the general tax 
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of the population in Canada and the United Kingdom and 3-4% of the population in 
Korea. The SHI pool covers 96% of the population in Korea while the multiple SHI 
pools cover 50% of the population in Mexico [Appendix 1].  
 
Within these mandatory pools, the degree of pool fragmentation and integration of 
risk pools varies across countries. Geographically defined risk pools comprise 
regional health authorities (RHAs) in Canada, the primary care trusts (PCTs) in the 
United Kingdom and the countrywide NHIC branches in Korea. However, these are 
essentially decentralized components of an integrated pool in some cases. More 
substantive risk fragmentation exists in Mexico due to the many social insurance 
schemes that make up the social security network. In spite of fragmentation in these 
pools, the cross-subsidies are greater in mandatory pools as they are large society 
pools comprising individuals of varying income levels and health status.  
 
Mandatory risk pools are not vulnerable to the inefficiencies and inequities 
associated with voluntary risk pooling such as cream skimming, adverse selection 
and high transaction costs, the latter occurring particularly in competitive health 
insurance markets. However, risk fragmentation can occur in two ways within 
mandatory pools: through unequal allocation of centrally collected revenue to 
individual risk pools; and unequal redistribution of pooled revenue to compensate for 
variations in the revenue base in favour of pools that have low revenue bases [45]. 
Population based funding or a needs-based allocation formula lessens geographical 
inequities by transferring financial resources from low to high need pools. Some 
Canadian provinces, the United Kingdom and Mexico use a population based 
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formula is determined by population size and weighted for indicators of relative need 
for care such as mortality, morbidity, unemployment, elderly people living alone, 
ethnicity and social economic status [9]. In Mexico the allocation formula takes into 
account health needs and level of socio economic development in states breaking 
away from historical budgeting that based health budgets on the size of the payroll 
for health services in different areas [19,28]. There are geographical inequities in 
Canada due to varying fiscal capacity since some provinces by virtue of geographical 
location and low economic activity could have a higher percentage of high-risk 
individuals such as rural unemployed populations, the elderly and low-income 
earners. This limits revenue raising ability from respective provincial tax systems 
particularly if the revenue base is inadequate.  Given that the bulk of health revenue 
is generated from the provinces‟ own revenue sources, there is need to equalize the 
revenue shortfall in less wealthy provinces through the supplementary funds from 
the federal government.  The federal transfer to provincial governments, the Canada 
Health Transfer (CHT), flows on a per capita basis. The allocation therefore does not 
take into account differential health needs in the population results, a significant 
inequity in the resource allocation process.  While population-based funding has long 
been proposed in allocating the CHT, the feasibility of this allocation method taking 
effect is unlikely given the opposition from wealthier provinces [36]. The other 
inequity in allocation is through the global budgets  from provincial/territorial 
governments to RHAs [46]. Global budgets result in some RHAs receiving 
disproportionately more financial resources than others as they have better expertise 
to advocate for increases in their share of the budget creating across-region 
inequality in the same province. To address this inequity only three provincial 
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resources to RHAs based on a needs-based allocation formula while Ontario uses the 
approach in allocating financial resources for home care and community-based 
services [47].  
 
Korea is somewhat different in that is has a unitary pool, the National Health 
Insurance Corporation (NHIC), with devolved purchasing authority to NHIC 
branches countrywide. The devolved units merely implement the roles of the single 
payer (NHIC) such as revenue collection, fund management and provider 
reimbursement [25]. However, prior to the integration reform in 2000, the Korean 
NHI was characterized by multiple risk pools defined by geographical area 
(rural/urban) and employment status (employed/self-employed/). The rural schemes 
were more vulnerable to financial shocks given the decreasing number of enrolees 
and a larger enrolment of high risk individuals (elderly and the chronically ill) [27]. 
To improve cross-subsidies, risk equalization under the fiscal stabilization fund was 
introduced at a time when the NHI faced financial crisis in 2001 as the multiple 
insurance schemes faced an accumulated deficit [48]. Integration of the multiple risk 
pools allowed greater cross-subsidies across individuals with a wide range of 
incomes and health status.   
 
Voluntary risk pools 
There are multiple risk pools and widespread fragmentation across all voluntary 
pools in the four health systems. The private insurance market is of two types in 
Canada and the United Kingdom, for-profit and not-for-profit. The cross-subsidies 
are greater for employer-based health insurance than individual plans since 
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premiums in the individual market in the United Kingdom limits cross-subsidies due 
to the small size of the pool. High risk groups (low income earners and the 
chronically ill) are often locked out of the pool. Moreover, insurers in the individual 
plan market have sanctioned premium increases without loss in subscriber numbers 
[37]. This attributable to subscription of voluntary cover by individuals of a higher 
social economic status that self-select to join this pool.  
 
Conclusively, in the absence of risk equalization measures in the private insurance 
industry in all the countries studied, the extent of cross-subsidies from low-to high 
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Purchasing 
Defining the benefit package 
The benefit package refers to the “services, activities, and goods covered by publicly 
funded, statutory/mandatory insurance schemes (social health insurance, SHI) or 
National Health Services” [49]. The comprehensiveness of a benefit package is 
determined by its level of explicitness or implicitness. An explicit benefit package 
consists of an element of itemization or a „positive list‟ of health benefits that are 
covered while an implicit benefit package covers a broad range of health goods and 
services albeit with a few exclusions or a „negative list‟, which can comprise 
cosmetic surgery, organ transplants etc [10]. Given these definitions Canada and the 
United Kingdom operate implicit benefit packages while the benefit packages in 
Korea and Mexico are explicit. 
 
The broad coverage of health services in Canada and the United Kingdom guarantees 
legal residents and citizens access to a wide range of health services free at the point 
of use. The explicit exclusions are minimal in the United Kingdom [See Appendix 
1] but the recent adoption of health related groups (HRGs) in reimbursement 
decisions for inpatient care is a gradual transition to explicitly structuring the benefit 
package [49]. In Canada, services provided in hospitals and in ambulatory physician 
clinics are publicly financed and free at the point of use [50] but the sustainability of 
the Canadian benefit package is waning as technological advancements shift 
provision beyond the confines of hospital settings and physician clinics [51]. As 
surgical procedures become less invasive than in the past often requiring shorter or 
no hospitalization, home-based care, a privately financed health service, has grown 
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privatization‟ [52] has resulted in a decrease in public spending and a rise in private 
spending, the latter accounting for almost 30% of the total expenditure on health. 
This is one of the reasons Canada is ranked among the least publicly financed health 
systems in the OECD. 
 
An explicit benefit package offers avenues for the inclusion of more health services 
and goods. For example Korea‟s benefit package has been expanded gradually to 
include more services [See Appendix 1] in a bid to contain the high OOP spending. 
However, the proportion of OOP payments has decreased marginally as a result of 
high co-payments on insured serviced and increased utilization of uninsured services 
charged at unregulated market prices. This is unlike Mexico where at present  
beneficiaries in both formal and informal sector schemes have access to a wide range 
of health benefits without co-payments. But this was not the case prior the launch of 
Seguro Popular. The „open‟ population or the informal sector had access to an 
under-funded benefit package at government run-facilities, where user fees were 
levied at the point of use for partial or full access for some services creating financial 
barriers for poor households. In addition, impoverishment and catastrophic spending 
was greater in the uninsured than insured populations. Seguro Popular offers FRP 
through the comprehensive benefit package covering essential personal health 
services and catastrophic ailments without co-payments [See Appendix 1]. Ailments 
covered under the catastrophic fund are revised annually based on transparent 
criterion that takes into account the burden of disease, cost-effectiveness, and 
resource availability. Additionally, the catastrophic fund is aggregated at federal 
level because the small risk pools at the state level are inadequate in allowing 
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and complex epidemiological transition, with a double burden of disease from 
infectious diseases associated with poverty such as TB one hand and, costly to treat 
lifestyle –induced non-communicable ailments such as diabetes on the other. In 
addition, the explicitly defined benefit package empowers enrollees to make 
demands from service providers as well as serving as a blueprint for accreditation to 
providers. This creates incentives for providers to deliver only cost-effective 
interventions mandated by the scheme [54, 55]. Provider accreditation intends to 
improve efficiency in the public delivery system and at the same time lessen the 
economic incentives under the fee-for-service provider payment system in the 
parallel delivery system, the private sector, which is for the most part privately 
financed through out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Economic evaluation and health technology assessment  
One of the shortcomings of an implicit benefit package is the uncertainty 
beneficiaries face over entitlements [56]. This often leads to „postcode prescribing‟ 
or the addition of new treatments or technologies during the commissioning process 
and can vary across geographical areas. Implicit additions were widespread in the 
United Kingdom whereby some health authorities or trusts by virtue of financial 
advantage could commission some treatments, drugs or technology that were not 
within reach of less affluent health authorities [57]. It is without doubt that economic 
evaluation of diagnostic procedures and pharmaceuticals, and health technology 
assessment (HTAs) were introduced in the NHS to provide guidelines on the health 
care services and goods that would be reimbursable by the public payer and 
minimize geographical inequities in access to health services and allocation of 
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the guidelines on cost-effective interventions, pharmaceuticals, technologies etc and 
has hitherto created a positive list of new and existing technologies, diagnostic 
procedures and pharmaceuticals [56] that are reimbursable by the NHS.  
 
Canada also applies economic evaluations and HTA but less rigorously than the 
United Kingdom. The national body Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies 
in Health (CADTH) is involved in HTA but financial constraints at the national level 
has led to an upsurge of local HTA agencies within regional health authorities, 
hospitals and provinces to gather cost effectiveness evidence that is “tailor made” to 
local needs [58]. While this upholds technical efficiency at the provincial/regional 
level there are significant drawbacks in the HTA process in Canada. One is the lack 
of co-ordination between the numerous national and local (provincial, territorial or 
regional) HTA agencies. This is unlike the United Kingdom where HTA appraisals 
and economic evaluations performed by NICE are disseminated throughout the 
entire NHS for implementation. Secondly, the absence of a homogenous decision 
maker to serve all the thirteen provinces reduces sectoral efficiency because of 
variations in HTA appraisals across different provinces/regions. Thirdly, the HTA 
process in Canada wastes resources due to the widespread duplication of the multiple 
HTA agencies. Lastly, there are possibilities of inequities in access to technology 
and HTA reports in Canada [59] but the extent of this inequity is as yet unknown. 
 
Thus far, evidence is lacking on the extent to which HTA has informed technology 
acquisition Mexico and Korea but the analysis of the OECD data suggests that the 
acquirement of medical technology is weakly regulated in Korea. In Mexico, 
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Technology (Centro Nacional de Excelencia Tecnológica en Salud) launched as part 
of the far reaching social protection health reforms [60] is yet to be determined. In 
Korea the number of MRI units and CT scanners surpassed the OECD average, 
which was 10.2 units per million population for MRI units and 12 per million 
population for CT scanners in 2006 [18]. The number of CT scanners and MRI per 
million population increased by approximately 48% and 33%, respectively, between 
1995 and 2005 as shown in Figure 5. By 2006 the capacity of CT scanners was 33.7 
units per million population and 13.6 MRI units per million population. The number 
of CT scanners increased tremendously after 1996, when CT scanning was included 
in the benefit package [61].  
 
Provider payment mechanisms 
The performance of a given health system depends on the extent to which a 
purchaser uses its financial power to influence provider behaviour in pursuit of 
efficiency and provision of quality health care. A prudent purchaser links resource 
allocation decisions based on provider performance using various mechanisms that 
may include: financial incentives; primary care gate keepers; managing choice; 
contracting with selected providers and maintaining provider profiles among others 
[11]. The purchaser therefore creates balance by aligning incentives such that the 
provider bears some financial risks [62].  
Financial incentives for providers 
GPs in the United Kingdom are reimbursed on a capitation basis with a mix of 
allowances [63]. This payment method involves very low administration costs but 
one of its shortcomings is under servicing of patients. To mitigate this disadvantage, 
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financially for meeting set targets based on indicators of quality care while earning 
bonus points for prompt delivery of care. The financial inducement for GPs to reduce 
mortality and morbidity from non-communicable diseases that constitute the highest 
burden of disease [64]  is intended to improve health outcomes in the population in 
the long-term. Nevertheless, inefficiencies could arise with illnesses excluded from 
the incentive structure not receiving as much attention from GPs as the „bonus-
linked‟ interventions.  
 
Unlike the United Kingdom, GPs in Canada and Korea are reimbursed on a fee-for-
service basis. This payment method creates perverse incentives to over-service, since 
providers bear minimal financial risks that are often borne by a third party (insurer) 
or patient.  In Korea, provider fees are highly regulated by government [65] while 
Canada applies price and status disincentives to limit the profitability of private 
practice [39]. These disincentives deter physicians from opting out of the public plan 
to practice privately, since patients visiting these providers meet all health care costs 
on an out-of-pocket basis and to a lesser extent duplicate health insurance if 
permissible. These principles enhance equity and ensure patients have access to 
medically insured services without extra charges. 
 
The perverse economic incentives in the FFS payment method can be contained if 
the purchaser has monopsonistic purchasing power to influence the provider. 
However, in spite of strong monopsony purchasing power, the NHIC in Korea 
cannot exploit this leverage because of the bargaining power possessed by 
physicians. Previous attempts to amend the reimbursement method were 
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which paralysed the entire health system [65,67]. Similarly in Canada, GPs have 
greater bargaining power than the monopsonistic purchaser, the RHAs. In spite of 
the disincentive structure to discourage over servicing, GPs have continually lobbied 
for fee increases making the profession immensely lucrative. This is because RHAs 
have no power over physician budgets and service contracts which are handled by 
respective provincial/territorial medical boards [68]. 
 
While the financial incentives under capitation for GPs have contained cost inflation 
at primary care level, specialists in the United Kingdom have flexible service 
contracts that permit dual employment. In the private sector they are reimbursed on a 
fee-for-service basis while the NHS offers them full or part-time salary contracts 
[63]. The inefficiency stemming from this arrangement has been the growth of 
waiting times and lists for elective care in NHS hospitals. Rationing decisions are 
possibly one of the contributing factors to the long waiting lists as a result of 
imbalances in supply and demand in a health system where service delivery is free. 
More importantly though, is the political economy prevailing in such a system that 
cannot be overlooked. The private sector is dependent on the public system for its 
crucial resource; the human resources. Given the economic incentives under the FFS 
reimbursement method, specialists have strong incentives to dedicate their valuable 
skill in the financially rewarding sector while waiting times and lists grow in the 
public sector. Ultimately, confidence in the public delivery system is eroded 
increasing the perception of inefficiency of the public sector [52]. To improve 
allocative efficiency in the NHS, waiting lists management for elective care has been 
taken away from specialists while service contracts for specialists have been 











- 132 - 
 
 
While long waiting lists for elective care and undersupply of specialists are a 
challenge in the Canadian and the United Kingdom health systems, Korea has an 
abundance of specialists and no waiting lists for elective care. The lack of supply-
side regulation has resulted in high numbers of specialists, who account for 80% of 
all practicing medical doctors. One in every four specialists has two medical 
specialities [70]. Moreover, most office-based physicians are board certified 
specialists and also own inpatient facilities where they practice [27]. Given the 
similar fee schedule for both individual and institutional providers, providers have 
high economic incentives to over-service in such a system. 
 
Institutional providers such as in the NHS have also received financial incentives in 
order to improve allocative efficiency through payment by result (PbR) introduced in 
NHS hospitals in 2005 [71]. Under this incentive model, hospitals are rewarded for 
good performance by increasing elective output as hospital budgets are proportional 
to the number of elective activities undertaken [72].  Other initiatives to improve 
allocative efficiency and increase elective output have been through public-private 
partnerships through the Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTC) launched in 
2003. The centres are operated by for-profit companies that provide care for NHS 
patients for some surgical procedures [73]. 
 
Gatekeeper role 
A strong primary care system is well suited to make use of preventative care, screen 
and detect illness and enhance a co-ordinated approach to providers at other levels of 
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and Mexico have weak referral systems. For instance in Korea there is no role 
differentiation between primary and secondary care providers, which leads to 
competition rather than co-ordination in service delivery [27] given that ambulatory 
clinics offer an expanded range of services similar to services provided at outpatient 
clinics in hospitals [35]. The consequence has been escalating health cost inflation 
and poor service delivery with an overall decrease in technical efficiency.  
 
Canada and the United Kingdom have primary care gatekeepers albeit with 
differences and similarities in how each country runs its PHC system. The major 
difference between the two systems is that GPs in Canada operate outside the RHA 
system whereas in the United Kingdom, PCTs have a dual role as providers of 
primary care and purchasers of secondary and tertiary care. It can thus be concluded 
that Canada‟s referral system is not as strong because the main purchaser, the regions 
have no control over primary care providers. 
 
Citizens and legal residents have a choice of a primary care provider determined by 
geographical area in both countries. Primary care providers are independent 
contractors [36,63] in both settings. In the UK patients register with a GP practice as 
opposed to Canada where there is no rostering of the population. Patients self-select 
a primary care practitioner with most GPs practising in solo GP practices [36]. There 
are few GP practices in Canada. Groups as opposed to solo practices have lower 
running costs due to stronger purchasing power, enhanced economies of scale due to 
sharing of facilities and better co-ordination of care for patients with other providers 
for home care, long-term care among others [75]. In addition, group practices reduce 
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in rural and underserved areas in the United Kingdom because of the needs based 
allocation formula in allocating financial resources [69].  This way GPs have less 
incentives to practice in urban areas since the allocation of resources to GPs is 
determined by indicators of relative need for care such as socio-economic status 
among others. Therefore, GPs practising in deprived areas receive more funds from 
central coffers. 
 
A strong referral system promotes technical efficiency especially if primary care 
providers have monopsony purchasing power. This is because the single purchaser is 
more responsive to populations‟ healthcare needs given the few autonomous bodies 
to consult with in the decision making process, which also improves cross-sectional 
planning in the health system. In such a system, there is more emphasis on 




Although there are limitations in considering only four countries, key take home 
messages for countries considering UC can be identified from the cross-country 
analysis.  
 
With respect to the main prepayment financing mechanisms that guarantee universal 
coverage notably, general tax revenue and mandatory insurance contributions, the 
former tends to be more progressive. In addition, general tax revenue is captured 
across a wide range of revenue sources, accounting for its financial sustainability 
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The revenue generating ability from the tax system is substantial in high-income 
countries because of; formalization of the economy by widening the tax base through 
contraction of the informal sector, and efficient tax systems that guarantee tax 
compliance. Unlike high-income countries, LMICs face challenges in mobilizing 
adequate revenue from taxation because of low income levels, large informal sectors 
and limited economic activity. These factors have to be taken into account in 
considering a universal system funded for the most part through general tax revenue. 
In such instances mandatory contributions offer better prospects of raising additional 
revenue to finance the health budget with government funds subsidizing 
contributions for those with lesser ability to pay. However, given that the immediate 
revenue base for mandatory contributions is, often, formal sector workers, revenue 
raising ability may be constrained in LMICs because of large informal sectors which 
considerably reduce the revenue base. Additionally, there are considerable 
challenges in collecting informal sector contributions because of weakly enforced 
contribution arrangements or voluntary contribution arrangements creating avenues 
for evasion. Furthermore, the poor are less likely to enrol in „mandatory‟ schemes 
because of financial barriers. Therefore, financial incentives by way of full or partial 
subsidization of contributions for those with a lesser ability to pay and low-income 
workers and access to comprehensive benefit package with minimal or no co-
payments are great inducements in enrolling the informal sector.  
 
In pooling risks, the goals of universal coverage (FRP and equity in access) can be 
maximized through prepayment financing mechanisms that allow for greater cross-
subsidies; these being primarily general tax revenue and mandatory contributions 
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preferred risk pooling mechanism, multiple fund pools covering different population 
groups, may be preferred as population coverage is expanded incrementally. This 
may result in gaps in coverage, financial unsustainability of the multiple payer 
system and challenges in integrating the multiple payers when 100% population 
coverage has been attained.  Though risk equalization may take of revenue shortfalls 
in financially unstable and high need risk pools, integration is the only guarantee to 
financially viability in a multiple payer system as the larger the risk pool the greater 
the cross-subsidies and vice versa. While risk fragmentation is less likely when risk 
pooling is through general taxation, revenue shortfalls in a tax financed system can 
be equalized through redistributive policies that move funds from low to high need 
pools. In such a system, population based funding integrates geographically-defined 
pools by taking into account relative need for care determined by indicators of 
relative need. 
 
In purchasing health services, it is crucial that financial risks are shared between 
providers and third parties while protecting patients from catastrophic spending and 
impoverishment from making health care payments. A comprehensive benefit 
package that involves minimal or no co-payment offers adequate FRP by minimizing 
excessive out-of-pocket payments. In resource-constrained settings, an explicit 
benefit package may be preferred as the itemized positive list often comprises 
interventions and treatments that have been found cost-effective. However, with 
explicit benefit packages cost-sharing arrangements by way of user fees and co-
payments on insured services for partial or full access to health care services may 
create financial barriers for the poor. For this reason, an implicit benefit package that 
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health care services is ideal if the goals of universal coverage are to be attained. 
Besides the benefit package it is worthwhile to take into account the information 
asymmetry between providers and consumers in the health care market. Providers by 
virtue of their superior knowledge base can induce consumption, of often, 
unnecessary care by patients. This is more widespread especially if the provider 
payment method offers high economic incentives to over-service. Fee-for-service is 
not desirable because of the perverse incentives to over provide. Reimbursement 
methods such as the diagnostic-related groups (DRG) that shift the financial risks 
from patients to providers are therefore preferred as they diminish the tendency to 
maximize provider utility. Provider behaviour can also be altered through active 
purchasing irrespective of whether an institutional separation exists between 
purchaser and provider through active purchashing. Purchasers in single payer 
systems often have greater monopsony purchasing power and can influence provider 
behaviour unlike multiple purchasers in a multi-payer system.  In such systems, 
supply-side regulation is essential to ensure efficiency and equity in the delivery of 
health services. 
 
Universal coverage is modelled on the principle of social solidarity, which 
determines the willingness to introduce and maintain cross-subsidies. Hence, societal 
beliefs and values cannot be overlooked when considering universal coverage. Most 
universal systems were devised during periods in history where societies were 
defined by high levels of social cohesiveness. Given the widening social distance 
and the erosion of social compassion in society today, particularly in LMICs 
whereby social and income inequalities are extensive, community initiatives such as 
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schemes create cohesiveness while creating a sense of „belonging‟ since these 
schemes are characterised by membership in a given geographical area and of similar 
religious or occupational (e.g substinence farming) affiliations. 
 
Finally, irrespective of the prepaid funding mechanism (general tax revenue or social 
health insurance) chosen in the transition to universal coverage, the organizational 
structure of the health system determines the extent to which equity and efficiency 
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Per capita health 
expenditures (US$)1 
Public Expenditure on 
Health as a % TEH 
Private Expenditure on 
Health as a % TEH 
Canada 39234 3678 70.4 29.6 
Korea 18387 1480 55.1 44.9 
Mexico 8004 794 44.2 55.8 
United 
Kingdom 
39793 2760 87.3 12.7 
OECD 
averages  
2824 73  



































Figure 1 Health financing by financial sources based on 2006 estimates.  
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Figure 3 The share of general tax revenue versus social insurance contributions 
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Figure 4 Public Expenditure on Health versus Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Payment as 
a share of the Total Expenditure on Health in four OECD countries, 2006  
 
   Source OECD HEALTH DATA 2008,  
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Appendix 1:  Suggested online Appendix to accompany article 
 
(Additional file 2) 
CANADA 
Revenue collection Domestic source of revenue: burden placed on companies and 
households through taxation, health insurance contributions 
and out-of-pocket payments.  
Contributing  
mechanisms General tax revenue generated from income taxes, 
employment-based health insurance, the Canada pension plan 
contributions, provincial sales tax (PST) collected by 
provinces with the rate varying across provinces tax and goods 
and services tax (GST) charged at 5%. Some provinces 
combine the GST and PST into one harmonized sales tax 
(HST) charged at 13%. Some and goods are zero-rated and not 
liable for GST. An earmarked tax or “premium” is set aside to 
supplement health revenues in some provinces. 
 
Major taxes collected are: excise duties, income taxes and fuel 
duties. Over 73 federal, provincial and territorial taxes 
collected. Of total taxes collected 49% are collected at federal 
level and 51% from provincial and territorial taxation. The 
proportion of federal corporate income taxes (CIT) is (35%), 
while the provincial CIT is (18%). Other federal taxes are 
employment and payroll taxes (13%), property taxes (14%), 
taxes on corporate capital (4%), other taxes (17%). 
The federal income tax rates for 2009 ranged from 15-29%: 
 15% on the first $40,726 of taxable income, +  
 22% on the next $40,726 of taxable income (on 
the portion of taxable income between $40,726 
and $81,452), + 
 26% on the next $44,812 of taxable income (on 
the portion of taxable income between $81,452 
and $126,264), + 
 29% of taxable income over $126,264. 
Complementary private health insurance offers coverage for 
health goods and services not covered by the public plan 
(Medicare).The self-employed also purchase complementary 
PHI.  
 
 Duplicate private health insurance 
This type of health insurance facilitates faster access to 
privately delivered care or serves as an alternative to the 
public plan. It is outlawed in most provinces. Until recently 
only four provinces: New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia and Saskatchewan did not impose any restrictions on 
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all or part of services rendered by opted-out physicians (a 
physician who has given up his rights to bill the public plan to 
practice in the private sector). Only in Nova Scotia that 
physicians (opted in or out) are not allowed to charge more 
than the public rate plans. Newfoundland doesn‟t impose any 
restrictions on the range of services private health insurance 
can cover. But the market share for this alternative PHI is 
limited since subscribers are not offered subsidies. The other 
provinces that had imposed a ban on duplicate insurance 
among them Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia have lifted 
the ban following the 2005 lawsuit in Quebec province. 
 
Out of pocket payments constitute 15% of total health 
expenditure, and are the second most important source of 
funds in this health system.  
Payments are made for private health goods and services such 
as ophthalmic care, over-the-counter medication and 
complementary and alternative therapies, extra-billing 
charges, services offered by opted-out physicians and 
provision of uninsured services that neither public nor private 
insurance plans insure. 
  
Other sources of funds are the mandatory employer 
contributions made to the provincial workers‟ compensation 
schemes managed by provincial workers‟ compensation 
boards (WCBs). Much of this money is paid directly to 
provincial health authorities and individual health facilities for 
the provision of health services. Others are donations from 
charitable organization directed towards health research, 
upgrading of facility infrastructure and equipment acquisition 
are other sources of funds for Medicare. 
 
Collecting   The Canada Revenue Agency collects federal taxes.  
organizations   
By 2004, 126 insurance companies provided health insurance 





Coverage and composition  
risk pools Federal government finances, administers and delivers 
health care for First Nations people living in reserves, 
the Inut, the armed forces and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, veterans and inmates of federal 
prisons. 
 
The rest of the population is covered under Medicare 
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provincial plans. Given the sheer size of these pools, 
the income and risk cross-subsidies are great. 
 
Complementary insurance insures 65% of the 
population. 
   
Allocation  
mechanisms Taxes are collected centrally. Most revenue raised by 
federal government is transferred to provinces, while 
some is spent on public health, pharmaceutical 
regulation and drug safety and on health care services 
for certain population groups.  
Federal government allocates tax revenue to provincial 
governments in the form of a federal transfer the 
Canada Health Transfer, which flows on a per capita 
basis. 
   
Provincial governments in turn allocate CHT based on 
either population-based funding or historical budgets 
to regional health authorities. 
 
Health insurance companies reimburse health 
providers based on claims made by the insured for 





Benefit package General practitioners are independent contractors and 
serve as the first point of contact acting as gate keepers 
to other levels of care. Patients have a choice of 
primary care provider but most have long standing 
relationship with GPs. 
 
 
The 13 single payer systems cover a wide range of 
hospital and physician. Medically necessary services 
as stipulated in the Canadian Health Act are offered 
free of charge and include; ambulatory physician 
services, specialized ambulatory care, elective surgery, 
secondary, tertiary and emergency care. Services 
excluded from Medicare‟s benefit package can be 
accessed from private providers through private 
financing either through private health insurance or 
direct payments. Provincial tax-financed drug plans 
(Pharmacare) cover out-patient prescriptions for social 
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Provider payment mechanisms  
 
Physicians are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis 
accounting for 83% of total remuneration with the 
exception of community clinics in Quebec where 
physicians are on salary contracts.  Some provinces 
have adopted blended system of payment of salary, 
capitation and FFS for family/general practitioners. 
Salaries are the preferred provider payment method for 
all cadre of nursing personnel based as well as 
pharmacists most employed in the commercial sector 
(for-profit retail pharmacies). 
Regional health authorities reimburse hospitals and 




Each province and territory has its own laws governing 
the single payer system. Provincial governments are 
responsible for funding hospitals, setting physician 
remuneration rates, providing public health services, 
assessing health technologies and funding health 
research. All provinces manage respective prescription 
drug plans and directly or directly provide home based 
care. The 13 payer systems are diverse with wide inter-
provincial variations in financing and provisions 
regulations. 
 
Health care is delivered in the private sector. Hospitals 
are privately owned and are not-for profit institutions 
that are funded through global budgets and managed 
by RHAs. For-profit hospitals do not qualify for the 
block grant and prohibited from providing publicly 
funded services. 
 
Primary health care is the first level of care and point 
of contact between the patient and the health care 
system. The services covered at primary care level 
include maternal and child health care and other non-
acute medical care services. Patients have a choice in 
selecting a family practitioner with most patients 
having established relationships with respective 
physicians. Canadian physicians are permitted to opt-
out of the public system (Medicare) and join the 
private sector and set their fees at any level but in 
seven provinces opted-out practitioners are not eligible 
for public subsidies while in the remaining three 
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physicians since they cannot bill patients more than the 
amount payable by the public plan.  
    
Health personnel are under supplied. 2.1 and 8.7 
practising physicians and nurses per 1000 population, 
respectively. 
 
Long term care is provided in nursing homes run by 
























Source of funds    
Domestic funding: households and companies bear the 
burden of financing health care services through 
general taxation, mandatory insurance contributions, 
private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Contribution mechanisms General tax revenue is generated from VAT (37.1%), 
personal income tax (12.7%), corporation tax (15.3%), 
social security (19.5%), property tax (11.8%) and other 
taxes (3.6%).  
Personal income tax is structured progressively with 
the marginal tax rate ranging from 9% -36%. Both 
domestic/foreign and for-profit/ non-profit companies 
are subjected to the corporation tax charged at tax rate 
of 15% and 27%. 
 
VAT is charged at 10% with many good and services 
exempted from the tax while others are zero-rated. 
 
Social health insurance contributions are paid by 
employees, employers and the self-employed.  
For industrial workers, civil servants and private 
school employees the contributions are proportional to 
wage income and shared equally between employer 
and employee. The contribution rate is 5.08%. There is 
a wage ceiling for contribution assessment of a 
monthly wage of US$ 50 000, a very high value with 
very few individuals in this category. 
For the self-employed, the contribution formula is 
based on income and property. For the income 
component the contribution is based on taxed income 
for those earning above US$5000 or an estimated 
income for those with annual incomes below US$ 
5000. The calculation of the estimated income takes 
into account the demographic information of the 
insured, household property and the car tax paid by the 
household. The contribution is made monthly. 
Defaulting for more than three months results in 
cancellation of health insurance benefits. 
 
Government partially subsidizes 22%-50% of 
contributions for the self-employed and low income 
earners. Low income earners in island and remote rural 
areas receive 10-30% of the while the disabled and 
those aged above 65 receive 30% for the. 80% of the 
subsidy is from general government budget while 20% 
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poor and unemployed receive full subsidization of 
their contributions. 
 
Out-of-pocket-payments: The largest proportion of 
out-of-pocket payments is for co-payments on insured 
services either in the form of a deductible or co-
insurance. The deductible is a flat fee of 4 USD for 
each unit of service while the co-insurance is levied at 
various rates for different services. The co-insurance 
for outpatient service ranges from 30% to 55%, 10 to 
20% for inpatient services and 30% of total cost of 
drugs at pharmacies. The co-payment for outpatient 
care is set higher than for physician clinics to 
encourage patients to visit physicians as opposed to 
hospital outpatient departments. 
In addition uninsured services are accessible on an out-
of-pocket basis. 
 
Supplementary private health insurance insures mostly 
against chronic illnesses such as cancers, new services 
and technology that are not insured by the NHI by 
facilitating the reimbursement of co-payments on some 
of these services. 
 
Collecting organizations The National Tax Service (NTS) is the main tax 
collection body. 
 The mandatory contributions are collected and 
managed by the National Health Insurance 
Corporation (NHIC). The contributions include 
monthly payroll deductions from formal sector 
employees and monthly payments by the self-
employed based on income. 
Risk pooling  
Coverage and composition  
of risk pools There are three main pools: the SHI pool covering 96% of the 
population, the general tax revenue pool covering 4% of the 
population (Medical Aid) and private health insurance pool 
covering 3% of the population 
  
The PHI pool doesn‟t not allow for adequate cross-
subsidies because premiums are risk-rated  
Allocation mechanisms  
Purchasing 
Benefit package The benefit package in the NHI was very has been 
incrementally extended to offer coverage to new 
services and technologies such as CT scanning.  
  
The range of health care benefits are either in form of 
cash or benefits in-kind, the latter constitutes 99% of 
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made for health care provision at non-NHI providers, 
compensation for excess levying of co-payments and 
to purchase appliances for the disabled such as hearing 
aids and wheel chairs. 
 
Curative services are the main insured services, 
unlimited inpatient days, medicines dispensed in 
pharmacies, CT scanning technology, traditional 
medicine meals during hospitalization, nursing, 
ambulance services, bi-annual check ups and 
vaccinations. Screening for stomach, colon, breast and 
liver cancer are shared between insurer (80%) and 
beneficiary (20%). Uninsured services are those that 
are not life-threatening or impair physical activity such 
as plastic surgery  
  
Provider payment 
mechanism Medical claims are reviewed by the central review 
agency Health Insurance Review Agency (HIRA). 
After the assessment by HIRA, providers are 
reimbursed by the NHIC on a fee-for-service basis. 
  
Both private and public hospitals are reimbursed on 
similar fee schedules. The common fee schedule (FFS) 
for both primary and tertiary care gives economic 
incentives to providers to over-service. 
 
 There are few hospitals that reimburse inpatient 
services based on the prospective Diagnostic Related 
Groups (DRG) -based payment system. 
 
The resource-based relative value (RBRV)-based 
payment method is used to reimburse outpatient office-
based physicians. Physicians receive substantial 
revenue from patients from payments made directly on 
an out-of-pocket basis mostly for provision of 
uninsured services. Hospital-based physicians are on 
salaried contracts. 
 
Provision 90% and 100% of acute care hospitals and physician 
clinics, respectively, are privately owned. Public sector 
controls close to 10% of acute care hospitals that 
include tuberculosis, leprosy and psychiatric hospitals 
as well as the Bogeunso or public health centers and 
the National Medical Centre.  
 
The acute care bed capacity is 6.8 per 1000 population 
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 Both Western-trained and traditional practitioners 
work in the NHI. About, 90% of specialists work in 
the private sector whereby a quarter of practising 
doctors possesses two medical specialties with 
specialists accounting for 80% of all practicing 
medical doctors. 
 The number of practicing specialists per 1000 
population was 1.1 while practising nurses were 4 per 














































Source of funds Domestic funding: burden of financing placed on 
companies and individuals through general taxation, 
mandatory insurance contributions, private health 
insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
 
General tax revenue is generated from both federal and 
state taxation. Federal taxes include personal income 
taxes (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), payroll taxes 
mainly channelled to social security accounts, value 
added tax (VAT), tax on gasoline, excise and import 
duties which account for close to 95% of all taxes 
collected. State general tax revenue derived from three 
main sources; hotel occupancy, lotteries and payroll 
deductions which account for 90% of total revenue, 
while other excise taxes and duties account for 10%.  
Income taxes are only collected at federal level with 
low income earners being exempt. The marginal 
income tax rate range from 3% for the lowest income 
tax come taxpayer to 30% for highest income taxpayer. 
VAT is charged at 15%, but many goods are zero-rated 
and not VAT exempt. 
 
Social health insurance contributions are mandatory 
for all formal sector workers. The health insurance 
component is part of the wide social benefits the social 
security systems provide. Other include; life insurance, 
pension, disability and sometimes childcare and 
recreation benefits.  
 
The institutions in the social security system are the 
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS, Mexican 
institute for social security); the Instituto de Seguridad 
y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado 
(ISSSTE); the Instituto de Seguridad para las Fuerzas 
Armadas Mexicanas (ISFAM, for the armed forces), 
and medical services provided by and for the national 
oil company (PEMEX), the Secretaría de la Defensa 
Nacional (SDN, department of national defense), the 
Secretaría de Marina (SECMAR, navy department), 
and the Sistema de Transporte Colectivo del Metro 
(underground transport system).  
 
The contribution to social security systems is tripartite 
in nature shared among federal, state and households 
or companies. There are three funding components of 
the social security schemes: the first component is a 
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the federal government, it promotes social solidarity 
among all population groups; the second component is 
the co-responsible contributor which guarantees 
solidarity in each population group and redistribution 
among states. It is shared between employer and state; 
the third component is the pre-paid family 
contribution, which is progressive and redistributes 
family income. The contribution is a monthly payroll 
deduction set at a progressive proportional rate to the 
wage. 
 
The current contributions are 4.275% for Old Age 
benefits; 2% for the complementary pension scheme 
(SAR); 2.375% for survivors and disability and 
1.425% for medical care for retirees. The contributions 
are up to 25 times the minimum wage and are limited 
to up to fifteen times the wage with the exception of 
SAR. Contributions are paid in these proportions: 
employer 70%; employee 25% and government 5%. 
 
For those outside the formal sector, „the mandatory‟ 
contribution is collected through three voluntary 
schemes: Voluntaria al Regimen Obligatorio 
(Voluntary Incorporation to the Obligatory Regime); 
Seguro de Salud para la Familia (Health Security for 
the Family); and Seguro Popular or Popular Health 
Insurance (PHI) the spring board to universal 
coverage. 
 
With the exemption of the Seguro Popular which 
covers a comprehensive range of health services, the 
other two schemes offer benefits similar to those 
offered to formal sector workers but with key 
exclusions: individuals with pre-existing conditions are 
not eligible to enrol, while some surgical procedures 
and expensive treatments are not covered.  
 
  
Seguro Popular contributions are tripartite in nature 
similar to contribution arrangements in formal sector 
schemes. The first component is the federal social 
quota. It was 15% of the mandatory minimum wage in 
2004; for the co-responsible contributor, the co-
responsibility is between state and federal 
governments and that takes into account the variations 
in development across states since Seguro Popular 
beneficiaries are unemployed. The federal contribution 
is on average 1.5 times higher than the social quota 
with poorer states receiving higher increments than 
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contribution, but families in the lowest two income 
quintiles are exempt from the family contribution. For 
households in other income quintiles, the upper limit 
of the family contribution is 5% of disposable income 
defined as total household expenditure minus spending 
on basic needs such as food. One contribution level is 
required for each of the other income quintiles with the 
exception of households in the tenth quintile that 
requires two levels of contributions.  
 
The other two voluntary schemes are financed through 
subscriber contributions and a federal contribution, 
which is an advanced payment of the annual premium. 
The annual contribution ranges from US$100-250, 
while the federal subsidy is close to US$110. The high 
premiums are an impediment to enroll in these 
voluntary schemes.  
 
Private health insurance is primarily voluntary 
purchased by individuals and to a lesser-extent 
employer-based in some private sector companies 
 
   Out-of-pocket payments: 
The biggest share of out-of-pocket payments (51%) is 
attributable for charges in the private sector. Patients 
pay directly for medicines in retail pharmacies for both 
prescription and non-prescription drugs, out-patients 
consultations and all services (diagnostic and 
treatment) offered by private sector providers. 
Subscribers of private health insurance pay out-of-
pocket for co-payments and deductibles.  
 
  
 The other share (49%) of out-of-pocket spending is 
from user fees in public sector hospitals. User fees are 
levied for in-patient care, medicines, dental care, most 
out-patient services except for maternal and child care. 
The poor are granted fee waivers that are determined 
through socio-economic evaluation.  
Collecting  
organization   
The Secretary of Finance and Public Credit or the 
Hacienda is the tax collection authority that collects all 
federal revenues 
 
The Seguro Popular scheme is managed by the 
National Commission of Social Health Protections.  
The Mexican Institute for Social Security and the 
Housing Fund collect contributions for schemes that 
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Risk pooling  
Coverage and  
composition of risk pools There are three main pools the general tax revenue 
pool covering 50% of the population, the SHI pools 
covering 50% and the PHI covering about 3% of the 
population.  
 
The largest of the social security programmes is IMSS 
which insures private sector workers and their 
dependants totaling 44.5 million members (45% of the 
Mexican population), followed by ISSSTE covering 
government workers and their employees. Together the 
two insure 95% of total formal sector labour force with 
the remaining 5% insured through the other employer-
based schemes. The mandatory social insurance pool 
consists of over seven risk pools which are financially 
fragmented and cannot harness the economies of scale 
in management since the organizations have different 
management structures. 
  
   
 The 50.5 % of the population was dependent is 
intended to be covered by Seguro Popular.  
 
PHI covers mostly the affluent and enables access to 
high quality care in private sector services for-profit 
hospitals and clinics. 
 
 
Allocation mechanisms  
Federal allocation under System for Social Protection 
in Health (SSPH) is divided into four components: 
health related public goods that include stewardship 
roles of the SSA; Fund for Community Health 
Services; non-catastrophic personal health services and 
catastrophic high cost personal health service. The 
stewardship functions (planning, information, 
evaluation, research and human resource development 
are financed by the SSA‟s or ministry of health budget. 
 
The catastrophic fund (FPGC) receives 8% of the 
federal social quota plus the federal and state solidarity 
contributions. An additional 2% is set aside for 
infrastructure development in marginalized areas and 
reserve fund of 1% of the total is designated for 
unexpected increases in service utilization and 
provisional payments across all states. The three funds 
are pooled at federal level, a measure that guarantees 
adequate and equitable risk pooling across the entire 
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The remaining social quota and solidarity 
contributions are allocated to states to finance the 
essential benefit package under Seguro Popular while 
the entire family contribution is collected and 
maintained at the state level.  
 
The SSHF handles IMSS funds and transfers pooled 
revenue to either a public or private managed care 
organizations (MCO) based on a prospective capitation 
basis. 
 
Patients pay directly for services in the private on a 
fee-for-service basis. 
Purchasing 
Benefit package Those insured under mandatory social health insurance 
schemes have access to free a range of services at the 
institution own facilities. 
 
 The Seguro Popular benefit package comprises 249 
interventions and 17 catastrophic interventions. 
Primary care essential services include ambulatory 
care, out-patient consultations and hospitalizations and 
basic specialties. Interventions covered under the 
FPGC are ailments that caused catastrophic 
expenditures among the uninsured population that are 
now insured and include treatment of childhood and 
cervical cancers at all stages, cataract extraction, 
severe trauma, cardiovascular ailments, cerebro-
vascular diseases, HIV/AIDS, long term rehabilitation, 
neo-natal intensive care, organ transplant and dialysis. 
Secondary care is mostly ambulatory, hospitalization 
and emergency care in general hospitals that provide 
basic specialties or specialty hospitals where imaging 
diagnostics and laboratory services are provided. At 
tertiary level, specialized care is provided 
 
Provider payment The private sector represented by private health 
insurance plans and private medical care organizations 
that reimburse hospitals on a fee-for-service basis. 
  
  
 Voluntary participating hospitals (15 in total) and 
clinics under the IMSS are reimbursed based on 
diagnosis, related groups (DRG) introduced. 
  
 Prospective capitation is used to reimburse private 
MCOs and IMSS affiliated Medical Areas. A medical 
area is responsible for 260 000 enrolees, and comprises 
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hospital reimbursed on a capitation basis with 
contracting out for specialty care, to the 41-IMSS run 
tertiary hospitals. 
 
Provision There are 4 000 hospitals in Mexico with 1 047 
belonging (26.2%) to the public sector with a larger 
proportion (85%) of general than tertiary level 
hospitals at 13.2 %. The private sector is the largest 
provider controlling close to 70% of acute care but is 
concentrated in the large metropolitan cities. For-profit 
hospital sector groups consisting of several hospital 
groups but a move towards monopolisation by one 
group possibly through mergers and acquisition has 
been growing. 
  
 The non-profit providers such as the Mexican Red 
Cross and nongovernmental organizations provide 
health services that relate to HIV/AIDS and 
reproductive health with minimal provision of primary 
care service and are not significant providers. 
  
 Human resources are under supplied. There are 1.9 
physicians per 1 000 population in 2006 and 2.3 nurses 
per 1 000 population. For the insured formal sector 
workers health care access is free at the point of use. 
Medical facilities are owned and funded by each social 
insurance agency, which also employs its health 



















Source of funds Domestic funding: households and companies bear the 
financing burden through general taxation, mandatory 
insurance contributions, private health insurance and 
out-of-pocket payments. 
    
Contributing mechanisms  
General tax revenue is generated from personal income 
tax (28%), VAT (15%), National Insurance (17%), 
Corporation Tax (10%), Other indirect taxes (10%), 
Local tax (4%), Capital taxes (3%), Other taxes (13%) 
 
Personal income tax is operated through a system of 
allowances and bands of taxable income which is 
subject to different tax rates depending on the tax band 
the income falls under. Two main income taxes are: 
personal income tax and National Insurance 
contributions. Personal income rates are structured 
progressively with lowest marginal tax rate being 10% 
and the highest 40%.  
 
The main marginal rate for Corporation tax is 28% but 
small companies with profit rates ranging between 
£300,000 and £1,500,000 lower and upper limits, 
respectively are charged a rate of 21%.  
VAT is charged at three rates 0%, 5% and 15%. The 
standard VAT rate is 15% with some good zero-rated 
or charged a reduced rate of 5%. Many basic goods are 
VAT exempt. 
 
National Insurance contributions: These provide 
auxiliary funds to the NHS budget. They are 
mandatory deductions of earnings by employers, 
employees and the self-employed.  
 
NI contributions are capped consisting of upper and 
lower limits for employee and employer contributions. 
The self-employed pay a flat rate weekly and a 
progressive yearly rate of total earnings. NI 
contributions are channelled to the National Insurance 
Fund managed by Treasury, from which a fixed 
proportion is channelled to the NHS. 
 
The NIC rates for the year 2008- 2009 were: 
Employees: NIC rates of 11% on earnings between the 
primary threshold [(PT) £105 per] and an upper 
earnings limit (UEL, £770). Earnings above the UEL 
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Employers: paid NICs for each employee earning 
above the secondary threshold [(ST) also set at £105 
per week in 2008-2009)], at a rate of 12.8% of all 
earnings above this level.  
 
Class 2 and class 4 NICs are applicable to the self-
employed. The class 2 contribution is a weekly flat 
rate of £2.30 for 2008-2009 by those with earnings 
exceeding £4, 825 per year. Class 4 contributions are 
paid at 8% on profits that range from lower profits 
limit (£5,435 yearly for 2008-2009) and the upper 
profits limit (£40, 040 per year for 2008-09) with 1% 
charge on profits above the upper profits limit. Class 3 
contributions are made voluntarily by UK citizens 
living outside the country, at a weekly rate of £8.10 for 
2008-09.  
 
Duplicate private health insurance (PHI). 
12.8 % of the population has private health insurance. 
PHI subscribers still retain full access to publicly 
delivered services but PHI finances flow primarily to 
private hospitals, and other providers of alternative 
care such as home nurse services. Private health 
insurance mainly insures against acute care costs in 
private hospitals. There are three product types that 
extend coverage beyond the acute care benefits, 
ranging from the most expensive comprehensive 
policy to standard policy and the cheapest budget 
policy that offers the least benefits. Pre-existing 
medical conditions, conditions and services that place 
insurer to moral hazard and expensive resource-
intensive services are not insured. 
       
Employers-based PHI represents 59% of the total 
while individual plans account for 31%. The remainder 
10% is from voluntary employee-paid groups 
facilitated by professional organizations or trade 
unions. Some companies leave the cost of financing all 
or part of premium costs to employees. 
 
An Insurance Premium Tax of 5% is charged for 
insurance companies. Private health insurance 
companies pools funds from employee deductions, 
while individuals pay directly to the companies. 
 
Health cash plans The benefit paid is a fixed 
proportion of the amount paid out-for-pocket by the 
patient, with an annual cash benefit ceiling of the cash 
amount that can be reimbursed by the plan. This 
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reimbursements paid via private health insurance.  
Premiums are paid weekly, monthly or yearly. There 
are 35 providers of health cash plans, close to half 
(17%) of these companies sell for the most part PHI. 
Of the latter, 12 are non-profit (provident) 
organizations accounting for 90% of the market share. 
Health cash plans in general cover treatments that are 
wholly not covered or partially covered under the NHS 
such as dental care, ophthalmic care and 
complementary care which includes acupuncture, 
osteopathy, chiropractic, chiropody, homeopathy, 
physiotherapy, day-care admission. The plans also 
provide coverage for services that are similar to those 
covered under the NHS such as reimbursement 
towards private specialist consultation. 
 
Out-of-pocket payments are made for services that are 
not covered under the NHS such as private beds at 
NHS hospitals (at patient‟s request), prescription 
drugs, dental care, ophthalmic services and long term 
care for the elderly.  
 
Collecting organizations Taxes and NI contributions are collected by the central 
collecting agency, Her Majesty‟s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC).   
 
Private health insurance contributions are collected 
directly from enrolees (employees and employers) by 
the 27 insurers shared on a 50:50 basis between 
provident and commercial (for-profit) companies. PHI 
is either sold directly by the insurer or through 
professional intermediaries. There are over 3000 
intermediaries mainly insurance brokers and 
independent financial advisers providing limited PHI 
in the individual market. Close to 85% of PHI sales in 
the individual market are made directly by insurers to 
subscribers.  
 
For health cash plans, sales are directly made by the 
subscriber through sales representatives and to lesser 
extent intermediaries. 
8.1% of the population have access health cash plan 
but the proportion of those with both PHI and health 
cash plan is still undetermined 
 
 
Risk pooling  
Coverage and composition  There are two main pools: the general tax pool which 
covers 100% of the population and the PHI pool 
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of risk pools The general revenue fund pool allows for income 
cross-subsidization due to the progressive nature of 
income taxes. 
 
The demand for PHI is intertwined by two factors, one 
is the perception on the quality (mostly non-clinical 
dimension) of care provided by the NHS and secondly 
the subscribers‟ characteristics. Subscribers are often 
males aged 40 to 65, higher income earners, executives 
in highly skilled professions and political-affiliates of 
the Conservative party. Premiums are community-
rated for group plans allowing for cross-subsidies and 
risk-rated for individual PHI, which limits cross-
subsidies. There is fragmentation of risk pools in the 
PHI market given the multiple insurers offering 
different benefit packages.  
   
 
Allocation mechanisms The national government allocates the overall 
Department of Health Budget (the NHS budget) in line 
with its annual overall public spending plan. The 
Department of Health then determines the allocation of 
monies to primary care trusts (PCTs) which 
breakdown the allocation to the two main health 
sectors; hospital and community health services and 
primary care or family health. The allocation of 
budgetary funds to PCTs or purchasers is by the use of 
a weighted capitation formula.  There is pool 
integration among the various geographically defined 
risk pools, the primary care trusts, through the needs-
based allocated formula. 
 
 Generally, insurers reimburse the providers directly 
while specialists bill the patients who then claim 
reimbursement from the insurer. 
 
Purchasing 
Benefit package 99% of the population is registered with PCTs (GPs 
practices) that are independent primary care providers 
contracted by the NHS. GPs work in group practices 
averaging 5 practitioners. Patients are referred to 
specialist care by GPs. The gate keeping role is a 
defining characteristic of the NHS. 
 
Beneficiaries have access to a wide range of services 
free at the point of use. The benefit package is not 
explicitly, thus a wide range of services are publicly 
funded. There are very few exclusions from the benefit 
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therapy and cosmetic surgery. These services are 
privately delivered and privately financed either 
through private health insurance or out-of-pocket 
payments. 
 
Primary health care is subsidized by public monies and 
is free provided by independent primary care 
providers. In-patient care at NHS hospitals is free 
except for amenity care. 
 
 Prescription drugs are subsidized but a flat rated fee is 
charged on all prescriptions. Nonetheless an estimated 
85% of prescription items dispensed do not qualify for 
the prescription fee.  Some population groups are 
exempt from the prescription charge and include: the 
elderly, pregnant women, children under the age of 16, 
low income earners, NHS in-patients and patient 
visiting STD clinics and social assistance receipts. 
 
 Independent contractors commissioned by PCTs 
provide eye care to NHS patients. Following the 
deregulation policies of the 1980s that placed undue 
restrictions to ophthalmic services, patients meet all 
costs for eye care except for (children, low income 
earners and people with special eye. In addition 
children, pregnant women and nursing mothers and 
people on welfare grants are exempt from making 
dental payments 
     
     
Provider payment   
mechanisms 
 The purchasers of health care services are Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) in England, local health groups 
(LHGs) in Wales. PCTs cover 50 000-250 000 people. 
  
GPs are paid on a capitation basis in addition to fixed 
allowances, health promotion payments and item of 
service payments or quality points. Hospital doctors 
and other health professionals are on salaried contracts. 
Specialists working for the NHS on a full time basis 
have flexible contracts that allow them to earn up to 
10% of the gross income from private practice while 
those on maximum part-time contracts do not have 
restrictions on their earnings from private practice. 
They can work unlimited hours in the private sector by 
giving up an eleventh of their NHS salary. 
  
Hospitals are reimbursed based on Health Care 
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 Private providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis. 
  
Provision The delivery system comprises strategic health 
authorities and primary care trusts (PCTs) the former 
responsible for strategic planning while PCTs 
commission services on behalf of NHS patients. 
Health care is accessed through primary and 
community health facilities and hospitals where a 
range of range of services are provided such as health 
promotion, preventative care, self-care, rehabilitation 
and aftercare.  
 
There are 0.7 GPs per 1 000 population. 
There is limited private general practice with just over 
200 exclusively private GPs in the UK who are not 
allowed to treat NHS patients privately. There are over 
36 walk-in clinics run by the private sector. 
 
Secondary care  either elective or emergency care is 
provided in the 200 general acute NHS trusts and 400 
community care hospitals and specialised tertiary level 
care facilities.  Emergency services are handled by 
ambulances provided under the NHS Ambulance 
Trust. The number of acute hospital beds is 2.2 per 
1000 population.  
 
There are about 230 private hospitals dominated by 5 
hospital groups accounting for 65% of private 
hospitals and 65% of private hospital beds. The NHS 
has a higher hospital bed capacity than the private 
sector which controls less than 5% of the total hospital 
beds. 
 
The number of health professionals has increased to 
2.5 practising physicians per 1 000 population and 
11.9 nurses per 1 000 population.  
 
Most diagnostic and laboratory services are located 
within the NHS‟s community and acute general 
hospitals. GPs make diagnostic referrals if procedure 
cannot be performed at primary care level or contract 
out to the private sector especially for pathological 
assessment. 
 
Pharmaceutical services are provided by community 
pharmacists contracted by the PCTs. Pharmacists 
dispense drugs and appliances prescribed by GPs as 
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Appendix 3: List and definition of variables 
 
VARIABLE VARIABLE EXPLANATION 
A. Expenditure on health (Total, 
Public, Private) 
 
1. Total expenditure on health 
2. Expenditure on personal care 
3. Expenditure on collective health 
care 
4. Current health expenditure by 
provider 













B. Health care financing 
 
 
Total expenditure on health: sum of 
expenditure on activities that through 
application of medical, paramedical 
and nursing knowledge and technology 
to promote health and prevent diseases 
among other goals. 
 
Current expenditure in health (total, 
public, private) is the sum of total 
personal and total collective service but 
excludes investment. 
 
Investment on medical facilities 
(total, public, private) comprises 
gross capital formation of domestic 
health care provider institutions 
excluding retails sale and other 








Health expenditure by financing 
agent or scheme 
 
Public expenditure on health: same 
as total expenditure on health 
General government (excluding 
social security): expenditure on health 
incurred by central, state and local 
authorities excluding social security 
schemes. 
Social security schemes: expenditure 
on health incurred by social security 
schemes including social health 
insurance funds. 
Private expenditure on health: 
Out-of pocket payment (households): 
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expenditure paid directly by private 
households. 
Out-of-pocket payments excluding 
cost sharing: Payments borne directly 
by a patient without the benefit of 
insurance. Include informal payments 
to health care providers. 
Cost sharing households: Patient pays 
part of the health care costs and other 
part paid by health insurance. 
Private insurance: Expenditure on 
health incurred by private insurance 
funds. Include non-profit institutions 
serving households other than social 
insurance, corporations other than 
health insurance and  institutions that 
are resident aboard but provide health 
insurance 












- 177 - 
 





*, Jane E Doe
 1,2




Life Sciences Department, King‟s College London, Cornwall House, Waterloo 
Road, London, UK 
2
Department of Zoology, Camridge, Cornwall House, Waterloo Road, London, UK 
3
Marine Ecology Department, Institute of Marine Sciences Kiel, Düsternbrooker 
Weg 20, 24105 Kiel, Germany 
 






















Text for this section of the abstract… 
Methods 
Text for this section of the abstract… 
Results 
Text for this section of the abstract… 
Conclusions 




Text for this section. 
Methods 
Text for this section. 
Results 
Sub- heading for this section 
Text for this sub-section. 
Sub- heading for this section 
Text for this sub-section. 
Sub- heading for this section 
Text for this sub-section. 
Discussion 
Text for this section. 
Conclusions 
Text for this section. 
Competing interests 
Text for this section. 
Authors' contributions 
Acknowledgements 
Text for this section. 
 
References 
1. Shuman S: Structure, mechanism, and evolution of the mRNA capping 
apparatus. Prog. Nucleic Acid Res. Mol. Biol 2000, 66:1-40 
2. Chomczynski P, Sacchi N: Single-step method of RNA isolation by acid 
guanidinium thiocyanate-phenol-chloroform extraction. Anal Biochem 
1987, 162:156-159 
3. Sambrook J, Fitsch EF, Maniatis T: Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory 
Manual. Cold Spring Harbor, Cold Spring Harbor Press 1989 
4. Wessely S, Wood F: Peer review of grant applications: a systematic 
review. In: Peer review in Health Sciences. Edited by Godlee F, Jefferson T. 
London, BMJ Books 1999, 14-31 




Figure 1  - Sample figure title 
Figure legend text 











- 179 - 
 
Figure legend text. 
Tables 
Table 1  - Sample table title 
Table legend text. 
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Additional files 
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Appendix 5: Instruction to Authors 
 
BMC Health Services Research is an open access journal publishing original peer-
reviewed research articles in all aspects of health services research, including delivery 
of care, management of health services, assessment of healthcare needs, measurement 
of outcomes, allocation of healthcare resources, evaluation of different health markets 
and health services organizations, international comparative analysis of health systems, 
health economics and the impact of health policies and regulations. 
Preparing main manuscript text  
File formats  
 
The following word processor file formats are acceptable for the main manuscript 
document:  
 Microsoft Word (version 2 and above)  
 Rich text format (RTF)  
 Portable document format (PDF)  
 TeX/LaTeX (use BioMed Central's TeX template)  
 DeVice Independent format (DVI)  
 Publicon Document (NB)  
Users of other word processing packages should save or convert their files to RTF 
before uploading. Many free tools are available which ease this process. 
TeX/LaTeX users: We recommend using BioMed Central's TeX template and BibTeX 
stylefile. If you use this standard format, you can submit your manuscript in TeX 
format (after you submit your TEX file, you will be prompted to submit your BBL 
file). If you have used another template for your manuscript, or if you do not wish to 
use BibTeX, then please submit your manuscript as a DVI file. We do not recommend 
converting to RTF.  
Note that figures must be submitted as separate image files, not as part of the submitted 
DOC/ PDF/TEX/DVI file.  
 
Article types  
When submitting your manuscript, you will be asked to assign one of the following 
types to your article:  
Research article  




Study protocol  
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Please read the descriptions of each of the article types, choose which is appropriate for 
your article and structure it accordingly. If in doubt, your manuscript should be 
classified as a Research article, the structure for which is described below.  
Manuscript sections for Research articles  
 
Manuscripts for Research articles submitted to BMC Health Services Research should 
be divided into the following sections:  
 Title page  
 Abstract  
 Background  
 Methods  
 Results  
 Discussion  
 Conclusions  
 List of abbreviations used (if any)  
 Competing interests  
 Authors' contributions  
 Authors' information (if any)  
 Acknowledgements  
 References  
 Figure legends (if any)  
 Tables and captions (if any)  
 Description of additional data files (if any)  
You can download a template (compatible with Mac and Windows Word 
97/98/2000/2003/2007) for your article. For instructions on use, see below.  
The Accession Numbers of any nucleic acid sequences, protein sequences or atomic 
coordinates cited in the manuscript should be provided, in square brackets and include 
the corresponding database name; for example, [EMBL:AB026295, EMBL:AC137000, 
DDBJ:AE000812, GenBank:U49845, PDB:1BFM, Swiss-Prot:Q96KQ7, PIR:S66116]. 
The databases for which we can provide direct links are: EMBL Nucleotide Sequence 
Database (EMBL), DNA Data Bank of Japan (DDBJ ), GenBank at the NCBI 
(GenBank), Protein Data Bank (PDB), Protein Information Resource (PIR) and the 
Swiss-Prot Protein Database (Swiss-Prot). 
Title page  
This should list the title of the article. The title should include the study design, for 
example:  
A versus B in the treatment of C: a randomized controlled trial  
X is a risk factor for Y: a case control study  
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included on the title page. The corresponding author should also be indicated.  
Abstract  
 
The abstract of the manuscript should not exceed 350 words and must be structured 
into separate sections: Background, the context and purpose of the study; Methods, 
how the study was performed and statistical tests used; Results, the main findings; 
Conclusions, brief summary and potential implications. Please minimize the use of 
abbreviations and do not cite references in the abstract; Trial registration, if your 
research article reports the results of a controlled health care intervention, please list 
your trial registry, along with the unique identifying number, e.g. Trial registration: 
Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN73824458. Please note that there should be no space 
between the letters and numbers of your trial registration number.  
Background  
 
The background section should be written from the standpoint of researchers without 
specialist knowledge in that area and must clearly state - and, if helpful, illustrate - the 
background to the research and its aims. Reports of clinical research should, where 
appropriate, include a summary of a search of the literature to indicate why this study 
was necessary and what it aimed to contribute to the field. The section should end with 
a very brief statement of what is being reported in the article.  
Methods  
 
This should include the design of the study, the setting, the type of participants or 
materials involved, a clear description of all interventions and comparisons, and the 
type of analysis used, including a power calculation if appropriate.  
Results and Discussion  
 
The Results and Discussion may be combined into a single section or presented 
separately. Results of statistical analysis should include, where appropriate, relative and 
absolute risks or risk reductions, and confidence intervals. The results and discussion 
sections may also be broken into subsections with short, informative headings. 
Conclusions  
 
This should state clearly the main conclusions of the research and give a clear 
explanation of their importance and relevance. Summary illustrations may be included. 
List of abbreviations  
 
If abbreviations are used in the text, either they should be defined in the text where first 
used, or a list of abbreviations can be provided, which should precede the competing 
interests and authors' contributions.  
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A competing interest exists when your interpretation of data or presentation of 
information may be influenced by your personal or financial relationship with other 
people or organizations. Authors should disclose any financial competing interests but 
also any non-financial competing interests that may cause them embarrassment were 
they to become public after the publication of the manuscript.  
Authors are required to complete a declaration of competing interests. All competing 
interests that are declared will be listed at the end of published articles. Where an 
author gives no competing interests, the listing will read 'The author(s) declare that they 
have no competing interests'.  
When completing your declaration, please consider the following questions:  
Financial competing interests  
 In the past five years have you received reimbursements, fees, funding, or salary 
from an organization that may in any way gain or lose financially from the 
publication of this manuscript, either now or in the future? Is such an 
organization financing this manuscript (including the article-processing 
charge)? If so, please specify.  
 Do you hold any stocks or shares in an organization that may in any way gain or 
lose financially from the publication of this manuscript, either now or in the 
future? If so, please specify.  
 Do you hold or are you currently applying for any patents relating to the content 
of the manuscript? Have you received reimbursements, fees, funding, or salary 
from an organization that holds or has applied for patents relating to the content 
of the manuscript? If so, please specify.  
 Do you have any other financial competing interests? If so, please specify.  
Non-financial competing interests  
Are there any non-financial competing interests (political, personal, religious, 
ideological, academic, intellectual, commercial or any other) to declare in relation to 
this manuscript? If so, please specify. 
If you are unsure as to whether you or one of your co-authors has a competing interest, 
please discuss it with the editorial office.  
Authors' contributions  
 
In order to give appropriate credit to each author of a paper, the individual 
contributions of authors to the manuscript should be specified in this section. 
An "author" is generally considered to be someone who has made substantive 
intellectual contributions to a published study. To qualify as an author one should 1) 
have made substantial contributions to conception and design, or acquisition of data, or 
analysis and interpretation of data; 2) have been involved in drafting the manuscript or 
revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) have given final approval 











- 184 - 
 
work to take public responsibility for appropriate portions of the content. Acquisition 
of funding, collection of data, or general supervision of the research group, alone, does 
not justify authorship. 
We suggest the following kind of format (please use initials to refer to each author's 
contribution): AB carried out the molecular genetic studies, participated in the 
sequence alignment and drafted the manuscript. JY carried out the immunoassays. MT 
participated in the sequence alignment. ES participated in the design of the study and 
performed the statistical analysis. FG conceived of the study, and participated in its 
design and coordination and helped to draft the manuscript. All authors read and 
approved the final manuscript. 
All contributors who do not meet the criteria for authorship should be listed in an 
acknowledgements section. Examples of those who might be acknowledged include a 
person who provided purely technical help, writing assistance, or a department chair 
who provided only general support. 
Authors' information  
 
You may choose to use this section to include any relevant information about the 
author(s) that may aid the reader‟s interpretation of the article, and understand the 
standpoint of the author(s). This may include details about the authors' qualifications, 
current positions they hold at institutions or societies, or any other relevant background 
information. Please refer to authors using their initials. Note this section should not be 
used to describe any competing interests.  
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All references must be numbered consecutively, in square brackets, in the order in 
which they are cited in the text, followed by any in tables or legends. Reference 
citations should not appear in titles or headings. Each reference must have an individual 
reference number. Please avoid excessive referencing. If automatic numbering systems 
are used, the reference numbers must be finalized and the bibliography must be fully 
formatted before submission.  
Only articles and abstracts that have been published or are in press, or are available 
through public e-print/preprint servers, may be cited; unpublished abstracts, 
unpublished data and personal communications should not be included in the reference 
list, but may be included in the text. Notes/footnotes are not allowed. Obtaining 
permission to quote personal communications and unpublished data from the cited 
author(s) is the responsibility of the author. Journal abbreviations follow Index 
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Please take care to follow the reference style precisely; references not in the correct 
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Preparing illustrations and figures  
Figures should be provided as separate files. Each figure should comprise only a single 
file. There is no charge for the use of color.  
Please read our figure preparation guidelines for detailed instructions on maximising the 
quality of your figures,  
Formats  
 
The following file formats can be accepted:  
 EPS (preferred format for diagrams)  
 PDF (also especially suitable for diagrams)  
 PNG (preferred format for photos or images)  
 Microsoft Word (figures must be a single page)  
 PowerPoint (figures must be a single page)  
 TIFF  
 JPEG  
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 CDX (ChemDraw)  
 TGF (ISIS/Draw)  
Figure legends  
 
The legends should be included in the main manuscript text file immediately following the 
references, rather than being a part of the figure file. For each figure, the following 
information should be provided: Figure number (in sequence, using Arabic numerals - i.e. 
Figure 1, 2, 3 etc); short title of figure (maximum 15 words); detailed legend, up to 300 
words.  
Please note that it is the responsibility of the author(s) to obtain permission from the 
copyright holder to reproduce figures or tables that have previously been published 
elsewhere.  
Preparing tables  
Each table should be numbered in sequence using Arabic numerals (i.e. Table 1, 2, 3 etc.). 
Tables should also have a title that summarizes the whole table, maximum 15 words. 
Detailed legends may then follow, but should be concise. 
Smaller tables considered to be integral to the manuscript can be pasted into the end of the 
document text file, in portrait format (note that tables on a landscape page must be 
reformatted onto a portrait page or submitted as additional files). These will be typeset and 
displayed in the final published form of the article. Such tables should be formatted using 
the 'Table object' in a word processing program to ensure that columns of data are kept 
aligned when the file is sent electronically for review; this will not always be the case if 
columns are generated by simply using tabs to separate text. Commas should not be used 
to indicate numerical values. Color and shading should not be used.  
Larger datasets can be uploaded separately as additional files. Additional files will not be 
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as supplied by the author. 
Tabular data provided as additional files can be uploaded as an Excel spreadsheet (.xls) or 
comma separated values (.csv). As with all files, please use the standard file extensions. 
Preparing additional files  
Although BMC Health Services Research does not restrict the length and quantity of data 
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movie files, or other information as additional information. These files can be uploaded 
using the 'Additional Material files' button in the manuscript submission process.  
The maximum file size for additional files is 20 MB each, and files will be virus-scanned 
on submission. 
Any additional files will be linked into the final published article in the form supplied by 
the author, but will not be displayed within the paper. They will be made available in 
exactly the same form as originally provided. 
If additional material is provided, please list the following information in a separate 
section of the manuscript text, immediately following the tables (if any): 
 File name  
 File format (including name and a URL of an appropriate viewer if format is 
unusual)  
 Title of data  
 Description of data  
Additional datafiles should be referenced explicitly by file name within the body of the 
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Gene names should be in italic, but protein products should be in plain type. 
There is no explicit limit on the length of articles submitted, but authors are encouraged to 
be concise. There is no restriction on the number of figures, tables or additional files that 
can be included with each article online. Figures and tables should be sequentially 
referenced. Authors should include all relevant supporting data with each article.  
BMC Health Services Research will not edit submitted manuscripts for style or language; 
reviewers may advise rejection of a manuscript if it is compromised by grammatical 
errors. Authors are advised to write clearly and simply, and to have their article checked 
by colleagues before submission. In-house copyediting will be minimal. Non-native 
speakers of English may choose to make use of a copyediting service.  
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 Use hard returns only to end headings and paragraphs, not to rearrange lines.  
 Capitalize only the first word, and proper nouns, in the title.  
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Introduction 
The restructuring of health financing policy in many countries has been intensified 
following the World Health Assembly Resolution adopted in 2005 by Member States 
to introduce or strengthen universal coverage policy.  
 
The goals of universal coverage are: to offer households financial risk protection 
(FRP) in order to avoid catastrophic spending and impoverishment from seeking 
care; to ensure equal access to health care based on relative need irrespective of 
ability to make health payments, social status or geographical location. This is 
achievable through increased prepayment for health care particularly through general 
tax revenue and mandatory health insurance, two health financing mechanism that 
promote universal coverage. 
 
Given their long experience as universal systems, OECD countries provide valuable 
lessons to low-to-middle income (LMICs) countries considering the introduction of 
universal coverage policy.  
 
This brief is based on an extensive review of experience in four OECD countries 
which have achieved or are attempting to achieve universal coverage. These 
countries were selected from different continents: Canada in North America, Mexico 
in South America, the United Kingdom in Europe and the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) in Asia. It attempts to draw out examples of „best practice‟ in relation to 
pursuing universal coverage. 
 
Policy implications 
Macroeconomic factors influencing revenue raising ability 
Government‟s fiscal policy and the rate of economic growth determine the amount of 
revenue that can be raised from the tax system to finance government expenditure. 
Growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) facilitates the mobilization of financial 
resources at the domestic level, mainly through general tax revenue, to finance 
public spending (Gottret, Schieber 2006). 
 
Canada and the United Kingdom implemented universal coverage laws during the 
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coverage was introduced during the economic transition from an agrarian to an 
export-led economy characterised by high employment rates. Social health insurance 
was introduced to meet the health needs of industrial workers in return for sustained 
productivity and continued economic prosperity (Son 1998).  
 
LMICs face challenges in mobilizing adequate general tax revenue due to low 
income levels and limited economic activity. For instance in 2006, government 
revenue accounted for 18 to 23% of GDP in LMICs compared with an average of 
54% in high-income countries (OECD 2007). The greater revenue raising ability in 
high-income countries is attributable to two main factors: formalization of the 
economy, which widens the tax base and contracts the informal sector; and efficient 
tax systems that guarantee compliance and minimal tax evasion. Given that high-
income countries derive a large proportion of general tax revenue from income taxes  
while in LMICs the emphasis is on indirect taxes, increasing taxation and excises on 
luxury items often only accessible by the wealthy, offers prospects for boosting 
general tax revenue (Gottret, Schieber 2006).  
 
When embarking on universal coverage, LMICs ought to take into consideration the 
low economic activity, inefficient tax systems and the large informal sector. These 
factors hinder the revenue generation ability of the tax system. Other financing 
mechanisms such as mandatory health insurance contributions can be explored to 
augment revenue for the universal system in the transition to universality to capture 
revenue from other sources. 
 
Financial incentives for the informal sector to make mandatory contributions 
Given its vastness and heterogeneity (poor and non-poor, unemployed and self-
employed) the informal sector is often poorly incorporated in SHI schemes. The 
experience of Korea and Mexico where mandatory contributions, account for a large 
share of public funding for health care, show that the financial sustainability of this 
financing mechanism is dependent on the size of the formal sector and the 
contribution rate. If the primary revenue base for mandatory insurance contribution, 
often formal sector workers, is not large enough to raise adequate revenue to 
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in place to subsidize coverage or encourage enrolment of the informal sector in 
mandatory prepayments schemes.  
 
One of the ways would be to  increase the contribution rate in order to boost revenue. 
However, high contribution rates result in informalization of the economy as formal 
sector workers may opt out of formal employment and it may also limit willingness 
to pay resulting in evasion. Low contributions rates therefore seem more appealing 
but too low a rate, limits the amount of pooled revenue to finance a broad range of 
health services and goods. The low contribution rate is one of the reasons that high 
co-payments are levied on insured services in Korea as the NHI fund is insufficient 
to cover a comprehensive benefit package that does not involve large co-payments. 
 
Given the disadvantages of high contribution rates and the unfeasibility of imposing 
high contribution rates, LMICs considering universal coverage ought to consider 
other avenues that may facilitate enrolment of the informal sector in mandatory 
schemes. Low income levels in LMICs countries because of low economic activity 
may hinder willingness to make high contributions; therefore, financial incentives 
are likely to offer better prospects for enrolling the informal sector in social 
insurance schemes. Financial incentives offered to informal sector workers under a 
„mandatory‟ contribution arrangement may encourage enrolment and avoid evasion. 
Evasion of the mandatory contributions was widespread prior to the launch of 
Seguro Popular in Mexico because of a weakly enforced „mandatory‟ contribution 
arrangement for the informal sector. The previous two schemes catering for the 
informal sector failed in extending full coverage especially to rural dwellers, the 
poor and other vulnerable population groups. Seguro Popular has been more 
successful in enrolling the informal sector because of its far-reaching financial 
incentives that include: full subsidization of contributions for vulnerable groups 
(funded from tax funds); preferential enrolment of the poor in the scheme; financial 
incentives for state-run health facilities  to improve service delivery since federal 
transfers are pegged on the number of Seguro Popular enrolees; and a 
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Multiple funding mechanisms and risk fragmentation  
Evidence from Canada and the United Kingdom show there is minimal risk 
fragmentation in the tax–financed single-payer systems, which are very large risk 
pools. These single payer systems have lower administration costs and tend to more 
efficient in fund management. These countries also have redistributive policies for 
the allocation of financial resources that equalize geographical inequities by moving 
funds from low to high-need pools based on indicators of relative need for care in the 
population. 
 
Multiple schemes are sometimes favoured in the transition to universal coverage, 
either mandatory and/or voluntary risk pooling. The risk pools can range from 
private prepaid plans catering for the affluent, employer-based SHI for formal sector 
workers and occasionally CBHIs for the informal sector (self-employed and low-
income earners). Risk fragmentation is inevitable in such a system because of the 
numerous small risk pools, which limits both income and risk cross-subsidies. A 
multi-payer system is for the most part characterized by gaps in coverage, revenue 
fluctuations in schemes and often by poor fund administration. This is the state of 
affairs at present in Mexico‟s multi-payer system social security system and in pre-
reform Korea prior to the integration reform.  The numerous formal sector schemes 
in Mexico vary in size, operate independently of each other and offer different 
benefit packages. Just like pre-reform Korea, the schemes are defined by type of 
employer. Some schemes have a higher number of enrollees and allow for greater 
risk sharing compared to others. 
 
The take home message for countries considering universal coverage through a 
multiple-payer system: minimize the number of risk pools and offer a similar 
statutory benefit package across schemes. This will ease integration when 100% 
population coverage has been achieved. Korea exemplifies the feasibility of 
integrating multiple schemes when the benefit package is similar, while Mexico 
illustrates the challenges of integrating multiple schemes that are diverse in the 
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Political transition and actors in providing a window of opportunity for reforms 
Political transitions opened windows of opportunity for pursuing universal coverage 
in all the OECD countries reviewed. While authoritarian regimes seeking political 
legitimacy introduced and enforced mandatory health insurance in Korea, it was 
democratization that opened a window of opportunity for the government to 
participate more in social policy. This paved the way for major health reforms 
(Kwon, Reich 2005) by allowing the input of vested interest groups (academics and 
civil society groups) in shaping the health policy process (Kwon 2009, Kwon, Reich 
2005). Universal coverage was achieved under egalitarian regimes, a political 
milestone in the democratic struggle (Kwon and Chen 2008). In Mexico, political 
activism led to the political liberalization of Mexico in 2000 ending the 71 year-reign 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Beltrán 2007). Some of the social 
reforms such as the implementation of universal coverage were passed after this 
historical political transition. In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party, a powerful 
political actor, endorsed the universal coverage law in the 1940s after the end of the 
Second World War (Savedoff 2004).  
 
The significance and contribution of political actors and transition in shaping health 
policy is irrefutable. Identifying and taking advantage of a window of opportunity 
during political transitions is fundamental to the transformation of social policy.   
 
The degree of social solidarity in society 
The public and private risk pooling mechanisms prevalent in high income countries 
arose from cultural, economic and historical decisions to devise prepayment 
mechanisms that ensure adequate financial risk protection for the population 
(Gottret, Schieber 2006). The unprecedented moves in support of income 
redistribution and public spending on social services such as education, health and 
social protection, reflect the degree of social capital in these countries. Social capital 
is a theoretical concept that relates to the level of social networks in a community 
and the extent of shared values (Wang et al. 2009). The impact of social capital 
particularly on population health differs across countries and continents due to 
diversity in societal norms and diverse belief systems. Evidence has shown that 
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inefficiently resulting in health inequalities (Wang et al. 2009, Raphael, Bryant 
2004).  
 
Societal beliefs and values cannot be overlooked when considering universal 
coverage. Universal coverage is modelled on the principle of social solidarity, which 
determines the willingness to introduce and maintain cross-subsidization especially 
from the rich to the poor or the healthy to the sick. For instance, Confucian family 
values in Korea which focus on family as a unit and not as individuals were taken 
into account when mandatory insurance was introduced by extending coverage to the 
insured‟s dependants. Additionally, Oriental medicine, a vital component of Korean 
culture was incorporated alongside contemporary medicine as an insured service 
(Son 1998). In the United Kingdom the devastation of the Second World War 
created a strong sense of nationalism and social compassion that surpassed social 
class stratification. The cross-class solidarity was fundamental in introducing the 
equity ideals the NHS was modelled on (Savedoff 2004). In Canada, the economic 
depression in the 1930s (Hirdes 2001) ignited a sense of responsibility by provincial 
governments to step in and offer financial protection to the masses that had lost their 
livelihoods. 
 
Society today is defined by a new world order, neo-liberalism, which entered the 
global arena in the late seventies (Navarro 2006). The promotion of individualism 
and consumerism at the heart of neo-liberalism has resulted in the widening of the 
social distance with adverse consequences for population health. Health inequalities 
that existed before the emphasis on neo-liberalism have been exacerbated (Coburn 
2000). 
 
 LMICs have been affected the most under the neo-liberal era. Private investors 
under the shield of the powerful ruling elite have dominated most economic sectors 
and are shaping social and economic policy in LMICs. Most of this has been through 
the liberalization of health markets. The working class, which was and still is a 
powerful voice in socially driven movements in high-income countries, is small and 
powerless in LMICs. In the United Kingdom and Canada, the working or middle 
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universal access to health care. Its dominance suppresses the relentless voice to 
privatize health care.  
 
Nonetheless, LMICs can still re-establish social solidarity through community 
initiatives such as CBHIs. The schemes create cohesiveness while creating a sense of 
„belonging‟ since these schemes are characterised by membership in a given 
geographical area and of similar religious or occupational (e.g substinence farming) 
affiliations. Moreover, CBHI schemes can serve as learning models for the 
promotion of social solidarity. However, government legislation is still needed to 
formalize the schemes and make enrolment compulsory if they are to form part of a 
mandatory insurance system (Bärnighausen, Sauerborn 2002). 
 
Create financial incentives for providers to cut costs and improve service 
delivery 
In typical labour markets, increases in the supply of manpower result in a decrease in 
earnings, loss of job security and low consumer prices. The health care market 
deviates from this norm, being plagued by supplier-induced demand (SID). This 
occurs because of the superiority in the knowledge base and clinical expertise of 
doctors; providers use this information asymmetry to influence consumer behaviour 
through over-utilization of unnecessary health care to maximize the provider‟s utility 
(Labelle, Stoddart & Rice 1994). 
 
SID is a contributing factor to the escalating health cost inflation in Korea where fee-
for-service is the main method of reimbursing for-profit providers. Since providers 
bear no financial risks under this payment method, they have little incentive to cut 
costs and instead induce demand, for often, unnecessary services. However, some 
reimbursement methods such as the diagnostic-related groups (DRG) shift the 
financial risks from patients to providers, and by so doing diminish the tendency to 
maximize provider utility. The recent endorsement of the DRG analogue method, 
Health-Resource Groups (HRG), for reimbursing inpatient care in the United 
Kingdom shifts the financial risk to providers. Conversely, salary and capitation 
payment methods have negative incentives to provide insufficient or inadequate care 
through under-servicing. However, the capitation service contract for GPs offers 
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ailments. This is a great motivation for GPs to improve the health outcomes of the 
population they serve. 
 
LMICs should adopt provider payment methods that shift greater financial risks to 
providers. Provider behaviour is also heavily influenced by a monopsonistic 
purchaser. Given that health systems in LMICs are likely to constitute multiple 
purchasers, supply-side regulation by government is needed to ensure efficiency in 
delivery of health services. 
 
Strengthening primary health care through a strong referral system 
The United Kingdom is a good example of how a strong referral system has ensured 
positive health outcomes while maintaining relatively low per capita expenditures. 
Organizing primary care providers in groups or trusts promotes efficiency in fund 
management with low spending per capita. Canada, Korea and Mexico do not 
operate an integrated system and there is an overreliance on hospital-based acute 
care rather than primary care leading to escalating health expenditures on health 
care.  
 
The primary care system in the United Kingdom also gives general practitioners 
incentives to practice in remote areas and underserved areas rather than setting up 
practices in urban densely populated areas (Light 2003). This is because GP 
practices in deprived areas receive more funds from central government.  
 
Health technology assessment (HTA) and economic evaluations.  
In this time of rapid technological advancements, treatments and pharmaceutical 
innovations, HTAs and economic appraisal are fundamental in ensuring only cost-
effective interventions, pharmaceuticals and technologies are covered by funds 
raised through mandatory prepayments schemes in a universal system. 
 
Given that universal systems can be single or multiple payer systems, single payers 
by way of their strong monopsonistic purchasing power are in a better position to 
control spending on technology, pharmaceutical and diagnostic aids. The United 
Kingdom provides a good example of how a single payer uses its monopsonistic 
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economic evaluations performed by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE). 
 
It would be useful for LMICs to draw on the evidence on the economic efficiency of 
health technologies and pharmaceuticals to maximize technical efficiency given the 
scarcity of resources.  
 
Control pharmaceutical expenditures  
Canada and the United Kingdom have relatively low pharmaceutical expenditure 
which can be attributed to stringent pharmaceutical regulation. Though the United 
Kingdom does not have a national formulary, the British National Formulary (BNF) 
lists all drugs licensed for use in the country as well as those not covered by the 
NHS. Additionally, primary care trusts (PCTs) and hospitals have their respective 
formularies that aid in prescribing (Busse et al. 2002). In this way the market share 
for high cost drugs is highly controlled through pricing policies. Canada uses price 
comparisons to set market prices for pharmaceutical products using average pricing, 
an approach involving comparing identical products in other countries with the 
underlying assumption that the prices in the comparator countries are fair. The 
United Kingdom allows free pricing of drugs but the Pharmaceutical Pricing 
Regulatory Scheme controls the overall profits a pharmaceutical company can make. 
This limits the sale of branded products to the NHS (Mossialos, Brogan & Walley 
2006), which in turn maintains low pharmaceutical spending. 
Pharmaceutical policy should be strengthened in LMICs to control most of the 
unwarranted spending. 
 
Regulation of private health insurance (PHI) 
Private insurance is highly regulated in the four countries reviewed. Stringent 
regulation of PHI by limits its scope of coverage to only health care services that are 
not publicly funded. This way preferential access to care is not given to those with 
PHI especially in health systems where there are long waiting lists for publicly 
funded services. PHI therefore does not facilitate queue-jumping since this source of 
private finance seldom flows to providers of publicly covered services. This is the 
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to the public payer. Secondly, tax rebates are not offered for PHI at least in most of 
the countries. 
 
LMICs can develop regulatory frameworks, through appropriate government policy, 
to ensure that private commercial insurers meet the equity goals of public insurance 
especially in this era of liberalization of health markets. While enforcements of 
regulation of PHI in LMICs may be challenging due to poorly developed 
institutional capacity (Sekhri, Savedoff 2006), laying a strong foundation for PHI 
stringent regulation at the onset of the transition to UC in LMICs, with defined roles 




LMICs face considerable challenges in moving towards universal coverage but can 
draw important lessons from the long experience in high income countries that run 
universal health system. Besides the prepayment financing mechanism chosen to 
promote universal coverage, either through general tax revenue or mandatory 
insurance contributions, contextual factors such as: the fiscal climate; politico-
economical factors; the degree of social cohesiveness; organizational structure of the 
health system and supply-side regulation; determine if the overall goals of financial 
protection and equity in access are achieved. For policymakers in LMICs, these 
factors cannot be overlooked and should be taken into consideration when 
embarking on the road to UC. 
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